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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JANUARY—APRIL 1944

THE SPARTAN RHETRA IN PLUTARCH LYCURGUS VI

B. THE EYNOMIA OF TYRTAIOS

(a) Plutarch's (Aristotle's?) Text

PLUTARCH concludes his chapter on the Rhetra (*Lyc.* 6) with six lines of Tyrtaios:

Φοίβου ἀκούνταντες Πυθανόθεν οίκαδ' ἔνεικαν¹
μαντεῖας τε θεοῦ καὶ τελέντ' ἔπεια
ἄρχειν μὲν βουλῆς θεοτυμήτους βασιλῆς
οίσι μέλει Σπάρτας ἵμερόσσα πόλις
5 πρεοβίντας τε γέροντας, ἔπειτα δὲ δημότας ἄνδρας
εὐθείας ρήτραις ἀνταπαμειβομένους.

These lines are quoted to confirm Plutarch's statement, that the Kings who added the last clause to the Rhetra (what I have called Clause III, *αἱ δὲ σκολιά*, etc.) 'persuaded the city [to accept this addition] on the grounds that it was part of the God's command'.² On Plutarch's view, the two Kings added an extra clause to an oracle, and justified their action by alleging that Delphi had authorized the clause. It is not immediately obvious how Tyrtaios' lines confirm this view. The Delphic utterance whose substance is given in lines 3–6 approximately paraphrases parts of Clauses I and II (*γερωσαν σὺν ἀρχαγέταις . . . τούτως εἰσφέρειν . . . δάμω δ' ἀνταγορίαν ἡμεν*), but where is Clause III? The burden has to be borne by the one word *εὐθείας*: 'the Kings and gerontes shall initiate business, the demos shall reply with *undistorted rhetrai*' or 'shall respond to the rhetrai *without distorting them*' (according as we take the dative *ρήτραις* as instrumental or as a true dative).³ If *εὐθείας* is given enough weight, the oracle which Tyrtaios quotes may be held to forbid the 'excessive amendment'⁴ against which Clause III was (in Plutarch's view) aimed.

Plutarch says that the two Kings who inserted Clause III were Polydoros and Theopompos. Plutarch no doubt believed (as Aristotle certainly did) that Lykourgos lived in the reign of Charilaos, Theopompos' grandfather: and everyone knew that Tyrtaios was two generations (at least) later again.⁵ With this sequence in his mind, what did Plutarch understand Tyrtaios to say? *Ἐπεισαν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ ταῦτα προστάσσοντος, ὡς πον Τυρταῖος ἐπιμέμνηται διὰ τούτων.* I take these words to mean: 'they persuaded Sparta to accept Clause III [καὶ αὐτοί, sc. as Lykourgos had persuaded her to accept Clauses I and II] on the grounds that it was part of Apollo's command [sc. of his oracle]: and Tyrtaios mentions the oracle as if this were so.'

Apollo's command is the Rhetra itself (which Plutarch regards as an oracle): the two Kings persuaded Sparta to accept Clause III on the grounds that it was really part of the original Rhetra (*δέ θεὸς ταῦτα προστάσσει: 'these are Apollo's words'*): the oracle which Tyrtaios quotes, in a metrical paraphrase, is the Rhetra, and the word *εὐθείας* shows that Tyrtaios accepted Clause III as part of it. This is what I

¹ MSS. have *οἱ τάδε ηκάν*: see below, p. 2, n. 5.

² The Greek is quoted in the following paragraph. ³ See below, p. 6.

⁴ Sc. a *σκολιά ρήτρα*: above, p. 63, n. 4. *Εὐθεία* is the formal opposite of *σκολιά*: the connexion of this notion with *προσθέτεις* and *ἀδραίτεις* (Plut. *Lyc.* 6, 7, cf. 13, 3) is illustrated by the lines of

Theognis referred to on p. 2, n. 1, *τόρπον καὶ στάθμης καὶ γνώμονος . . . εὐθύτερον*, etc.: *οὐτε τι γάρ προσθεῖται . . . οὐτ' ἀρελάν*, etc.

⁵ Tyrtaios fr. 4 (Diehl), *πατέρων ἡμεράν πατέρες*. At least two generations, since the words might be understood more indefinitely; cf. *Iliad* 20.308, *καὶ παῖδων παῖδες τοῖ κεν μετόπισθε γένεσσαν*.

conceive Plutarch's view to have been, and Aristotle's. If this is what they thought, we see at once why they thought the Rhetra was an oracle: Tyrtaios (as they understood him) explicitly calls it an oracle.

The morality of the two Kings' action is dubious: but does that matter?¹ Aristotle's reasoning, as I see it, was realistic: 'Clause III is obviously an afterthought, due to experience of how Clause II worked: oracles only contain afterthoughts if they have been tampered with: Tyrtaios regards Clause III as part of the oracle, so the two Kings must have succeeded in passing Clause III off as part of Apollo's words.' This would be logical,² if Aristotle understood Lykourgos to have been among the persons who ἀκούσαντες . . . ἐνεκαν (Tyrtaios, line 1). Did he?

Andrewes, in his paper *Eunomia* (C.Q. xxxii, 1938, 89 ff.), has argued that the usual ascription of these lines to the poem called *Eiropia*³ is right, since that poem's theme was the authority of the Royal Houses. In fr. 2 (Diehl := Strabo 8. 4. 10) we hear that 'Zeus has given Sparta to the Herakleidai, who led us from Erineos to Peloponnes', and in the lines before us (= fr. 3^b Diehl) we hear once more that Sparta is in the care of the Kings, and their authority is strongly emphasized. These considerations lead him (p. 99 f.) to suppose that the subject of ἐνεκαν in line 1 of our fragment is the Herakleidai: that in fact this fragment follows fairly closely on fr. 2. I find his argument persuasive, but I do not see that this need prevent Aristotle from thinking that Lykourgos was one of those Heraklids.⁴ The Herakleidai fetch the oracle after they have settled in Peloponnes (*οἴκαδε* shows this⁵), and are not necessarily the same persons, or the same generation, as led the migration from Erineos.⁶ And Lykourgos was a Heraklid.

¹ How grave a view might be taken of this we may judge from the lines of Theognis, 805-10: 'straighter than a straight-edge the man must be who receives oracles from Delphi: if you add to them, nothing can heal you: if you subtract, your guilt abides.' Cf. Herodotus 7. 6. 3: Onomakritos was evidently forgiven when they were all in trouble together. Theognis no doubt doth protest too much: but oracular business (one may say without cynicism) had to combine pedantic principles with liberal practice. The conjuror will insist that there is no deception. I need not remind my reader that I am not discussing real behaviour (I do not myself believe that the two Kings inserted a clause into an oracle): I am discussing whether Aristotle could allow himself to believe such a story. It seems to me no worse than Cicero's story of the Augur's Wink. The real behaviour which I do posit, and which may not be 'straighter than a straight-edge', is Tyrtaios'. Did he really know that the Pythioi had in their archives an ancient oracle such as he cites? I do not feel censorious about it.

² It is true that stories of oracles are often illogical. Plutarch speaks (doesn't he?) as if Lykourgos wrote the Rhetra himself (6. 4, *προστύχομεν* and esp. *ἀνήψε*: see above, p. 63, top): we could suppose that Aristotle here thinks of the Rhetra as oracle-inspired rather than as Apollo's own words: the inspiring oracle, then, was said by the two Kings to involve Clause III, and Tyrtaios confirms their claim. This saves

Aristotle's moral niceness at the cost of his consistency: it still goes some way towards explaining why he thought (still on Tyrtaios' evidence) that the Rhetra was an oracle; only his notion of what he meant by an oracle becomes more hazy. Plutarch's sentence introducing Tyrtaios' lines could no doubt be understood in other ways still, once we allow this haziness.

³ The poem is so named by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1307^a) and Strabo (8. 4. 10). Aristotle quotes no lines, Strabo quotes fr. 2 (Diehl). Our lines (fr. 3^b, Diehl) as well as Diodoros' variant (fr. 3^a) are very frequently ascribed to it by modern scholars.

⁴ Andrewes thinks it does, because of the plural (p. 99), and that this is why in Diodoros' version the opening couplet is rewritten. But why must Lykourgos, more than any other inquirer, go without company?

⁵ *Οἴκαδε* is an emendation, the MSS. have of *τάδε νικάν*: sc. *Οἴταδε* ἐνεκαν? 'They brought the oracles from Delphi to Oita.' This might suit very well with Aigimios and his sons, but will not suit at all, I think, with e.g. the tense of *μελεῖ* in line 4. We must accept *οἴκαδε*: the Herakleidai (or whoever) did not bring their oracles with them when they came from central Greece, but fetched them thence after they had settled in Sparta.

⁶ Not necessarily: I mean that Aristotle was not bound to infer this, though apparently Hellanikos and Xenophon did. See pp. 4-5.

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(b) Diodoros' (*Ephoros'?*) Text

Lines 3-6 are quoted, with small variations, and preceded and followed by lines which Plutarch does not give, in the *Excerpta de Sententiis* from Diodoros (= Diodoros 7. 12 Vogel). A marginal hand adds, *η Πυθία ἔχρησε τῷ Λυκούργῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὕτως*: if we may trust it (and why not?) Diodoros took the poem to contain the gist of an oracle given to Lykourgos at Delphi. These are rather muddled waters: the excerptor is careless, and Diodoros himself is only too likely to have blunted his original, and that original (whether Ephoros or another) might prove to confuse rather than help the search for Aristotle's meaning. But since we cannot ignore it, I give the text as reported by Boissevain, *Excerpta de Sententiis* (Berlin, 1906), p. 273. The lines are not written as verses: the ten verses (down to πό of πόλει) take up five lines of the ms., and the heading (*η Πυθία*, etc.) is written in the margin against these five lines:

η Πυθία ἔχρησε τῷ Λυκούργῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὕτως

δέ (sic) γάρ ἀργυρότοξος ἀναξ ἐκάρεργος Ἀπόλλων
χρυσοκόμης ἔχρη πίονος ἐξ ἀδύτου
ἀρχει μὲν βουλῇ (sic) θεοτυμήτους βασιλῆς
οἵτι μέλει Σπάρτης ἔχερόσσα (sic) πόλις
5 πρεσβυγενεῖς δέ γέροντας ἐπειτα δὲ δημότας ἀνδρας
εὐθείν (sic) ρήτρας ἀνταπαμειβομένους
μιθεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἔρδειν πάντα δίκαια
μηδέτι ἐπιβουλεύειν τῆδε πόλει
δῆμοι τε πλήθει νίκην καὶ κάρτος ἐπεοθαί
10 Φοίβος γάρ περὶ τῶν ὡδῶν ἀνέφηνε πόλει

I have given all the MS. vagaries (so far as Boissevain reports them), to indicate that we need not shrink from correction.² We must clearly write *(δέ)* in line 1, *βουλῆς* in 3, *ιμερόσσα* in 4, *εὐθείας ρήτρας* in 6 (the last three from Plutarch). I have little doubt we should also write *τε* for the first *δέ* in 5, as Plutarch has, and *δέ* for *τε* in 9: and if so, it seems misplaced fastidiousness to refuse to write *μιθεῖσθαι τε* in 7, or in 8 to decline to mend the metre (on the ground that the unmetered text is meant to be unmetered).

Should we harmonize the versions of Plutarch and Diodoros? If at all, only with great care. The opening couplet of course cannot be harmonized at all; I agree with Andrewes (p. 99) that Diodoros' opening has the more obvious signs of tampering (due perhaps, as Andrewes suggests, to someone who was embarrassed by the plural *ἀκούσαντες* in Plutarch's first line—whether or no he wished to make it more Lykourgan). We may therefore fairly suspect the two closing couplets: suspect, I mean, that they have been added by the same poet who wrote the new opening. Andrewes goes farther, and questions whether they even belong to Diodoros' poem.³ I cannot agree. Diodoros' poem was no doubt poor botched stuff, not very coherent: but I do not doubt that it purported to give the substance of the Rhetra.⁴ It gives it with

¹ The *marginale* has been unfairly spat upon. Dindorf writes: *codex inepit η Πυθία, etc.: quasi sequentia, quae sunt Tyrtaei, sint Pythiae.* I question how much of the lines is Tyrtaios': certainly their relevance for Diodoros was that they contained an oracle.

² Our corrections may be wrong, but I am protesting against e.g. Andrewes p. 98 'the dubious gain . . . is not worth the cost of a triple corruption in two lines of Diodorus . . .' Andrewes's resolve to think badly of Diodoros' verses makes him unduly tender towards the

Excerpta's text.

³ 'Certainly the last couplet must be separated from lines 3-6. The hexameter . . . amounts to a direct denial of the doctrine' of these lines (p. 98). He then quotes Meyer's view that the couplet is part of a polemic against Tyrtaios, 'but the collocation is more probably a pure accident' (ib. note 2).

⁴ 'The resemblance even of Diodorus' lines to the Rhetra has been greatly exaggerated' (Andrewes, p. 97). Captain Andrewes allows me to say he would withdraw this, and is now prepared

a special emphasis: it stresses the end of Clause II and means to leave no doubt of the sovereignty of the Demos.

Diodorus got it perhaps from Ephorus. Whether he did or not, we are in a different stream from Aristotle and Plutarch: I must desert for a while the pursuit of Aristotle's opinion, and (for concreteness' sake) state my own.

(c) *Tyrtaios and the Rhetra*

I believe the Rhetra was an act of the Spartan ekklesia: it was enacted during the crisis which succeeded the Messenian Revolt:¹ its main topic is the *sciscendi ratio*, it defines how the State shall enact its laws: and what most needed definition was the nature and status of the Gerousia (sc. the 'Kings in Council'). Tyrtaios lived to see this crisis, and his poem *Eunomia* was written at that time. The poem was, as Andrewes has shown, a call to loyalty: 'the loyalty which Tyrtaios strove to revive was loyalty to the kings, and with this simple remedy he hoped to cure all Sparta's troubles' (Andrewes, p. 97). The poem, therefore, maintained that the powers reserved by the Rhetra to the 'Kings in Council' were so reserved in conformity with an ancient oracle. 'The Heraklids led us from Erineos to Peloponnese, and Zeus has put Sparta in their care: they also received (long ago?) an oracle from Delphi which gave them, with their Council, certain powers'—powers which are well summarized in a phrase of Plutarch's (*Agis* 11. 1) as *τὸ κράτος ἐν τῷ προβούλευεν*, *Probouleutic Control*.

This 'ancient oracle' enjoins of course substantially the same procedure as the ekklesia had just enacted (or was preparing to enact), though no doubt Tyrtaios showed his bias: he was less concerned with the *κράτος* of the Demos than with the probouleutic *κράτος* of the Kings and Council, and inside that Council he was less interested in the Gerontes than in the Kings. But for all the difference of emphasis, the poem and the Rhetra both enjoin the same procedure: and the likeness did not escape the notice of those (Aristotle, etc.) who were concerned with Sparta's constitution.

If you thought the Rhetra was Lykourgan, it was necessarily much earlier than Tyrtaios. Aristotle (for example) put Lykourgos in the early eighth century² and probably put Tyrtaios latish in the seventh: the Kings Polydoros and Theopompos about half-way between them. Consequently, whereas Tyrtaios was really a contemporary of the Rhetra and in his poem seeks to reinforce it with the authority of his ancient oracle, in the eyes of Aristotle and other ancient writers the Rhetra is many generations older than Tyrtaios, and the ancient oracle which he quotes is the Rhetra itself.

The poem was no doubt eagerly consulted. Andrewes has suggested (p. 99 f.)

to think that even Plutarch's lines refer to the Rhetra. This will (as I see it) involve the abandonment of his view that the Rhetra is later than Tyrtaios (his p. 96 with notes 1, 2, and 3: see my next note). That view is not fundamental to his paper, whose clear thinking has done much to elucidate Sparta's constitutional problems.

¹ Aristotle Pol. 1307^a speaks of the danger of great wealth and great poverty coexisting, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται. συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὅπερ τὸν Μεσογριακὸν πόλεμον. This was the occasion of Tyrtaios' poem. Andrewes argues from this (p. 96, note 1) that Tyrtaios wrote *during* the war; that ἐν

τὸν Μ. πόλεμον must mean this, since it is an instance of ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, sc. he takes συνέβη τοῦτο as equivalent to τοῦτο γίνεται. I understand Aristotle to say that these things come into being (γίνεται) during wars: this will not prevent the crisis being precipitated (συνέβη) after the war is over. I would put the war (and Tyrtaios) a little later than he does (cf. p. 1, n. 5 above), and the Rhetra a little earlier.

² Plut. *Lyc.* 1. 2, confirmed by the *Epitome* of the Λακ. πολ. (= Arist. fr. 611, § 10). Lykourgos is contemporary with the First Olympiad. Theopompos will be two generations from Lykourgos, Tyrtaios two from Theopompos.

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that it was used by Hellanikos, who drew the inference that the constitution was the work of the early Kings; so he left Lykourgos out of it.¹ Xenophon, with his harmonizing mind, clings to Lykourgos, but his date for him, *κατὰ τὸν Ἡρακλεῖδας*, is no doubt from this poem.² Aristotle was sure, on other grounds,³ of Lykourgos' date: and if (as I believe) he understood Lykourgos to be among the persons who *ἀκούσαντες . . . ἔνεικαν*, he did not let this disturb his date; and indeed it is not likely that the poem was *explicit* about how soon (how many generations) after the arrival in Peloponnese the Herakleidai went to Delphi: though it seems to have *implied*, to Hellanikos and Xenophon, that it was pretty soon. The solid fact was that Tyrtaios ascribed the chief organs of the constitution (Kings, Gerousia, Ekklesia) to an oracle which by this time was ancient. This suited all the theories: I should rather say, all theories were made to suit *this*.

The theorist who evolved Diodoros' version was apparently less scrupulous than most, since he tampered with the poem. He may have been King Pausanias, who seems to have tampered with Herodotus' oracle about Lykourgos:⁴ we now know that he attacked Lykourgos⁵ and appealed beyond him to Delphi, whose intentions Lykourgos corrupted. The new opening couplet eliminates the consultants and leaves only Apollo: I do not see, however, why King Pausanias should want to stress the sovereignty of the Demos, and I am very content to leave Diodoros' poem anonymous.

Plutarch's version is better than Diodoros'. When we have to choose, sc. in the opening couplet, I have no doubt that Plutarch is nearer the original poem. I am less certain that Plutarch was right to break his quotation at the participle *ἀνταπαμειβομένος*. Jacoby has suggested to me possible parallels to such a participle where we should expect an infinitive (or a finite verb), e.g. Archilochos fr. 1

*εἰμὶ δ' ἐγώ θεράπων μὲν Ἐρναλίου ἄνακτος
καὶ Μουσέων ἐρατόν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος.⁶*

That may be: but Diodoros, once we write *μνθεῖσθαι τε*, provides the infinitive we look for, and bad as his lines seem, I am unwilling on that ground only to deny that the original poem may have continued in some such way. The last couplet, however, which does not seem specially corrupt, does seem both bad and tendentious: while fairly sure that it is part of Diodoros' poem,⁷ I do not wish to give it to Plutarch's, nor to the original Tyrtaios.

¹ F. gr. Hist. 4 F. 116.

² Xen. *Λακ.* Πολ. 10. 8: quoted by Plutarch, *Lyc.* i. 5-6. The fact that Xenophon uses the phrase *κατὰ τὸν Ἡρακλεῖδας* as an *indication of date* shows that Plutarch is right in understanding him to mean the first Heraklidai to settle in Sparta.

³ The synchronism with *Ol.* I: see p. 4, n. 2. This rested on the *diskos*, which (*pace* Meyer and Jacoby) I am confident he did not discover for himself but owed to Hippias.

⁴ King Pausanias' pamphlet containing many oracles is mentioned by Ephorus, F. gr. Hist. 70 F. 118: Ed. Meyer suggested that the oracles in Diodoros 7 are from this source, via Ephorus (*Forsch.* i. 215 ff.). Though Meyer misconceived the pamphlet's tendency (see next note), I believe his main thesis still stands. Diodoros 7. 12 (Vogel) gives Herodotus' oracle (1. 65) with two extra lines.

⁵ Pausanias' pamphlet was *κατὰ τῶν Λυκούργου νόμων*, the *κατά* being guaranteed by the Vatican palimpsest of Strabo: Ehrenberg, *Neugründer*, p. 14.

⁶ Or does *ἐπιστάμενος* depend on *εἰμὶ* understood? An unusual construction; cf. *Od.* 4. 231. In Solon fr. 1 (Diehl) line 52, *ξυλλέγεται βλοτον* can be understood more easily. I know no satisfactory explanation of the participle *φυλασσόμενον* in Theognis 806 (the passage referred to on p. 2, note 1 above). It is tempting to put the two couplets into *recto* and write *ἐπεσθε* for *ἐπεστα*:

*ἄρχετε μὲν βουλῆς, θεοτίμητοι βασιλῆς,
οἰστὶ μέλει Σπάρτης ἵμερόσασ τόλις,
πρεσβύτεροι τε γέροντες ἐπεσθε δέ, δημόται ἄνδρες,
εἰδεῖταις ρήτραις ἀνταπαμειβόμενοι.*

⁷ As against Andrewes and Meyer: above p. 3, n. 3.

(d) *εὐθεῖας ρήτραις*

Tyrtaios' poem, in which Delphi enjoins a procedure practically identical with the Rhetra's, persuaded Aristotle that the Rhetra was a Delphic oracle. Yet the word *ρήτρα* occurs in the poem, and cannot there possibly mean 'oracle': it must mean either an 'act' of the *ekklesia* or a 'bill' laid before the *ekklesia*. After the Kings and Councillors have initiated business, the Demos takes its turn

εὐθεῖας ρήτραις ἀνταπαιειθομένοις.

This could mean either

(a) 'replying to the straight proposals', or (if we choose to lay on *εὐθεῖας* the weight which Plutarch did) 'replying to the proposals without distorting them': or else

(b) 'replying with straight enactments', or (with emphasis on *εὐθεῖας*) 'replying with enactments which have not been distorted'.

The latter does more justice to *ἀνταποίαται* in Clause II, but I do not know if Tyrtaios wanted to do it justice. The difference is not very substantial: 'responding to proposals' and 'responding with enactments' may come to very much the same thing (once we rid ourselves of an *a priori* belief in the passiveness of the response), and we shall see that the word *ρήτρα* is capable of bearing either sense.

It is curious that with this phrase before him, Plutarch in his *Lycurgus* seems to have believed not only that the Rhetra was an oracle, but that the word *ρήτρα* meant 'oracle'. In ch. 13 he gives three more Rhetra, and adds (13. 11) *τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα νομοθετήματα ρήτραις ὀνόμασεν ὡς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νομιζόμενα (κομιζόμενα?) καὶ χρηματὸς ὄντα*.¹ In the *Agis* on the other hand he uses the word *ρήτρα* frequently, and always (I believe) in the sense of a proposal laid before the Spartan Gerontes or *ekklesia*. Did he intentionally restrict his usage here to 'proposal' rather than 'enactment'? He may have done, though in fact he elsewhere uses both *νόμος* and *ψήφισμα* in the same way as he uses *ρήτρα* here, and I think this distinction was not material to him.²

If he did make the distinction he was certainly wrong, since long before he wrote Spartan documents use the word to mean 'enactment',³ and long before the events which he describes the sense 'enactment' is found in contexts which point us to Sparta: the Army of the Ten Thousand,⁴ the Spartan colonies of Herakleia and Tarentum;⁵ Olympia.

I need not discuss the Olympian Rhetra (*ρητραι*) in detail. The most famous,⁶

¹ This doctrine is repeated in *de Pyth. or.* 19 (*Mor.* 403 E), *αἱ ρῆτραι δὲ ὡν ἐκόσμησε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολειάν Λυκούργος ἐδόθησαν αὐτῷ καταλογάδην*. Elsewhere (e.g. *Mor.* 227 B, C) he treats the three Rhetra as utterances of Lykourgos himself.

² See Appendix I.

³ *IG* v, fasc. 1, no. 20, lines 2-3: no. 1498, line 12.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 6. 6. 28. The youthful Wilamowitz (*Hom. Uni.*, 1884, p. 280, note 16) said it here means *Vertrag*, and in a Spartiate's mouth. Ed. Meyer corrected him over 50 years ago (*Rh. M.* xlivi, 1887, p. 82, note 2) but Liddell and Scott still say it means *covenant*. The man is probably an Arkadian, though he is pleading against a Spartiate defendant and before a Spartiate judge. The *ρῆτρα* he refers to is an

enactment of the Army: it is given in 6. 6. 2, *εἰ τις χωρὶς ἀπελθὼν λάθοι τι, δημόσιον ἔδοξεν εἶναι*.

⁵ The *Tabulae Heracleenses*: *IG* xiv, 645, Schwyzer, *Dial. gr. ex. ep. pot.* 62: early Hellenistic. Lines 95-185 are headed *συνθῆκα διονυσος χωρων*: if the parties do not fulfil their obligations, they shall be answerable: 145-6 *κυνολογος εσσοντας κατ τας ρητρας και κατ τας συνθηκας*, in accordance with the laws and with this agreement: 151 *κυνολογος εσσοντας κατ τας ρητρας*. The usage in this Spartan colony is confirmed for Tarentum by Photius s.v. *ρῆτραι*: *συνθῆκαι λόγοι δημοκούλαι* (this is the Homeric use). *Ταραντῖνοι δὲ νόμον και ολον ψηφίσματα, παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίου ρῆτρα Λυκούργου νόμος, ὡς ἐκ χρημάτων τιθέμενος* (Plutarch's view).

⁶ *IvO* 2: Schwyzer, op. cit. 409.

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which regulates the rights of private vengeance, is certainly an enactment of the Elean State, and probably some of the others¹ are, though one (see below) is a treaty. These are all headed *a φράτρα*: in another (whose heading is lost) *a φράτρα a δαμοσια* is mentioned,² probably an 'enactment of the sovereign power', but just possibly a judicial pronouncement. *Δημο πρήγμα* are mentioned in the famous Chian law of about 600 B.C.,³ again most probably 'enactments of the Demos', though the context is too fragmentary to forbid their being judicial pronouncements. These examples, of which the last at least is very early, agree in showing that the word can mean a 'pronouncement of the Demos' quite as well as a 'proposal laid before' the Demos.

One of the Olympian Rhetrai is not an enactment of the Elean State, but a treaty between Elis and Heraia.⁴ This comes close to the sense which it bears in its oldest literary use, the 'private treaty' which Odysseus proposes to Eumaios in *Odyssey* 14. 393 ff.

ἀλλ' ἀγε νῦν ρήτρην ποιησόμεθ'. αὐτὰρ ὅπισθε
μάρτυροι ἀμφοτέρουσι θεοί

Eumaios believes Odysseus to be a stranger, and has disbelieved his news: the stranger answers, 'Very well, let us make a *bargain* or *treaty*: if my words prove true treat me well: if false, then put me to death.' 'No, thank you,' says Eumaios. This sense of a sealed covenant or treaty, with the Gods as witnesses hereafter, with contingent forfeits, etc., comes pretty close to the Elis-Heraia treaty. If they had put it in writing in some sacred place which Eumaios controlled as Elis controlled Olympia, it could be appropriately headed *a φράτρα Ευμαιοι καὶ τοι ξενοι*.

These senses, a treaty between two parties, an enactment of a Demos, possibly a pronouncement of a Demos, cohere very well. A Rhetra is a form of words to which a number of people agree. When it means 'proposal', it is a form of words to which a number of people are asked to agree. I would not deny *a priori* that it might mean a 'divine pronouncement': but this sense would not cohere with the others so well, and (outside the misunderstandings of the 'Lykourgan' Rhetrai) it does not in fact occur.

APPENDIX I: *ρήτρα* IN PLUTARCH'S *Agis*

Plutarch uses the word of the Rhetra of Epitadeus in *Agis* 5, and in *Agis* 8-11 of the so-called Rhetra of Agis (really Rhetra of Lysandros?—see below). In both cases it means 'proposal' rather than 'enactment', but I do not know whether the distinction is material for Plutarch.

Agis' Rhetra was never enacted. Epitadeus' was enacted, but is called *ρήτρα* in the pre-enactment stage: 5. 3, *ρήτραν ἔγραψεν* = 5. 4, *ἴδιον εἰστίνευκε τὸν νόμον*: Plutarch then proceeds *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι . . . δεξάμενοι καὶ κυρώσαντες*, etc. So he cannot be said to use the word to mean 'enactment' as specifically opposed to 'proposal'. Nevertheless, he uses it as equivalent to *νόμος* (5. 3-4, quoted above), and his usage here corresponds to his use of *ψήφισμα* in the Attic lives: *ρήτραν ἔγραψεν*⁵ corresponds to *γράψει ψήφισμα*, *Pericles* 17. 1, cf. 10. 4, 30. 2, 30. 3, 32. 2, 37. 3, *Them.* 10. 4, 11. 1.

¹ *IvO* 10, 11: Schwyzer 414, 415.

² *IvO* 7: Schwyzer 412.

³ Schwyzer 687 A; Tod, *Selection*, 1.

⁴ *IvO* 9: Schwyzer 413.

⁵ This means 'he drafted a motion': in 9. 1, the motion has been drafted, but not yet accepted by the Gerontes. In the Spartan document of Hellenistic date, *IG* v, fasc. 1, No. 1498, the same words are used of the publication on stone of the enacted law: *ταῦ δὲ πρήγματα ταῦτα γράψαντες* *εν σταλαν λιθιναν ανθεντας τοι βιδυσιοι*. Ehrenberg,

Neugründler 18, calls the phrase *ρήτραν γράψειν* an 'Ungenauigkeit der späteren Autoren,' as if a Rhetra could not be written down. Why ever not? They wrote them on bronze at Olympia, from a very early date. In the archaic inscription from Mykenai, *IG* iv. 493, Schwyzer 98, the words *κατα* (i.e. *κατ τα*) *γερμένεια* no doubt refer to something which was in writing, as *ειρημένον* in Thuc. 5. 39. 3 and *ειρητο* in 5. 46. 2 certainly do.

The constitutional issue in the *Agis* is obscured by emotion, and by the exasperating *lectio incerta* in 8. 1, *εἰσέφερε δι' αὐτοῦ* or *δι' ἑαυτοῦ* or *εἰσέφερεν ἑαυτοῦ*. According to the first reading, Lysandros is the proposer of this Rhetra, according to the other two Agis is. I think the former more likely, because it gives sense to *ψηφισαμένους* in 12. 1: *ψηφίζεσθαι* there cannot mean anything else (so far as I see) than what it certainly does in *Pericles* 13. 11, 20. 2, 24. 1, 25. 1, and perhaps *Alcib.* 35. 1, viz. *ψήφισμα γράφειν* (a usage which the Lexica do not recognize). If so, the King apparently cannot (in the 3rd century B.C.) introduce a Rhetra himself, but must get an ephor to do it (8. 1). Epitadeus also is probably ephor when he introduces his (5. 3, however we explain the tense of *ἔφορενσας*).

The ekklesia apparently meets and discusses the bill before the Gerousia has voted on it: 9. 1, whilst the Gerontes are still disagreeing Lysandros summons the ekklesia; 9. 5, the King speaks in this ekklesia; 10. 1, Leonidas opposes him, etc.; then, 11. 1, the Gerontes reject it. This may be a symptom of revolution. Yet we get the same impression in the famous ekklesia of Hetoimardas (or Etymaridas?)¹ early in the fifth century: Diod. 11. 50. The Gerousia assembles (50. 2), and the ekklesia also assembles (50. 3), and it seems that a great many voices were heard in it. When the issue seemed practically decided, Etymaridas, one of the Gerontes, succeeded in overpersuading both Gerousia and ekklesia (50. 6).

In both these ekklesiae there seems to be plenty of talk. So there is in the ekklesia of Stheneleidas in Thuc. 1. 79-87, and though the speakers whom he reports are officials, it is gratuitous to suppose that they had to be. The moral story in Aeschines 1. 180 relates how a notorious evil liver almost carried the Spartan ekklesia with him,² till one of the Gerontes intervened. It is not quite clear that the *νεάτεροι καὶ τῶν ἀλλων οἱ πολλοί* in Diodoros (l.c. 50. 3) actually made speeches, but they evidently made themselves heard; and what of *τῶν μὲν πλεόνων* in Thuc. 1. 79. 2?

APPENDIX II: V. BLUMENTHAL IN *Hermes*, lxxvii, 212 ff.

I have not yet been able to see Treu's paper in *Hermes*, lxxvi (1941), in which he proposes, as I do, to read *ἀνταγορίαν* for the *ανγορίαν* of the MSS. So far as I can judge from v. Blumenthal in *Hermes*, lxxvii (1942), 212 ff., which I have seen, he believes, as I do, that the Spartan ekklesia had the power of discussion and amendment, and bases this belief (as I do) on Plutarch's paraphrase, e.g. *ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιοῦντα τὴν γνώμην*. 'Dass letztere Deutung nicht richtig sein kann, weil sie dem Wesen der entscheidenden Wehrmännerversammlung widerspricht, scheint mir evident', says v. Blumenthal, and he takes Plutarch's *ἐκτρέποντα*, etc. as 'imperfecta de conatu', and in Clause III reads *σκολιῶν* (gen. plur.) *ἐρέοιτο* (from *ἔραματα*): 'shows a fondness for crooked rhetra'. The *a priori* argument seems to me most dangerous, and indeed circular: the question is, was the Spartan ekklesia a Wehrmännerversammlung of the type v. Blumenthal imagines, or not? The Rhetra I believe shows us an ekklesia with a probouleutic council: I do not understand how such an ekklesia, if it may not discuss or amend, ever comes to have a *σκολιῶν ῥήτρα* before it (above, p. 64 top).

I have already answered v. Blumenthal's objections to the form of the word *ἀνταγορία* (above, p. 64 with note 3 and esp. note 4): a gnat to his camel.³ A small

¹ Cf. the variants *Ἐτοιμοκλῆς* (Paus. 3. 13. 9) and *Ἐτυμοκλῆς* (*Anth. Pal.* 7. 720): the latter form recurs in Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 22 and 6. 5. 33.

² He made a set speech (*δημηγοροῦντος*), and unless he is one of the Gerontes, his *γνώμη* must be an amendment (*κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην ψηφίζεσθαι μελλόντων*).

³ He would read *δαμάδων γορίαν*: the latter

word will be part of the Illyrian ('hylleisch') element in Laconian Greek, and correspond to *heriam* in an Illyrian inscription. For *δαμάδων* see Hesychios *δαμάδης*: the word is exactly apt, and I think possibly the true original is *δαμάδ-δ(ων) ἀν(τα)γορίαν*. The asyndeton will be an advantage.

point: that the context like that notion

point: he translates *ἀνταγωνέων* in Arist. *Frogs* 1072 as 'widersprechen', and he implies that this is how Treu takes it, whereas in Pindar, *Pyth.* 4. 156 it is 'wechselreden'. The context in Aristophanes is quite indecisive: I imagine what he has in mind is episodes like that recorded by Thucydides, 8. 86. 9; perhaps that actual incident. If so, the notion of 'counter-proposal' is apt enough, both here and in Pindar.

[*To be concluded*]

H. T. WADE-GERY.

NEOPHRON AND EURIPIDES' MEDEA

SINCE it is only natural that lovers of a great poet's work should seek to defend their favourite from the charge of plagiarism, most of the scholars who have discussed the problem of the relationship between the *Medeas* of Neophron and Euripides have, whether consciously or unconsciously, approached their task in no very impartial spirit. Yet the prejudice against acknowledging Euripides' indebtedness to his predecessor is an unreasonable one, for a great tragedy or a great work of art of any kind must be aesthetically judged without regard to its forerunners. For instance, we do not think any the worse of *Antony and Cleopatra* or of its author when we notice that 'The barge she sat in, like a burnish'd throne', etc., and many other fine passages in that play are taken almost verbatim from Sir Thomas North.¹ If we bear in mind then that whatever the result of our inquiry it will not affect adversely the reputation of Euripides' great work, we cannot fail to be impressed by the tenuous nature of the arguments by which scholars have convinced themselves of the chronological priority of Euripides' *Medea* as against Neophron's.

The discussion has its basis in the statement of the anonymous *Argument* to the Euripidean play, *τὸ δράμα δοκεῖ* (sc. ὁ Εὐριπίδης) ὑποβαλέσθαι παρὰ Νέόφρονος διασκενάσας, ὡς Δικαιαρχος . . . τοῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος βίου καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ὑπομνήμασι. The arguments which have been advanced to refute this statement are for the most part traditional: I will deal with them as they have been set forth by Mr. D. L. Page in the introduction to his excellent edition of the *Medea*, pp. xxx ff.; for he has stated the case as well as it can be stated and I expect his book to be in the reader's hand.²

It is at once clear that later exaggerations in Diogenes Laertius, ii. 134,³ and Suidas, s.v. *Νεόφρων*, of this statement of Aristotle and Dicaearchus do not concern us, and, as Page concedes, p. xxxi, 'Suidas' statement that Neophron first introduced παιδαγωγοὺς καὶ οἰκετῶν βάσταν [into Tragedy] is not at all disproved by showing that Suidas later confuses Neophron with Nearchos, a tragedian of the fourth century'. We cannot agree, however, that because the word *δοκεῖ* is prefixed to the anonymous writer's remark and *φασίν* to the later exaggerations of Diogenes Laertius and Suidas, the story was therefore *never* more than an opinion. That the anonymous writer together with Diogenes and Suidas found it difficult to believe the statement which they read in Aristotle⁴ is no indication whatsoever that Aristotle himself had any doubts about it. Again, although we may admit that the *Hypomnemata* were not written by Aristotle himself but by a pupil working under his direction (and this is not at all certain), it still remains the case that a fourth-century scholar believed Euripides' *Medea* to be a magnificent adaptation of a play by Neophron. It becomes clear that only the most convincing of arguments should shake our faith in the explicit statement of Aristotle's pupil when we remember that he had complete records to draw upon, and that, if Neophron had lived in the fourth century, he would

¹ Norwood, *Greek Tragedy*, p. 22, reminds us that Aeschylus probably drew heavily on Phrynicus. Herodotus was deeply indebted to Hecataeus, and in this case, as in Neophron's, great efforts used to be made to prove the fragments of Hecataeus forgeries so as to save the originality of Herodotus!

² For bibliography see Louis Séchan, *Études sur la tragédie grecque dans ses rapports avec la céramique*, Paris, 1926, Appendix VII, pp. 592 ff. Neophron's priority has been maintained by

Weil, Bergk, Decharme, Haigh, Croiset, Norwood, etc.; Euripides' by Paley, Wilamowitz, Nauck, Christ-Schmid, Séchan, Méridier, and many others. The latter have predominated in numbers in recent times.

³ From Antigonus of Carystus, according to Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, xv, 1880, 487.

⁴ Dicaearchus probably, but not certainly, had it from Aristotle. I do not press the point that he may be an independent authority.

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have been this writer's elder contemporary or at any rate a playwright well known to him and to the Athenians at large by repute, for Neophron was the author of 120 dramas. Such arguments are not forthcoming.

Before discussing those which have been put forward, we may emphasize the curious fact that Euripides' *Medea* requires only two actors, while all his other plays, except the non-tragic *Cyclops* and *Alcestis*, demand the third actor who was being used by Aeschylus and Sophocles long before the first production of the *Medea* in 431 B.C. It would seem then that Euripides modelled his *Medea* on some earlier play which was written at a time when the third actor was not yet generally employed. This argument is not of great weight in itself, but it does not stand alone.

We may dismiss as irrelevant Page's observation that 'it is remarkable that this Neophron, a great Tragic innovator and author of 120 plays, should have disappeared leaving hardly a trace behind him'. How many poets who contributed more to the development of Tragedy than Neophron have disappeared without leaving any trace at all behind them? But we need merely recall the parallel case of Aristarchus, who like Neophron was a Peloponnesian—he came from Tegea. Apart from living for more than a century, Aristarchus wrote seventy tragedies, and in the words of Suidas, s.v., *πρῶτος εἰς τὸν νῦν μῆκος τὰ δράματα κατέστησεν*. Whatever the meaning of these words, it is clear that Aristarchus too was a considerable tragic innovator: yet we know as little of him as of Neophron.¹ However, this is not relevant to Neophron's date.

'It is strange', Page goes on, 'that Aristophanes of Byzantium, while stating that neither Aeschylus nor Sophocles had treated the subject, omits all reference to Neophron.' But Aristophanes in his *Arguments* never mentions the treatment by a minor tragedian of a theme dealt with by one of the three great tragedians. When composing an *Argument* to a play by one of the latter, he contents himself with saying that the subject was or was not treated by the other two.²

Again, Parmeniscus tells us that there was a *πολυάκος λόγος τῶν φιλοσόφων* to the effect that the Corinthians paid Euripides five talents to ascribe the murder of Medea's children not to their ancestors, as one version of the story had done, but to Medea herself. This story, says Page, pp. xxv, xxxi, 'was certainly based upon the supposition that Euripides, not Neophron, was the first to transfer the murder of the children from the Corinthians to Medea'. This absurd tale is an insecure foundation upon which to build a theory, and those who were foolish enough to believe and spread it are not likely to have been authorities on fifth-century literary history. But, even so, I think that Page's conclusion is not necessarily correct. The *πολυάκος λόγος* might equally well have had its origin in the fact that, at a time when Athenian relations with Corinth were strained, Euripides was criticized for following Neophron's version of the myth in which this transference was first made, when other and more politically suitable versions were open to him.³ The critics thought that he should have followed a version in which the Corinthians were guilty. It need not be considered surprising that a comparatively minor poet such as Neophron made this very effective innovation. Such a version would be more likely to originate in Corinth than anywhere else, and Sicyon, the birth-place of Neophron, is very near to Corinth. Furthermore, Neophron was also responsible for the new and peculiar version according to which Jason died by hanging.⁴ There is no evidence that Euripides introduced

¹ Somewhat fewer lines of his have survived—twelve as against twenty-four of Neophron's. Yet his reputation was long maintained: Ennius translated his *Achilles* and Plautus refers to it in the first line of the *Poenulus*.

² See his *Arguments* to Aeschylus, *P.V.*, *Eum.*, Sophocles, *Ant.*, *Phil.*, Euripides, *Alc.*, *Med.*,

Phoen., *Orest.*, *Bacch.*

³ Verrall, ed. *Medea*, London, 1881, p. xxii n., says that the author of the story 'did not know, or did not choose to notice, any predecessor, and presumed a similar ignorance in his public'.

⁴ Scholiast on *Medea* 1387. Euripides disliked it, 1386 ff.

any novelty into the legend of Medea and Jason, although this is inferred by nearly all of those who deny the priority of Neophron's play. There is such evidence in Neophron's case.¹

Let us now turn to the linguistic objections which have been considered as definitely proving that the extant fragments of Neophron could not possibly have been written in the middle of the fifth century. In the second fragment Page objects to *θεοστυγές*. 'Why *θεοστυγές*? Not because the hatred of the gods has much special relevance to the sentiment. It has not.' Medea applies the adjective to her own strength by which so fearful a crime is soon to be committed. The murder of her children is surely hateful to the gods, and the fact that it is so is stressed again and again by Euripides.² The fact that *θεοστυγές* is 'a fine word, sufficiently uncommon, full of sound and fury',³ is relevant to a discussion of Neophron's poetic talents, but cannot help us to decide his date.⁴ In the next two arguments Page again appears to assume that the fact that Neophron's poetry is bad is sufficient indication that he cannot have written in the middle of the fifth century B.C. These arguments are, first, that the use of *θυμός* as the object of the verb in frag. ii.12 when it has been in the vocative in vv. 1 and 9 is awkward, and, secondly, that the last five lines of frag. ii are very poor poetry, while the last two lines in particular are extremely artificial both in phraseology and word-order. I do not agree that the lines are as bad as Page would have us believe. But apart from that, there is no reason for supposing that bad technique, bombast, and other poetic vices were unknown in the Periclean or any other age. Page terms the use of *μέγας* with *θυμός* in frag. ii. 11 'intolerable', but it seems to me to be simply a recollection of the frequent Homeric application of *μεγαλήτωρ* to that same noun, e.g. *Od.* ix. 299, v. 298, etc. In the first fragment, says Page, the form *ἡλυθον* does not occur in the iambic trimeters of tragedy until the later plays of Euripides, and then very rarely. He cites *Electra* 598 (c. 413 B.C.). But it also occurred in Euripides' *Cresphontes*, frag. 451, which Wilamowitz dates to 430-427 B.C.⁵ If this dating be accepted, there is no objection to its appearance in Neophron a few years earlier. The construction 'ἡλυθον μαθεῖν' has few parallels in Attic'. This is the case, but the construction has never been questioned in Sophocles, *O.C.* 12 *μανθάνειν γὰρ ἡκομεν . . . ἀν δ' ἀκούσωμεν τελεῖν*.⁶ Also, the 'uncommon' pause after the first syllable in v. 2 is found in a papyrus fragment of Sophocles' *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος*, v. 15, which Page himself dates to some year before 438 B.C.,⁷ and in *id. O.T.* 546 (with this same word *σοῦ*) and *ib.* 1448; its origin can be seen as far back as Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 483. Next, we are told that *πρὶν η̄* is not found elsewhere in Attic poetry. I would submit that it is not found in Neophron either. In the mid-fifth century he used the Attic alphabet and wrote *ΙΙΠΙΝΕΣΑΜΑΡΤΕΙΝ* which can be *πρὶν ἔξαμαρτεῖν* as well as *πρὶν η̄ ἔξαμαρτεῖν*. The phrase found in our text then is nothing more than that common source of error, a false transliteration, and if we write *πρὶν ἔξαμαρτεῖν* we cannot be accused of emending the text to suit our own ends. The word *βροχωτών* is remarkable, but, as Page admits, it is no more so than *αὐλωτός*, which occurs only in Aeschylus, frag. 326. 2, and *δακτυλωτός*, Ion, frag. 1. 2. Finally, 'φεῦ at the end of the thirteenth line (of frag. 2) is a metrical anomaly: no other iambic line in Greek Tragedy admits a full stop before its last syllable'.⁸ This may be admitted.⁹

¹ Frag. 3. See also p. 14.

² *Medea* 850, 1323 f., 1328, 1383. He may have had Neophron's adjective in mind when writing vv. 1372-4.

³ Page, p. xxxiv.

⁴ The word is used without excessive sound or fury in Euripides, *Troades* 1213, where Hecuba applies it to Helen who had caused the death of

Hector, cf. Aeschylus, *Cho.* 635 *θεοστύγης*.

⁵ *Hermes*, xi, 1876, 302. Note that Theon admitted *καρῆλυθεν* in Sophocles, *Ichneutae* 177.

⁶ See Jebb's note, and Nauck, *Tragorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, p. 730.

⁷ *Greek Literary Papyri*, Loeb edition, p. 14.

⁸ Page, p. xxxv.

⁹ But see next footnote. E. B. Cade, *C.Q.*

We may now sum up the arguments which have been advanced to refute the statement of Aristotle or his pupil. *Perhaps* the use of $\eta\lambda\nu\theta\nu$ in an iambic trimeter and certainly the full stop before $\phi\epsilon\nu$ tell against the dating of Neophron's fragments to the middle of the fifth century. It is quite obvious that these two points, even if we admit them both and are content to ignore the fact that simple emendations can remove them,¹ are far too weak to outweigh the explicit statement of the Aristotelian *Hypomnemata*, which were written in the fourth century when complete records of tragic performances were at hand.

If it is argued that the occurrence in twenty-four lines of so many unusual points of language and metre constitutes a ground for suspicion (apart from the fact that individually most of them can be paralleled or explained away), we may reply, first, that fragments of equal length from other lost tragedians provide analogous cases, and secondly, that Neophron was educated in the Peloponnesian tradition of tragic writing at Sicyon and hence it is not surprising that his work should show many points of difference from that of the three great Athenian tragedians.

If Neophron wrote in the fourth century, *pace* Page, p. xxxii, it is not easy to see how the mistake in the *Hypomnemata* could have arisen. Euripides' *Medea* was a famous play in the fourth century,² and if a pupil of Aristotle's had suddenly announced that it was largely filched from Neophron, his astonishing statement would surely have been checked and corrected at once. This seems all the more likely when we remember that a fourth-century Neophron would have been a contemporary of some of the readers of the *Hypomnemata*, and they would remember the first production of his play; it is fair to argue that they would have spotted the chronological blunder at once and it would never have gained currency.

Nor can the statement in the *Hypomnemata* have been a fiction designed to detract from Euripides' achievement, for such a fiction would only have been attempted in the poet's own lifetime. Why should anyone bother to devise such a forgery late in the fourth century when Euripides and the resentment which his work aroused among his contemporaries had long since passed away? Page, p. xxxii, adduces the $\pi\omega\lambda\alpha\kappa\omega\lambda\omega\gamma\omega$ as a parallel to such a forgery. But the $\pi\omega\lambda\alpha\kappa\omega\lambda\omega\gamma\omega$ appears to have originated from a criticism which was actually levelled against the poet in 431 B.C. It had its roots in reality, and the kernel of truth which it contained was simply developed and exaggerated by posterity. But there is no reason to believe that such a forgery as we are considering had any connexion whatever with the controversies which raged round Euripides in his lifetime. If the statement in the *Hypomnemata* is a forgery, the slanderous tale which it contains can only have originated in the fourth century. The two cases are therefore not parallel.

One might further argue that Euripides' *Medea* was so great a play and so popular in the fourth century that no playwright at that time would have had the audacity to adapt it so drastically and with such poor results as Neophron is said to have done. *Medea* was indeed a common title even after 431 B.C., and plays of that name were written by Euripides the younger, Dicaogenes, Carcinus, Diogenes, Biotus, and the writer of Nauck, *frag. adesp. 6*.³ Practically nothing is known of any of these plays,

xxxv, 1941, 87, n. 4, finds that the ratio of resolved feet in Neophron's trimeters (1 resolved foot to 24 trimeters) seems to indicate 'a fairly early date'. But so little of Neophron has survived that the point cannot be pressed.

¹ In frag. 1 Herwerden suggested $\eta\theta\epsilon\lambda\omega\lambda\omega\lambda\omega\omega$ $\mu\alpha\theta\epsilon\nu$. In frag. 2, 13 Meineke proposed $\epsilon\kappa\omega\lambda\omega\lambda\omega\omega\omega\omega\omega$ $\delta\alpha$ or $\epsilon\kappa\omega\lambda\omega\lambda\omega\omega\omega\omega\omega$ $\delta\eta$ with $\phi\epsilon\nu$ *extra versum*.

² Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1461^b20, and the evidence of the vases in Page, pp. lvii ff.

³ The dramatic fragment discussed by Pickard-Cambridge in J. U. Powell, *New Chapters in Greek Literature*, 3rd Series, p. 152, provides no parallel, being from a comedy or satyric drama. Comedies called *Medea* were also written by Cantharus, Antiphanes, Eubulus, and Strattis.

but what indications there are show that they tended to differ very considerably from Euripides.¹

An important consequence of accepting the chronological priority of Neophron's *Medea* is that the criticisms levelled even in antiquity² against the Aegeus scene in Euripides' play are shown to be misplaced. The lack of motivation for the king's appearance is the point to which objection has been taken. Wilamowitz³ seeks to defend Euripides by suggesting that his *Aegeus* preceded his *Medea*, and so the audience which went to the theatre to see the latter knew beforehand that Aegeus was in some way connected with the heroine. (In fact, the date of Euripides' *Aegeus* is altogether unknown.) Page⁴ writes 'for all we know, this meeting between Aegeus and Medea was a part of the tradition, known to the audience and awaited by them'. The objection to these views is that no evidence is adduced to support them. But if we accept the statement of the Aristotelian *Hypommata*, Neophron's *Medea* provides just that evidence which these scholars require (frag. 1). Euripides' audience had seen that play and therefore knew to expect Aegeus in Euripides' drama. This is why there is little need for Euripides to justify the king's arrival: Neophron had already done that for him. In my opinion then the following innovations in the *Medea* legend are due to Neophron: (i) the ascription of the murder of the children to Medea herself;⁵ (ii) Jason's death by hanging; (iii) the meeting between Aegeus and Medea at Corinth.

I would submit therefore that Neophron's *Medea* was produced before Euripides' for the following reasons: (i) the writer of the Aristotelian *Hypommata* says so; (ii) it is otherwise difficult to see how his error could have originated; (iii) it is unlikely that a fourth-century Neophron would produce a very inferior adaptation of one of the greatest and most famous plays in existence at the time; (iv) this view explains why Euripides uses only two actors at so late a date as 431 B.C.; (v) there is little or nothing in the surviving fragments of Neophron which could not have been written before 431 B.C., and (vi) this view refuses to credit Euripides with poor and uncharacteristic craftsmanship in the Aegeus scene, a criticism from which he can otherwise be rescued only by postulating an element in the *Medea* legend, viz. a meeting with Aegeus in Corinth, which is not known to have existed before he wrote.⁶

Where so much is uncertain we may be pardoned for hazarding a guess. We can scarcely deny Séchan's observation⁷ that the fact that Euripides' great play was awarded the last prize was partly due to his adoption of a form of the legend which denied the guilt of the Corinthians, for in the spring of 431 Athenian feeling against Corinth was running very high. Was his comparative failure also due in part to the fact that the judges were aware of his profound debt to Neophron?⁸

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¹ See Schol. Eur. *Med.* 167; Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 1400b9; Nauck, op. cit., p. 825 (Biotus), id., p. 838.

² Aristotle, *Poetics*, l.c. The criticisms have by no means been refuted in recent times; for instance, the great dramatic power of the scene and its integral relation to what follows in the play are irrelevant to the fact that the king's arrival is a 'blatant coincidence', as Grube, *The Drama of Euripides*, p. 187, calls it; contrast Grube, l.c., Page, p. xxix, Murray, Translation of the *Medea*, p. 89, etc. ³ *Hermes*, 1880, xv, 482.

⁴ p. xxix; cf. Murray, l.c.

⁵ There was, of course, an older version according to which Medea killed her children unintentionally, Page, pp. xxii ff.; Séchan, op.

cit., pp. 589 ff. Séchan's argument, p. 593, that Neophron gave some reasons for Aegeus' appearance in Corinth because Euripides had already been criticized for not doing so, is unusually desperate.

⁶ To the fact that he is adapting an earlier play I am inclined to attribute the confusion which exists about the children's exits and entrances during Medea's great soliloquy at vv. 1021 ff. See Neophron, frag. ii. 10 f., and e.g. Page, n. on 1053; Grube, op. cit., p. 160 f.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 589 f.

⁸ I cannot believe with Professor Murray, Translation, p. x, and elsewhere, that the play's failure was due to its 'extreme originality'.

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ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ (Aristotle fr. 592 R.)

PLUTARCH, *Aet. Graec.* 5, p. 292 B: "Τίνες οι παρ' Ἀρκάσι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις χρηστοί;" Λακεδαιμόνοι Τεγεάταις δαλλαγέντες ἐποίησαντο συνθήκας καὶ στήλην ἐπ' Ἀλφεῶ κοινὴν ἀνέστησαν, ἐν ᾧ μετὰ τῶν ἀλλων γέγραπται Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ μὴ ἔξειναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν. ἔξηρούμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτο φησι δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι βοηθέας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζοντις τῶν Τεγεατῶν.¹

The interpretation of Aristotle rests probably on the euphemism for the departed as *οἱ χρηστοί*, the 'good people', which may have been an old one and which was certainly common in his own time.² It has been challenged by Latte who curtly denies that the common euphemism can be used to explain the use of the word in the treaty. Comparing the phrase *κρεθθαί οπαὶ καὶ λειστοὶ* in the laws of Gortyn he himself takes *χρηστός* as the verbal adjective from *χρῆσθαι*: *χρηστός* is ὁ χρῆσθαι ἔξεστιν ὁ ἀν τις θέληι, 'the man against whom everybody is allowed to act as he likes', who 'is liable to be killed by any man', the 'outlawed', whom the legal terminology of Athens in the sixth century calls *ἄτυκος*.³ Neither interpretation of the word *χρηστός*, let alone of the phrase *χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν*, makes sense in the treaty. As the text stands,⁴ the object (*Μεσσηνίους*) is the same for the positive clause ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας and for the negative μὴ ἔξειναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν; and obviously the subject (*Τεγεάται*) is the same too. Now nobody will believe that the Spartans were so solicitous for the welfare of their hated enemies as to enjoin the Tegeatans not to kill them, while insisting on their being driven from the town. If they ever showed humanity it was certainly not in their relations with their Messenian slaves. What the Spartans could demand in regard to them, and what in fact they demanded, is apparently this: Tegea shall 'drive out' the Messenians and 'make no use of them'. That this is the real meaning of the term becomes clear from an archaic inscription from Dreros (Crete)

αδ' εφαδε πολι· επει κα κοσμησει, δεκα φετιον τον α/γτον μη κοσμεν· αι δε κοσμησειε, οπε δικασιε, αφτον οπηλει διπλει καρτον / ακρηστον ημεν, ασ δοοι, κοτι κοσμησειε, μηδεν ημην.

¹ Repeated in a shorter form *Aet. Rom.* 52, p. 277 BC καὶ γάρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς Ἀρκάδων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίον συνθήκας γεγράφθαι φησι μηδένα χρηστὸν (edd.; μηδὲν ἄχρηστον MSS.) ποιεῖν βοηθέας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζοντις τῶν Τεγεατῶν, ὅπερ εἶναι μηδένα ἀποκτιννύνα. The context here favours the opinion that Aristotle's explanation rests on the equation *χρηστός* = dead. I am not sure that Hesych. (s.v. *χρηστός* οἱ καταδεδηκασμένοι: *χρήσιμοι*) refers to the treaty.

² For the antiquity of the euphemism and its local use see Rohde, *Psyche*², ii, p. 346 f., followed by Liddell-Scott, *Add.*, p. 2110 and, curiously enough, by Ehrenberg (*C.Q.* xxxvii) p. 16, 'the *χρηστός* is the man to be used (in this case to be ill-used)'. The parallel adduced by Latte, of course, proves nothing for the meaning of the simple adjective *χρηστός*.

³ Latte, *Heiliges Recht*, 1920, p. 114, followed by Liddell-Scott, *Add.*, p. 2110 and, curiously enough, by Ehrenberg (*C.Q.* xxxvii) p. 16, 'the *χρηστός* is the man to be used (in this case to be ill-used)'. The parallel adduced by Latte, of course, proves nothing for the meaning of the simple adjective *χρηστός*.

⁴ And personally I believe it to be sound: the two clauses stood side by side in the treaty,

forming one article. Aristotle, after rendering it correctly, though in the language of his own time, proceeds to interpret the phrase *χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν* used in this article. I am concerned here exclusively with a possible linguistic explanation of this phrase, the meaning of which cannot be simply deduced from a true or an alleged meaning of the adjective *χρηστός*. But if my explanation should be right, it does away with the possibility (which seems to underlie Halliday's translation) that Aristotle joined with *καὶ* two different articles of the treaty, and that the second article referred in reality to the *λακωνίζοντες τῶν Τεγεατῶν* who are to be protected from the wrath of such of their fellow-citizens as belonged to the anti-Spartan party. I shall not specify here why this possibility seems very improbable to me, nor shall I go into the question how Aristotle understood the whole article, of which he only explained one phrase, and whether he (or his collaborator) cared to understand it at all.

Here the first editors, following Latte, understood *ακρηστον* as *ἄτιμον*, outlawed. But Ehrenberg in commenting upon this law¹ states (rightly, as it seems to me) that if the guilty *kosmos* is to be neither killed nor banished, but to become *ἄχρηστος*, we should adhere to the real meaning of the word: the *ἄχρηστος* is obviously 'an unemployable, useless at least in the political sense . . . a citizen of minor rights'. If this is so it follows that *χρηστός* in a treaty between Sparta and Arcadia ought to mean the exact contrary: the *χρηστός* is *employable* in the political sense, he is a citizen, and *χρηστονίς ποιεῖν* must mean 'to make somebody a citizen'. The second clause forbids Tegea to make the Messenians citizens. That is the really important provision in the treaty from the point of view of Sparta, a real help also to their adherents in Tegea, for the Messenians as citizens would of course have swelled the ranks of the anti-Spartan party. It is useless to speculate whether Sparta thought that the observance of the negative clause would admit of an easier and more complete control than that of the positive one. In any case it is understandable that they made sure and followed up the positive and comprehensive clause by the negative and special one.

F. JACOBY.

OXFORD.

¹ loc. cit.

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QUINTILIAN ON PAINTING AND STATUARY

THE clear affinity between Quintilian's art-criticism (xii. 10. 3-9) and the comparable portions of Pliny's *Natural History* has often been remarked. Pliny's principal sources for his chapters on art have long been recognized as going back through Varro to the great third-century critics, Xenocrates of Sicyon and Antigonus of Carystus, the latter of whom worked over Xenocrates' treatise and incorporated new material of his own; an earlier Greek source was Duris of Samos, on whom Antigonus drew for the anecdotic element in his tradition. The careful work of many patient scholars has been successful in disentangling to a considerable extent the characteristic contributions of these and other authorities to Pliny's medley of information.¹ On the other hand, Quintilian's incursion into the same field seems never to have been studied independently, but only incidentally to research on the Plinian sources. The purpose of this paper is to examine Quintilian's contribution afresh; my indebtedness to earlier studies, in particular to those of Robert, will be readily apparent.

Pliny's history of art is an episode in his great encyclopaedia, which has gained its place as a logical pendant to his chapters on metals, species of earth, and precious stones (Sellers, p. xiii). Quintilian writes, here as always, as the Professor of Rhetoric, tabulating in a compact and concise form the most useful material for his students, to illustrate the progress of oratory by that of the fine arts. It is clear from the elder Seneca that the traditions connected with the great classical painters and statuaries formed part of the regular rhetorical *supplex* of the declaimers (e.g. *Contr.* viii. 2, x. 5, where the theme centres round Phidias and Parrhasius respectively); so too Pliny (xxxv. 73) speaks of Timanthes' painting of Iphigenia as *oratorum laudibus celebrata*, a statement which is borne out both by Cicero (*Orat.* 74) and Quintilian (ii. 13. 13). Illustrations from the fine arts are often introduced by Cicero (*de or.* iii. 26; *Brut.* 70; *Orat.* 5, 74, 169, etc.), but in some respects Quintilian's criticism shows an advance upon that of Cicero; for Quintilian does attempt to draw parallels between individual artists and individual orators, a method in which, as Sandys points out (*Orat.* introd. p. lxxiii), he is far closer to Dionysius of Halicarnassus and to Demetrius than to Cicero. This passage of book xii must be carefully read in the light of the sections immediately following if the full elaboration of Quintilian's comparative method is to be appreciated: in § 10 the early orators (Cato, Gracchus, etc.) are expressly termed primitives like Polygnotus or Callon; next, Crassus and Hortensius represent the 'media forma', corresponding (by implication, not name) to Zeuxis and Parrhasius, Myron and Polyclitus; Quintilian continues 'tum deinde efflorescat non multum inter se distantium tempore oratorum ingens proventus', and proceeds to name fifteen orators of the late republican and early imperial periods, each with his appropriate label—this passage plainly corresponds closely to § 6 'floruit autem circa Philippum . . . pictura praecipue', where the great fourth-century painters are listed similarly, each duly labelled; lastly, Quintilian names Cicero, 'out of chronological order, as surpassing in his unique versatility even Euphranor, who is mentioned in § 6 (likewise

¹ A convenient and fascinating summary appears in the introduction to Jex-Blake-Sellers, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London, 1896); see also A. Furtwängler, 'Plinius und seine Quellen über die bildenden Künste' (*Jahrb. f. class. Philologie*, Suppl. Bd. ix, 1877-8), C. Robert, 'Archäologische Märchen aus alter und neuer Zeit' (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, Heft x, 1886), F. Münzer, 'Zur Kunsgeschichte des Plinius' (*Hermes*, xxx, 1895), A. Kalkmann, *Die Quellen der Kunsgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin, 1898).

out of chronological order) as 'et ceteris optimis studiis inter praecipuos et pingendi fingendique idem mirus artifex'.¹

Quintilian frankly gives his opinions as second-hand. Thus he begins (§ 3) 'primi, quorum quidem opera non vetustatis modo gratia visenda sint, clari pictores fuisse dicuntur Polygnotus atque Aglaophon'; and this is followed by similar expressions (*traditur, ut existimant, ut eum [sc. Parrhasium] legum latorem vocent*), which are even more obtrusive in his account of the statuaries (*a plerisque tribuitur palma, deesse pondus putant; videtur, dicitur, dantur, creditur, adfirmant, reprehenditur*). His method is, in fact, similar to his practice in his literary criticism; cf. x. 1. 54 'Panyasin . . . putant in eloquendo neutrius aequare virtutes', and the other examples collected by Peterson in his introduction (p. xxxiii). Once he gives what purports to be his own view, when, in speaking of those who pose as connoisseurs in preferring the early primitives to the great masters of a later day, he says (§ 3) 'proprio quodam intellegendi, ut mea opinio est, ambitu'. This may well be 'subtle satire' (Sellers, p. xxxi), but it is not necessarily an original contribution of Quintilian's own, for, as can be seen by comparing such passages as Cic. *Orat.* 169 and Pliny, xxxiv. 6, it is an observation in the conventional rhetorical tradition. It would be interesting to know how far the remark genuinely reflects the attitude of his own day; contrast Petronius, 88 (of Nero's time) 'noli ergo mirari, si pictura defecit, cum omnibus dis hominibusque formosior videatur massa auri quam quicquid Apelles Phidasque, Graeculi delirantes, fecerunt'.

It is now possible to detect the ultimate origin of some of these criticisms, with the help of those scholars who have done the same service to Pliny. That one of Quintilian's authorities is Xenocrates of Sicyon is at once obvious from the phrase used of Zeuxis and Parrhasius in § 4, *plurimum arti addiderunt*: this is a typically Xenocratic turn (cf. Pliny, xxxiv. 65, xxxv. 58, 79, Sellers, p. xxvii ff.); while his opening remark 'primi . . . clari pictores fuisse dicuntur' belongs to the same type of criticism (cf. Pliny, xxxv. 58, of Polygnotus, 'plurimumque picturae primus contulit', id. xxxiv. 54, of Phidas). Xenocratic also is the reference to *luminum umbrarumque ratio* (§ 4; cf. Pliny, xxxv. 29; Sellers, p. xxxiv); it is noteworthy, however, that Quintilian attributes to Zeuxis this important discovery, which is assigned by Plutarch (*glor. Ath.* 2) to Apollodorus (cf. Pliny, xxxv. 60)—Quintilian's complete neglect of Apollodorus is an uncanny commentary on that painter's own epigram on Zeuxis, 'artem ipsis ablatam Zeuxim ferre secum' (Pliny, xxxv. 62). Again, Parrhasius' special service to art, according to Quintilian, is his nicety in contour (§ 4 'examinasse subtilius lineas traditur'); so too Pliny says of him, in a demonstrably Xenocratic passage (xxxv. 67) 'primus symmetrian picturae dedit . . . confessione artificum in lineis extremis palmam adeptus'.

These Xenocratic judgements are few, and, as we shall see in considering Quintilian's account of statuary, the views of another critic, involving an entirely different artistic standpoint, are followed in the greater part of these sections. That other critic is Antigonus, as Robert saw. Traces of his influence can, I think, be recovered from Quintilian by applying to these judgements the same criteria as have been used with such success in the study of Pliny. If we turn now to the list of fourth-century painters in § 6, it is at once evident that a different tone prevails; there is no discussion of technicalities, but each artist is given a succinct label: 'cura Protogenes, ratione Pamphilus ac Melanthius, facilitate Antiphilus, concipiendis visionibus, quas φαντασίας vocant, Theon Samius, ingenio et gratia, quam in se ipse maxime iactat,

¹ 'Si Euphranor fut le plus érudit des artistes, Cicéron se montre le plus artiste des lettrés' (E. Bertrand, *Études sur la peinture dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1893, p. 320—a work in which

Cicero's interest in art is discussed with the sympathy and understanding peculiar to French scholars).

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¹ See Wil
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Apelles est praestantissimus.' The method followed here is again that which is familiar from the literary criticism of book x, and which appears also in the account of oratory (§§ 10-11) to which this passage is a prelude; it is clearly the approved tradition of the rhetoric schools, and Quintilian has either himself drawn up these various *virtutes*, or taken them over from some other rhetorical source; in either case, each label represents in summary form judgements that can probably be traced back to Antigonus.

Antigonus was the author of a work entitled *ἱστοριῶν παραδόξων συναγωγή*, and of various biographies of philosophers, which were much utilized by Diogenes Laertius; he had himself studied philosophy, and he was a scholar who among varied interests was familiar with the technical treatises composed by several of the great painters; under Attalus and Eumenes he did much to influence the revival of Attic sculpture at Pergamum.¹ These studies and leanings have enabled scholars to trace to him a number of passages in Pliny; and his fondness for anecdote, as shown in the *Lives of the Philosophers*, has thrown light on others, although it has been proved that he drew a large part of his anecdotic material from an earlier writer, Duris of Samos (fourth century B.C.). Quintilian's art-criticism must now be examined in the light of these facts.

Quintilian ascribes to Protogenes the specific *virtus* of *cura*, and for Apelles he claims *ingenium et gratia* on the evidence of that artist himself. Now Pliny mentions Apelles' own claim to *χάρις* in a passage (xxxv. 79) which probably goes back to the painter's own treatise on art (Sellers, p. xl), and this is immediately followed by an anecdote in which Apelles is said to have admired the *cura* shown in one of Protogenes' paintings (here unnamed, but from Plutarch, *Demetr.* 22 and Aelian, *V.H.* xii. 41 we can infer that it was the Ialysus): the first of these passages betrays the influence of Antigonus, who introduced into his treatise references to those artists who wrote upon their art, and the second may either be ascribed to the same type of source or else be derived from the anecdotic element supplied to Antigonus by Duris (cf. Apelles' *benignitas* towards his rival Protogenes, Pliny, xxxv. 88; Sellers, p. lviii). Quintilian's text, summarizing as it does the special qualities of both painters in words that echo Pliny's language, may therefore be justifiably stated to show also the influence of Antigonus. *Ingenium*, coupled by Quintilian with the *gratia* of Apelles, further suggests a type of criticism originating in a school of thought familiar with philosophical-rhetorical concepts; so Pliny (xxxv. 73) speaks of the *ingenium* of Timanthes, with reference to his painting of Iphigenia *oratorum laudibus celebrata*,² and Pausanias (v. 10. 8, cf. Robert, p. 51) similarly remarks *'Ἀλκαμένους ἀνδρὸς ἥλικιαν τε κατὰ Φειδίαν καὶ δευτερεῖα ἐνεγκαμένου τοφίου ἀγαλμάτων.*

Quintilian characterizes Pamphilus and Melanthius as distinguished for their *ratio* ('scientific theory'); now we know from Diogenes Laertius, iv. 3. 18, that it was Antigonus who preserved the tradition that Melanthius wrote a treatise *περὶ ζωγραφικῆς* (Sellers, p. xxxviii), while Pliny tells us (xxxv. 80) that Apelles admitted his inferiority to Melanthius in *dispositio*, a statement probably derived from Apelles' own treatise of which Antigonus made use; and of Pamphilus, Melanthius' master, Pliny states (xxxv. 76) that he was 'primus in pictura omnibus litteris eruditus, praecipue arithmeticā et geometriā, sine quibus negabat artem perfici posse', words which, as Sellers points out (p. xlvi), can also be traced to a written treatise by the

¹ See Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, 'Antigonus von Karytos' (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, Heft iv, 1881); Sellers summarizes his conclusions (pp. xxxvi ff.).

² Pliny concludes his notice of Timanthes with the highly rhetorical remark 'in unius huius

operibus intellegitur plus semper quam pingitur et, cum sit ars summa, ingenium tamen ultra artem est'. His description of the Iphigenia bears marked resemblances to Quintilian's account of the same painting in ii. 13. 13; see the discussion in Kalkmann, p. 108.

artist himself, and may therefore be reasonably ascribed to the hand of Antigonus. Quintilian's succinct *ratio* may then well be a summary of the tradition derived from Antigonus concerning both master and pupil.

Another trace of Antigonus can perhaps be detected in Quintilian's notice of Theon, a painter to whom Pliny attributes no special excellence. The mention of his *φαντασίαι* (Kalkmann suggests, p. 116, that *visiones* may be Quintilian's own translation of the Greek term) is certainly to be connected with the story of the vivid hoplite-painting told by Aelian (*V.H.* ii. 44), where the painter is said to have arranged for a trumpet to be sounded at the moment when the painting was unveiled to the spectators: *καὶ ἔδεικνυτο ἡ γραφή, καὶ ὁ στρατιώτης ἐβλέπετο, τοῦ μέλους ἐναργεστέραν τὴν φαντασίαν τοῦ ἐκβοηθοῦντος ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον παραστήσαντος.* The anecdote is of the type that suggests Antigonus' authority; and it is significant that the term *φαντασία* belongs also to rhetoric (*π. ἵψους* 15, Seneca, *Suas.* ii. 14; cf. Quintilian, vi. 2. 29; see Furtwängler, p. 30, Kalkmann, p. 116).

Antiphilus (of Alexandria) is mentioned as outstanding for his *facilitas*. The meaning of this is uncertain; it may mean no more than 'rapidity of execution'; but it is generally held to be connected with the specifically Egyptian 'short-cut technique' condemned so roundly by Petronius (§ 2 'pictura quoque non alium exitum fecit, postquam Aegyptiorum audacia tam magnae artis compendiarium invenit', a passage where decadence in oratory is compared with decadent art); and more probably it implies some form of impressionism, not, however, symptomatic of decadence, but marking an important advance in art (see Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen*, p. 769; Swindler, *Ancient Painting*, pp. 275-6; cf. Sellers, p. 238). Now Pliny mentions two Greek artists who were famous for their rapid work, Nicomachus and his pupil Philoxenus (xxxv. 109 f.), and of the latter he says 'hic celeritatem praceptoris secutus breviores etiamnum quasdam picturae compendiarias invenit'; Sellers suggests that Nicomachus may have introduced Antiphilus' new technique into Greece. Pliny illustrates the *velocitas* of Nicomachus by an anecdote which bears a suspicious similarity to one told later (xxxv. 124) of the Sicyonian Pausias, in a passage otherwise demonstrably Xenocentric (Sellers, p. xxxiii); it may well be, therefore, that Antigonus introduced such stories when working over Xenocrates' material; and if so, he may have referred also to Antiphilus in a general discussion of 'shortened technique', information which Quintilian has here crystallized after his manner in distinguishing Antiphilus for *facilitas*.

The remaining fourth-century artist named by Quintilian is Euphranor. His judgement of this painter is not of the 'label' type, but resembles more his characterizations of the fifth-century artists: he says (§ 6) 'Euphranorem admirandum facit, quod et ceteris optimis studiis inter praecipuos et pingendi fingendique idem mirus artifex fuit'. Both stylistically and chronologically this notice should properly follow Quintilian's account of Zeuxis and Parrhasius; its position here is no doubt due to his wish to introduce Euphranor, a master of both arts, at the point of transition from painting to statuary. In § 12, after his sketch of oratory, he adds 'at M. Tullium non illum habemus Euphranorem circa plurimum artium species praestantem, sed in omnibus quae in quoque laudantur eminentissimum'. There is an obvious resemblance between this latter passage and Pliny's notice of Euphranor (xxxv. 128) 'dociis ac laboriosus ante omnis et in quocumque genere excellens ac sibi aequalis'; Pliny follows this with a demonstrably Xenocentric passage, succeeded in its turn by the statement 'volumina quoque compositus de symmetria et coloribus', which as certainly may be ascribed to Antigonus. Quintilian no doubt refers to these *volumina* in his vague phrase *ceteris optimis studiis*; and if we may see in Pliny's epithet *laboriosus* a judgement of similar type to that made by Apelles of Protogenes (xxxv. 80 'cum Protogenis opus inmensi laboris ac curae supra modum anxiae

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miraretur') which probably goes back to Antigonus, it is likely that Quintilian's judgement in § 12, corresponding as it does to Pliny's notice, can be traced to the same source.

Certain points in Quintilian's notice of Zeuxis and Parrhasius need discussion. One is chronological. Pliny (xxxv. 61) puts Zeuxis' *ἀκμή* in 397 B.C., expressly rejecting an earlier date (424-421), and he makes Parrhasius an *aequalis* of Zeuxis (§ 64). Quintilian assigns both painters to the period *circa Peloponnesia tempora* (§ 4), and states that they were *non multum aetate distantes*; he dates Parrhasius by a reference to Xenophon, *Mem.* iii. 10. 1 (Kalkmann sees in this, p. 115, either an original contribution by Quintilian or else a reference derived from Varro). The evidence against Pliny's dating of Zeuxis is well known (see Sellers on Pliny *l.c.*; Pfuhl, p. 681), while there is reason to suppose that Parrhasius was considerably older than his rival (Pfuhl, p. 689). It looks, therefore, as if Quintilian's chronology, for all its vagueness, is roughly correct, if we can assume that Parrhasius came into prominence towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and Zeuxis near its middle period. Pliny's date for Zeuxis, in fact, depends on that assigned to Apollodorus (408-5); but this is almost certainly wrong (Pfuhl, p. 676, would place Apollodorus' activity about the beginning of the war). Quintilian's authority has evidently corrected the chronology followed by Pliny; such adjustments can be traced to Antigonus' hand in Pliny's account of the origins of sculpture (xxxvi. 9-10) and of the invention of encaustic (xxxv. 122), as is pointed out by Sellers (pp. xxvi, xxxii, 237), and we may presumably see Antigonus' influence also behind Quintilian's statement.

Other points concern Quintilian's judgements of these two artists. After mentioning their special services to their art, he continues 'nam Zeuxis plus membris corporis dedit, id amplius aut Augustus ratus atque, ut existimat, Homerum secutus, cui validissima quaeque forma etiam in feminis placet; ille vero ita circumscripsit omnia, ut eum legum latorem vocent, quia deorum atque herorum effigies, quales ab eo sunt traditae, ceteri tamquam ita necesse sit sequuntur'. Now the statement that Zeuxis 'gave more fullness (*corpus*) to the limbs' is certainly to be connected with Pliny's remark of Zeuxis (§ 64) 'reprehendit tamen cœu grandior in capitibus articulisque', a Xenoclastic passage, on which Sellers comments that Quintilian praises Zeuxis on the same grounds for which Pliny blames him, an instance of conflicting criticism in antiquity. Robert (p. 76, cf. Kalkmann, p. 111) considers that Quintilian here reproduces Antigonus' counter to Xenocrates' criticism, biased as its author was by his excessive predilection for the *symmetria* of the Sicyonian school, which Antigonus did not share. This counter-criticism is supported by a learned reference to Homer (Robert compares *Il.* xxi. 424, *Od.* xxi. 6); it is worth noting that Zeuxis himself regarded his painting of Helen (cf. Cic. *de inv.* ii. 1-3) as fulfilling the Homeric conception of her beauty, and inscribed beneath it *Il.* iii. 156-7 (Val. Max. iii. 7). The mention of Homer is entirely in the manner of the rhetoric schools, and may well go back to Antigonus in view of his known literary and rhetorical interests. Quintilian continues with a judgement of Parrhasius which is most difficult to interpret. Kalkmann (p. 112) takes the words *ita circumscripsit omnia* to refer to Parrhasius' skill in pure line-drawing, comparing Pliny, xxxv. 68 'et alia multa graphidis vestigia extant in tabulis ac membranis eius, ex quibus proficere dicuntur artifices'. Pfuhl disagrees (pp. 691, 695), holding that Quintilian is still speaking of the plastic effect of Parrhasius' contours in his painting, an interpretation which would imply that Quintilian's words here are a mere duplication of his statement in § 4, *examinasse subtilius lineas traditur*. But in fact, as he has already done with Zeuxis ('plus membris corporis dedit', etc.), he is now adducing a new *virtus* of the painter, not elaborating his previous statement; *nam* at the beginning of the sentence is not explanatory of the immediately preceding clause, but is used with a slight ellipse, giving a fresh explanation of the ways in

which these artists *plurimum arti addiderunt*. Kalkmann then may be right in his view of the passage; but if Quintilian had meant 'line-drawing', would he not have written *lineas circumscriptis* as in x. 2. 7?

I do not think that the words *ita circumscriptis omnia* need be taken in any such technical sense, and an explanation of an entirely different sort can, in my opinion, be derived from the words that follow. *Circumscriptis* is certainly ambiguous, but its meaning must surely be connected with the succeeding *ut eum legum latorum vocent*, etc.¹ If it simply bears the natural meaning that Parrhasius 'was so definitive in all his work' that he established a type which succeeding artists felt themselves bound to follow, then it seems to me highly probable that we have here a statement well in keeping with what we know of the boastful character of Parrhasius. The whole reference, with its crisp phrase *legum lator*, followed by a somewhat obvious explanation for the benefit of laymen, is surely an echo, condensed after Quintilian's manner, of the self-laudatory epigram attributed to Parrhasius by Athenaeus (xii. 543 E)—

εὶ καὶ ἄπιστα κλύνοντι, λέγω τάδε· φημὶ γὰρ ἡδη
τέχνης εὐρῆσθαι τέρματα τῆσδε σαφῆ
χειρὸς ὑφ' ἡμετέρης· ἀνυπέρβλητος δὲ πέπηγεν
οὐρος· ἀμώμητον δ' οὐδὲν ἔγεντο βροτοῦς.²

Such epigrams form a highly characteristic contribution to the art-criticism contained in Pliny, and can be traced back to the anecdotic element supplied by Duris of Samos (Sellers, p. lvi) to Antigonus. This passage of Quintilian, therefore, surely may represent Antigonus' recasting of the epigram, with his own gloss added in explanation, just as he appended an explanation of the preceding judgement of Zeuxis. If this is accepted, it is possible also that Quintilian's mention of Theon of Samos, connected as it is with Aelian's anecdote, may go back beyond Antigonus to Duris; and it may be added that another passage in Quintilian (ii. 13. 13) has a Duridian touch: in speaking of Timanthes' Iphigenia, he adds a detail unknown from any other source, that in this painting Timanthes *Coloten Teium vicit*. These words suggest a competition; and where similar competitions are mentioned in Pliny, there is a strong presupposition that they are from the hand of Duris (Sellers, p. lxiv).

Let us now turn to Quintilian's account of statuary. It will need a less detailed examination, for Robert (pp. 50 ff.) has analysed the whole passage with much care, and the force of his conclusions has long been recognized. Quintilian's judgements here show a remarkable difference in standpoint from those of Pliny. It is now a commonplace that Pliny's criticism of the great statuaries is derived from Xenocrates of Sicyon, whose method was based upon the artists' 'gradual conquest of the problems of symmetry and proportion' (Sellers, p. xviii); his scheme of gradation opened with Phidias, continued with Polyclitus, Myron, and Pythagoras (in that order), until the perfect representation of proportion was reached by Lysippus—i.e., Xenocrates subordinated everything to the greater honour of the Sicyonian school. Varro was Pliny's immediate authority for this connected series of criticisms, as the mention of him in xxxiv. 56 shows. The Xenocratic method involves anachronisms by which

¹ Robert's view of this passage (p. 74) is inexplicable, as Kalkmann realized; he takes *ille vero* to refer to Homer, not to Parrhasius 'wie Brunn . . . und Overbeck . . . wunderlicher Weise meinen'; thus he regards the phrase *legum lator* to imply Homer also. Goethe knew better, in his version of these sections in his *Schriften zur Kunst*.

² Cf. Pliny, xxxv. 71 'namque et cognomina

usurpavit habrodiaetum se appellando aliisque versibus principem artis et eam ab se consummatam'; Zeuxis' retort to Parrhasius' boast is couched in similar language, and affords further support for my interpretation of Quintilian (quoted by Aristides, *Or. xl ix*, 'Ηράκλεια παρπλι, Ζεῦξις δ' ὄνομ· εἰ δέ τις ἀνδρῶν | ἡμετέρης τέχνης πειραρά φησιν ἔχειν | δεῖξαντά').

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Myron is placed later than Polyclitus, and Pythagoras later than both (Sellers, p. xx); it takes no account of archaic sculpture, it respects Phidias simply as having discovered the possibilities of *toreutice*, it ignores Praxiteles or at least puts him in an entirely subordinate position. Quintilian's judgements show no trace of these standards or predilections. He takes due account of the primitives, he places Myron and Polyclitus in their correct order, he regards Phidias as outstanding, he couples Praxiteles with Lysippus; and his criterion is not *symmetria* but abstractions such as *diligentia, decor, pondus, veritas*. He does not mention Pythagoras, but he names Phidias' pupil Alcamenes, and at the end he sets Demetrius of Alopece, not without a certain stricture.¹ It will be convenient to set out his account in full (§§ 7-9):

'duriora et Tuscanicas proxima Callon atque Hegesias, iam minus rigida Calamis, molliora adhuc supra dictis Myron fecit. diligentia ac decor in Polyclito supra ceteros, cui quamquam a plerisque tribuitur palma, tamen, ne nihil detrahatur, deesse pondus putant. nam ut humanae formae decorem addiderit supra verum, ita non explevisse deorum auctoritatem videtur. quin aetatem quoque graviorem dicitur refugisse nihil ausus ultra levis genas. at quae Polyclito defuerunt Phidiae atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen dis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex creditur, in ebore vero longe citra aemulum, vel si nihil nisi Minervam Athenis aut Olympium in Elide Iovem fecisset, cuius pulchritudo adiecisse aliquid etiam receptae religioni videtur: adeo maiestas operis deum aequavit. ad veritatem Lysippum ac Praxitelem accessisse optime adfirmant: nam Demetrius tamquam nimius in ea reprehenditur et fuit similitudinis quam pulchritudinis amantior.'

It is evident that Quintilian's authority has a bias towards the Attic school, not to the Sicyonian (cf. Stuart Jones, *Ancient Writers on Greek Sculpture*, London, 1895, pp. xx, xxxiv); he was interested not in technique but in generalizing criteria of a philosophic nature. Further, it is plain that the same authority, or an authority belonging to the same school, had been used by Cicero before him, in a passage² where the standards employed are exactly similar; in fact, if Cicero's judgements on the statuaries were fused with those made by Quintilian, the whole would form one homogeneous piece of criticism.³ On the other hand, there is nothing in Quintilian's language to recall that of Pliny, unless his notice of Phidias can be connected with *N.H.* xxxiv. 54 ('Iovem Olympium quem nemo aemulatur').

One cannot fail to be struck by the difference in tone between these criticisms of the statuaries and those of the painters. In his sketch of the development of painting

¹ It is not clear whether Quintilian intends his list to be taken in strict chronology; certainly Lysippus, Praxiteles, and Demetrius are not chronologically named, but his scale of progress does imply that Myron preceded Polyclitus. See Robert, p. 49 f., for a full discussion.

² Cic. *Brut.* 70 'quis enim . . . non intellegit Canachi signa rigidiora esse quam ut imitentur veritatem; Calamidis dura illa quidem, sed tamen molliora quam Canachi; nondum Myronis satis ad veritatem adducta, iam tamen quae non dubites pulchra dicere: pulchriora etiam Polycliti et iam plane perfecta, ut mihi quidem videri solent.' It is noticeable that the brief remarks on painting which follow this passage have nothing in common with Quintilian's judgement of the painters, neither have those in *de or. iii.* 26.

³ Similar criteria are to be seen in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *de Isocr. ch. 3* πέφυκε γάρ ή Λυσίου λέξις ἔχει τὸ χαρίν, ή δὲ Ἰσοκράτους βούλεται. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῖς ἀρταῖς ὑπερεῖ Λυσίου κατὰ γοῦν τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην. προτερὲν δέ γε ἐν ταῖς μελλούσαι λέγεσθαιν ὑψηλότερός ἐστιν ἐκείνου κατὰ τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστερος μακρῷ καὶ ἀξιωματικότερος. θαυμαστὸν γάρ δὴ καὶ μέγα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους κατασκευῆς ὄφος, ἡρωικῆς μᾶλλον ή ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως οἰκείων. δοκεῖ δή μοι μὴ ἀπὸ ακοποῦ τις ἀν εἰκάσαι τὴν μὲν Ἰσοκράτους ὥριτορικὴν τὴν Πολυκλείτου τε καὶ Φειδίου τέχνην κατὰ τὸ σεμνόν καὶ μεγαλότεχνον καὶ ἀξιωματικόν, τὴν δὲ Λυσίου τὴν Καλάμιδος καὶ Καλλιμάχου τῆς λεπτότητος ἐνέκα καὶ τῆς χάρτου. Note also Demetrius, π. ἐρμ. 14; Dio Chrysostom 12, p. 403 R.; Strabo viii. 372; Lucian, *Rhet. Praec.* 9 (Robert, pp. 52, 56).

Quintilian has chosen to use sources which took some account of technique; and for the fourth-century painters he has conveniently summarized their *virtutes* for his pupils; he has even attempted some rough chronological estimates. Nothing of this appears in his account of statuary. He seems deliberately to have avoided consulting Varro, where, as Pliny's explicit reference shows, he could have found the connected series of Xenocratic judgements; and he has not troubled to indicate chronology, nor to summarize the main *virtutes* of the statuaries. That Quintilian could judge of this branch of art in very different terms is shown by the passage in ii. 13. 10, where he illustrates the pleasure derived from *figurae* by a reference to Myron which implies considerable penetration ('quid tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? si quis tamen ut parum rectum improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis afuerit, in qua vel praecipue laudabilis est ipsa illa novitas ac difficultas?'); and that he could have illustrated his notice of Polyclitus, had he wished, by a reference to the *Kaváv* is plain from v. 12. 21 ('an vero statuarum artifices pictoresque clarissimi, cum corpora quam speciosissima fingendo pingendove efficere cuperent, nunquam in hunc ceciderunt errorem, ut Bagoam aut Megabyzum aliquem in exemplum operis sumerent sibi, sed doryphoron illum aptum vel militiae vel palaestrae . . . nos, qui oratorem studemus effingere, non arma, sed tympana eloquentiae demus?'). Quintilian's deliberately chosen attitude in these sections probably reflects the greater interest taken by the Romans in painting: as Friedländer points out (*Sittengeschichte Roms*, 9th edn., iii. p. 103), while sculpture remained always a Greek art and therefore a foreign one, painting was practised by the Romans themselves and was never regarded as an entirely Greek province.¹ This is borne out to some extent by a number of passages in the *Institutio Oratoria* where illustrations are offered from the field of painting which show considerable knowledge of technique (ii. 13. 12, x. 2. 6, and especially viii. 5. 26 and xi. 3. 46), whereas there is nothing comparable from that of sculpture.²

Robert holds that Antigonus is the ultimate source of Quintilian's judgements on the statuaries as he appears to be of those on the painters. It is not possible to support this contention by deductions similar to those which can be made for the account of painting, as there are no linguistic parallels or anecdotic hints to be derived from Pliny. But an argument can be based on other points, from Quintilian himself. In the discussion of the statuaries, the emphasis put on such criteria as *diligentia*, *decor*, *pondus*, *veritas* shows a certain correspondence with others that are at least implicit in the passage on painting: thus, the conception of *amplum* and *augustum* applied by Quintilian to Zeuxis, the mention of Apelles' *gratia*, the reference to Protogenes' *cura*, all belong to a like sphere of criticism; and in both passages the religious aspect of art is conventionally touched upon, in connexion with Zeuxis among the painters and with Polyclitus and Phidias among the statuaries. But far more significant is the whole artistic standpoint, the bias towards the Attic school; for this is precisely the attitude of the Pergamenes, who were so much influenced by Antigonus in their sculptural ideals (Sellers, p. xxxviii). Robert claims without hesitation, in fact, that in Quintilian's lists of painters and statuaries alike we have examples of those 'canons' of ten to which the Pergamenes were supposedly addicted, and that from Quintilian's criticism we can reconstruct the 'Pergamene' point of view which contrasts so often with that put forward by Pliny. But faith in such precise canon-making has faded somewhat since the days of Brzoska's famous thesis *de canone*

¹ Cf. Furtwängler, p. 35; he remarks that greater biographical detail and more accurate knowledge was available concerning the painters and their work.

² See the passages conveniently collected by G. Assfahl, *Vergleich und Metapher bei Quintilian* (Stuttgart, 1932), pp. 54 ff.

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decem oratorum (Breslau, 1883)¹, and indeed both Brzoska and Robert himself are forced to weaken their case by their Procrustean methods of countering the unwelcome fact that to Quintilian's ten statuaries there correspond eleven painters: Brzoska would eject Euphranor, Robert would remove Polygnotus from the 'canon'; this, however, is begging the question, as can be seen from the fact that Quintilian and Cicero between them, in the two passages noted above as wholly complementary, name eleven statuaries (Cicero adds Canachus to the list), while if we include also the related passage of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*de Isocr.* ch. 3, quoted above) we must add a twelfth, Callimachus. Similarly, although Cicero's discussion of painting in *Brut.* 70 does not fit in with Quintilian's judgements in the same manner as the corresponding sets of judgements on statuary, it exhibits a like rhetorical tradition, and we are entitled to add from it the names of Timanthes, Aetion, and Nicomachus to Quintilian's list of painters (for Timanthes, cf. Quintilian, ii. 13. 13). While accepting the Pergamene origin of these judgements, with their admixture of philosophical and rhetorical criteria, it is not possible to do more than attribute to the Pergamenes 'the formation of a list or Canon of sculptors of indefinite number, arranged chronologically, with a fixed scale of appreciation' (Stuart Jones, *op. cit.*, p. xx). It is fair to add that Robert was aware of these objections, but his obsession for the number 'ten' led him to what seems an improbable conclusion. That Antigonus is at the back of Quintilian's critique of statuary seems, however, extremely probable.

To conclude, while sufficient argument is available to show clearly enough the ultimate provenance of Quintilian's art-criticism, it is not possible to determine his immediate source. It is unlikely that he did not consult the work of Varro, whom he praises highly in xii. 11. 24; the Xenocratic touches in his judgements of the painters, coupled with the direct evidence of Pliny (xxxv. 56) that he himself obtained his corresponding passages from Varro, make it almost certain that Varro was one of his authorities. On the other hand, we have seen that Quintilian deliberately did not use Varro for his account of statuary, or at least that he rejected the Xenocratic tradition for that branch of art, so that it is impossible to claim Varro as his sole intermediary. The different tone of the two passages, although the influence of Antigonus seems undoubted in both, suggests that he did not rely on any single authority; it is, in fact, difficult to avoid the conclusion that Quintilian's art-criticism is based on a similar method to that which he evidently employed in his literary criticism, namely, that he followed the traditional judgement of the schools of rhetoric without necessarily borrowing from one single predecessor (cf. Peterson, *introd.* to book x, p. xxxii). He would probably have had access to Pliny himself, for the *Natural History* was completed in A.D. 77, some eight years before the earliest date to which the publication of the *Institutio Oratoria* can be assigned (Colson, *introd.* to book i, p. xvi). He might have obtained some information from Celsus' rhetorical books, as Cousin suggests (*Études sur Quintilien*, Paris, 1936, p. 663), although his low opinion of Celsus is not in favour of this (cf. xii. 11. 24, and Peterson's note on x. 1. 124). The scattered comments in other parts of the *Institutio*, especially those on painting, suggest the use to some extent of technical handbooks. And it is unlikely in any case that these 'Pergamene' criticisms, influenced so largely by Antigonus, were not as well known to the *rhetores Graeci* who taught young Romans as were the literary judgements of the Alexandrian critics (cf. Peterson, *introd.* p. xxxv). Whatever his immediate sources, Quintilian has preserved, at least in his account of painting, a most important supplement to the information otherwise available; in this connexion the soundness of his taste in summarizing so carefully the qualities of the great

¹ Unfortunately inaccessible to me; his conclusions are criticized by M. Fraenkel (*Jahrb. d. kais. d. arch. Inst.* vi, 1891, pp. 49 ff.; cf. Pfuhl, p. 728).

fourth-century painters deserves commendation: 'in the Greek painting of the fourth century we have lost a world' (J. D. Beazley, in Beazley-Ashmole, *Greek Sculpture and Painting*, p. 66). And in his sketch of the development of statuary, the fact that he was writing a handbook of rhetoric has caused him to hand down an equally important record of a school of criticism which could otherwise be known only through widely scattered material.

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THE TABLETS OF ZEUS

PROFESSOR FRAENKEL in his recent very illuminating article on 'The Stars in the Prologue of the *Rudens*' (*C.Q.* xxxvi. 10 ff.) has explained how a Greek poet at the end of the fourth century could describe the stars as the messengers of Zeus and as his regular and, so to speak, professional informants on the sins and evil deeds of human beings. He also comments on the idea that the sins are recorded in Heaven (*eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Iovem*) and says—rightly as I hope to show—that this idea 'though more familiar to us from Semitic sources'¹ is a genuine Hellenic belief'. Following Friedrich Marx, he quotes a fragment from Euripides' *Melanippe* (506 N.²).²

δοκεῖτε πηδᾶν τάδικήματ' εἰς θεούς
πτεροῖσι, κάπειτ' ἐν Διὸς δέλπου πτυχαῖς
γράφειν τιν' αὐτά, Ζῆνα δ' εἰσορῶντά νυν
θνητοῖς δικάζειν, οὐδέ ὁ πᾶς ἀν οὐρανὸς
Διὸς γράφοντος τὰς βροτῶν ἀμαρτίας
ἔξαρκέσειν οὐδέ ἐκείνος ἀν σκοπῶν
πέμπειν ἐκάστω ζημίαν κτλ.

Euripides is under no suspicion of having borrowed from Semitic sources. The passage looks off-hand like one of those wild, utopian *αὐτοχθόνων* in which Euripides' imagination sometimes indulges, though it may seem slightly less fantastic if we accept Marx's³ explanation that 'Zeus is a copy of the earthly judge'. If, however, we wish to reach more definite conclusions as to the origin of this curious idea and the more fundamental conception from which it sprang, we may do well to examine a passage in Aischylos which Fraenkel could ignore because it was irrelevant to his argument and which Marx, who mentions it, dismisses as 'nur sehr entfernt verwandt'. The passage is *Eum.* 271 ff.

ὅψῃ δὲ κεῖ τις ἄλλος ἵλυτε βροτῶν
ἢ θεὸν ἢ ξένον
τιν' ἀσεβῶν,⁴ ἢ τοκέας φίλονς
ἔχονθ' ἔκαστον τῆς δίκης ἐπάξια.
μέντος γάρ Ἀιδης ἐστὶν εὐθυνος βροτῶν
ἔνερθε χθονός,
δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπῷ φρενί.

The passage is, no doubt, legal in conception as well as in phrasing. In referring to the punishments in the underworld the poet, we may assume, uses the word *εὐθυνος* as an equivalent of *δικαιοσύνης*; cf. *Suppl.* 230 *κάκει δικάζει τάμπλακήμαθ'*, ὡς, λόγος | *Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦνος ὑστάτας δίκας*. Hades—as judge—is an *ἄλλος Ζεύς*, the *Ζεὺς τῶν κεκηκότων*.⁵ No inference seems to be more obvious than that the poet who here speaks of the *δελτογράφος φρήν* of the divine judge is familiar with the idea of Zeus as keeping records on his *δέλποι* of human sins and crimes—the very idea which

¹ Friedrich Marx in his commentary on the *Rudens* (*Abhandl. d. Sächs. Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl.* xxxviii. 5, 1928), II. 15 f. quotes the following passage from the O.T. *ἔξαλεψθήτωσαν ἐκ βιβλίου ζώντων καὶ μετὰ δικαίων μη γραφήτωσαν* (Ps. 68. 29); καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βιβλίον σον πάντες γραφήσονται (Ps. 138. 16). He also mentions Luc. 10. 20 *χαίρετε ὅτι τὰ ὄντα ὑμῶν ἐγγέγραπται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*. For possible Egyptian sources see

below, p. 28, n. 1.

² Probably the *Σοφή*; cf. Wilamowitz, *Sitz. Ber. Berl. Akad.*, 1921, p. 75.

³ Loc. cit. (see n. 1).

⁴ This dochmiac is evidently incomplete. Wilamowitz in his edition (Berlin, 1914) ad loc. denies that Aischylos could construe *ἀσεβῶν* with the accusative case.

⁵ *Suppl.* 158.

Euripides ridicules. Is not the god who writes on his δέλτοι the primary, his δελτογράφος φρήν the secondary conception? Is not the idea of the god's δελτογράφος φρήν more complex than the other, and does not the complex conception presuppose the separate existence of the elements of which it is made up?¹

Logically, all this may be true, yet we are not dealing with logic but with the working of the poet's imagination, and speculations like those in which we have just indulged are unjust to Aischylos' imagery. To describe intellectual activities and qualities Aischylos has—fortunately—no technical terms, but he has a wealth of impressive images and, to use the ill-suited word, metaphors.² We remember the 'deep furrow across the mind from which the good counsels sprout forth', the 'paths of his' (Zeus') 'mind' which 'stretch forth densely shaded' as through a thick forest, the 'diver-like plunging into the abyss' of the soul,³ to mention only a few instances which come to mind at once. The physical imagery employed by Aischylos—and other early poets—to describe the activities of the mind might some day prove a good subject for a monograph.

Furthermore, it is easy to say but not quite so easy to prove that the earthly judge kept records of the transgressions of earthly malefactors. The evidence on which one would have to rely in arguing that either the judges or the εὐθυνοι in Athens kept accounts of the proceedings which took place before them is far from conclusive. Some scholars incline to think that the θεομοθέται kept records of individual judicial decisions, and Wilamowitz believes that the εὐθυνοι under certain circumstances did make a note of his findings.⁴ There may be some truth in these views, though our sources would rather lead us to think of both judges and εὐθυνοι as looking at and examining what other people—the parties—presented to them in written form.⁵ That any judicial authority in Athens constantly kept an eye on all or some people's actions and made notes with a view to using them when it finally came to a trial is certainly out of the question, and it seems more reasonable to admit that this kind of unfaltering watchfulness is the very thing which distinguishes the divine judge from his earthly counterpart. In other words, δελτογράφος does not belong to the legal imagery of our passage. It belongs to the imagery of mental activities⁶ of which we have said a word above.

Within this imagery the 'tablets of the mind' have their specific connotations which will become clear from another passage in Aischylos which has, however, no relation to the subject of the divine Justice. Ήν (sc. τὴν πλάνην) ἔγγραφου σὺ μνήσου δέλτοις φρενῶν says Prometheus to Io (789) when he is about to acquaint her with the last part of her wanderings and trials. This line gives us the clue which we need. μνήμη, 'recollection', is the specific mental function which the tablets symbolize.

¹ If it were correct that the idea of the δελτογράφος φρήν presupposes the idea of the god himself or his agent as δελτογράφος (cf. the scholiast ad loc.), Bernhard Daube's (*Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon*, Zurich and Leipzig, 1939, 168, n. 10) reference to the Egyptian 'scribe in the Underworld' would have more force. He might have mentioned Wilamowitz's note to the parallel passage (*Suppl. 230 f.*): 'iudicium inferorum potius e religione Aegyptiaca quam Graeca, *Eum. 270*.' See, however, Walter Kranz, *Stasimoi* (Berlin, 1933), 103. Some other points which Daube makes (*ibid.*) and some of the passages which he quotes point in the same direction in which I am proceeding.

² Cf. W. B. Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* (Oxford,

1936), 51 and *passim* on Aischylos' metaphors.

³ *Sept. 593 f., Suppl. 93, 408.*

⁴ See R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* (Chicago, 1931—), i. 85, 87 for a discussion of the evidence for the θεομοθέται and especially for an interpretation of the important passage Arist. *de r.p. Ath. 3. 4*. On the εὐθυνοι see Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893), ii. 235.

⁵ See, e.g., Lys. 9. 6 ff.; Arist. *de r.p. Ath. 48. 4*. Cf. G. M. Calhoun 'On Oral and Written Evidence in Athenian Courts' (*Transact. Am. Phil. Ass. I*, 1919, 177 ff.).

⁶ Cf. A. Dumortier, *Les Images dans la Poésie d'Eschyle* (Paris, 1935), 206; Daube, loc. cit. (see above, n. 1), 168.

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The Greeks knew two kinds of *μνήμη*, the written and the *ἄγραφος*. The distinction between them is familiar to us from the story of Theuth and Thamous in Plato's *Phaedrus*.¹ Theuth, who has invented *τὰ γράμματα*, offers them to King Thamous and recommends his new invention as *μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον*; he is told that the invention is a poor substitute for the real *μνήμη*, man's physical memory.² Mr. J. A. Notopoulos, in a recent paper³ full of good points, has interpreted this story in the light of earlier Greek views and experiences, and has traced the history of the antagonism between two varieties of *μνήμη* back to the time when writing first came into use and when the epic poems which had formerly been entrusted to the memory of the rhapsode were for the first time written down. We need not agree with all Mr. Notopoulos' conclusions, and we may feel less certain than he that 'the story in the *Phaedrus* is in its essence a genuine tale preserved in folk memory'⁴ (for, when Socrates has told it, Phaedrus remarks *ὦ Σώκρατες, ράδιως σὺ Αἰγυπτίος καὶ ὑποδατοῦς ἀν ἑλλής λόγους ποιεῖς*), but Mr. Notopoulos is evidently right in maintaining that the distinction is not confined to Plato. Aischylos himself, whom we have just found referring to the *φρένες* as the seat of *μνήμη*, recognizes elsewhere *τὰ γράμματα* as her instrument. They are among the inventions by which Prometheus raised mankind to the level of civilized existence: *ἔξηρον αὐτοῖς γραμμάτων τε συνθέσεις | μνήμην ἀπάντων, μουσομήτορ' ἐργάνην . . .* (460 ff.).

We may then conclude that in our passage (*Eum.* 275) Aischylos describes the physical—*ἄγραφος*—*μνήμη* in terms of the alternative form.⁵ And we may once more, though only for a moment, return to Plato to note that he, after all, does the same in his famous image of the wax tablet, the *κίρινον ἐκμαγεῖον* in man's mind on which the *αισθήσεις* leave their 'impressions'.⁶ Plato calls this tablet a *δῶρον τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης*.

The *δελτογράφος φρήν* is the *μνήμων φρήν*. Bernhard Daube⁷ is correct in classing Hades with other powers of vengeance whom Aischylos describes as *μνήμονες*, 'unforgetting'. While it is wrong to assert that the *δελτογράφος φρήν* presupposes the god himself as *δελτογράφος*, we may yet maintain that if the one idea is Greek the other is so too. The basic conception is the same in both cases. So is the symbolism, though the symbol is used in two different ways, and we may well doubt whether the notion of the highest god as looking at his tablets (on which either he himself or a subordinate spirit has noted men's sins) was sufficiently dignified to be advanced in earnest by a poet of the fifth century. *πᾶν ἀπονον δαμονιών | ἡμενος ὁν φρόνημά πως | αὐτόθεν ἔξεπραξεν ἔμ | πας ἀδράνων ἀφ' ἀγνών* (*Suppl.* 100 ff.) is Aischylos' true belief. While popular imagination or some wit may have conceived the idea of Zeus' *δέλτοι*

¹ *Phaedr.* 274 C ff.

² At *Rep.* 6. 487 A Plato insists that the prospective philosophers be *φίσαι μνήμονες*. The phrase probably implies a disapproval of contemporary attempts to increase man's normal power of memory by ingenious mnemonic devices which would make memory a *τεχνικόν* instead of a *φυσικόν*. It is well known that devices of the kind found favour with the rhetoricians (cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 267 A on Euenos of Paros).

³ 'Mnemosyne in Oral Literature', *Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc.* lxix, 1938, 465–93.

⁴ Loc. cit. 476. On Caesar's report about the Druids and their distrust of written records (*B.G.* vi. 2) cf. G. Pasquali, *Stud. It. N.S.* viii, 1930, 297 ff., who suggests that the Greek author

whom Caesar follows remembered the *Phaedrus* and thought in terms of this story when he explained the views and habits of the Druids. Mr. Notopoulos uses Caesar's report as evidence of a 'struggle' comparable to the antagonism between the two forms of *μνήμη* on which he has shed so much new light. I agree with Pasquali that the passage in Caesar reflects Greek thought and should be used with caution.

⁵ Cf. *Suppl.* 179 *αἰνῶ φυλάξαι τάμ' ἐπ τη δελτομήνος; Cho.* 450 *ἀκοίνων ἐν φρεσι γράφον.*

⁶ *Theat.* 191 C, D. The 'epistemological imagery' of this dialogue may well be compared with the images and 'metaphors' which Aischylos and other poets use in describing mental activities.

⁷ Op. cit. (p. 28, n. 1), 167 f.

before Euripides,¹ quite possibly the ironical version which we find in the *Melanippe* is the first form in which it was ever put forward. Euripides (or his character) wishes to discredit the notion that Zeus 'remembers' and punishes men's sins—the same notion which Aischylos so emphatically endorses. Euripides discredits it by putting it before the audience in the less dignified alternative: he pictures Zeus as relying on the *μνήμη* of written records. By formulating the proposition in such terms Euripides almost anticipates the explicit repudiation to which he proceeds a few lines later.

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¹ Two comic verses which Marx quotes are of uncertain date and offer no help towards a solution of our question.

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NOTES ON THE CORPUS TIBULLIANUM

I. ii. 17-18—illa fauet seu quis iuuenis noua limina temptat
seu reserat fixo dente puella fores.

DELIA is being carefully watched and the door is locked to keep her in and her lover out (lines 5-6). It is hardly reasonable to suppose that she has in these circumstances been left in possession of the key; it is presumably in the custody of the *ianitor*.¹ According to Ovid (*A.A.* iii. 643), what girls in this situation did was to have a duplicate key (*adultera clavis*) fabricated for use when occasion offered.

The Delphin Ed. note 'Par. pro *fixo* habet *falso*' may, of course, record what is merely a correction. *Falso* may, on the other hand, have arisen from a gloss on a reading *ficto* in a manuscript prior to those extant, which could easily have degenerated to *fixo*. This reading would sufficiently improve the sense of the passage to merit consideration, for lines 17 ff., while couched in general terms, clearly refer to the situation in which Tibullus and Delia are placed and describe the kind of behaviour by which they are to merit Venus' aid.

It is worth noting that *figere* is nowhere used with *clavis* as a substitute for such verbs as *immittere* and *subicere*.

I. v. 59-60—at tu quam primum sagae praecepta rapacis
desere; nam donis uincitur omnis amor.

Postgate, in p. xxx of the Introduction to his *Selections from Tibullus*, refers to this passage as a flagrant example of the pointless use of *nam* in Tibullus, and in his Loeb edition he refrains from translating the word. *Nam* is, indeed, worse than pointless; it is inappropriate in the context to a degree that renders it wellnigh unacceptable in the poet whom Quintilian described as 'tersus atque elegans maxime'.² The trivial change of *nam* to *num* restores point to the verse and logic to the argument. The theme is the rivalry between the poor lover and the rich seducer, who is aided by the bawd. Tibullus begs Delia to abandon the latter's teaching that money is everything, and asks pleadingly 'is true love wholly conquered by gifts?', or, as we should say, 'can true love avail nothing against gifts?' The true love is that which the poor lover has to offer, and his gentle ministrations, which the rich man would never perform, are described in the following lines. The adverbial sense of *omnis* is equally appropriate to Ovid's echo in *Rem. Am.* 462.

I. viii. 51-4—parce precor tenero: non illi sontica causa est,
sed nimius luto corpora tingit amor.
uel miser absenti maestas quam saepe querellas
conicit et lacrimis omnia plena madent!

Postgate betrays his realization that *uel* is inappropriate here by translating it as 'see, again', but this forcing of the sense does not succeed in justifying the use of *uel* to connect two sentences, one a statement and the other an exclamation, describing different and coexistent manifestations of unhappy love. It seems probable that *uel* is a copyist's error for *uae*, whose rarity, especially with a nominative, would account for the corruption. *Vae* has an affinity for *miser*,³ which adds to the probability of this correction. For *uae* with a nominative cf. Horace, *Carm.* I. xiii. 3-4.

¹ As in Apuleius, *Met.* ix. 20, where the situation is similar to that in the present passage.

² Compare, e.g., Virgil, *Ecl.* ix. 28, and Plautus, *Amph.* II. ii. 94.

³ *Inst. Or.* X. i. 93.

II. iii. 31-2—*fabula nunc ille est: sed cui sua cura puella est,
fabula sit mauult quam sine amore deus.*

Postgate translates: 'Now is he the talk of all. But one that loves his girl would liefer be the talk of all than a god without a love', and K. F. Smith in his introduction to the poem (p. 414) gives a rendering likewise contrary both to grammar and to the required sense. When a word like *malo* is followed by the subjunctive in a correct author, the subject of the dependent clause is different from that of the main verb (cf., for example, Juvenal, viii. 269). The logic of the context also demands that *deus*, and not the mortal lover, should be the subject of *sit*. There has been no question of 'a god without a love' to set in opposition to 'a scandal'; the theme of the preceding lines is Apollo's behaviour while dwelling in Admetus' country, when he regarded his reputation as well lost for the sake of love. 'He is now a byword', says Tibullus, 'in consequence of this behaviour. But a lover would prefer the god to be a byword rather than a celibate.' Man fashions the gods after his own image, and the lover is glad that Apollo is a lover like himself.

II. iii. 61-2—at tibi, dura seges, Nemesim quae abducis ab urbe,
persoluat nulla semina Terra fide.

quae ψ: qui A abducis ψ: abducit A terra A: certa ψ uulg.

Postgate, whose reading is quoted, first took *dura seges* as vocative instead of nominative, at the same time adopting A's *terra* instead of the usual *certa*. The manuscript evidence is, however, self-contradictory, since A, which reads *terra*, also reads *qui*, while the manuscripts which read *certa* also read *quae*, neither of which combinations makes sense. *Certa* is the 'lectio difficilior' as well as the prevalent reading, and should not be lightly discarded. *Persoluat nulla semina certa fide*, as read by K. F. Smith, is, however, of manifestly dubious Latinity. I suggest that in a manuscript prior to those extant *nulla* and *certa* became displaced, and that the wavering of the copyists were due to a somewhat vague dissatisfaction with the resultant reading. I therefore suggest—

at tibi dura seges, Nemesim qui abducis ab urbe,
persoluat certa semina nulla fide.

The couplet is then addressed to Nemesis' rich lover, who has taken her to his country estate, not, as in Postgate's reading, to the estate itself, and the meaning is 'may your fields not repay with steadfast loyalty any of the seeds you sow'. Compare Horace, *Carm. III. xvi. 30, segetis certa fides meae.*

III. xii. 19-20—*†sis iuueni grata, ueniet cum proximus annus†,
hic idem uotis iam uetus adsit amor.*

The commentators have made considerable changes with poor results, e.g. *sis, Juno, grata ac* (Gruppe). A connective such as *ac* or *et* is, of course, required after *grata*, but, apart from this, so slight a change as *sit* for *sis* will give a satisfactory sense. The subject of the verb is then the same as that of the preceding sentence, namely Sulpicia, and the meaning is 'may she possess the young man's love, and still be his darling when her next birthday comes round'. For *gratus esse* in this sense compare Horace, *Carm. III. ix. 1 donec gratus eram tibi.*

That the prayer *sit iuueni grata* was not superfluous is clear from III. xi. 6 and 9-14, III. xii. 8, III. xvi, and III. xvii, where Cerinthus' affection appears as uncertain or tending to waver.

W. S. MAGUINNESS.

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NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES OF PLATO'S *TIMAEUS*

I

41 A 7. Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὃν ἔγώ δημιουργός πατήρ τὸν ἔργων, δι' ἑμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα ἑμοῦ γε μηδὲθέλοντος.

THIS famous sentence, which opens the address of the Demiurge to the created gods, has puzzled commentators both ancient and modern. We must, I think, agree with Taylor and Cornford, who both discuss it at length, that no sense can be got out of *θεοὶ θεῶν* taken together, i.e. with a comma after *θεῶν*; I need not reproduce their arguments on this point. Accordingly they punctuate after *θεοὶ*. Taylor, however, thinks that even so the sentence cannot be translated, and accepts Badham's proposal to read *ὅσων* in place of *θεῶν ὃν*. He then takes *ὅσων ἔργων* as an instance of 'inverse relative attraction' and translates 'Ye gods, works whereof I am maker and father, seeing they were fashioned by my hands, are indissoluble without my consent'. Cornford objects to *ὅσων* on the grounds that it creates an objectionable hiatus between the first two words (and it is true that the *Timaeus* is very sparing of hiatus), and also that it destroys what he finds to be the dominant rhythm of the whole speech, and particularly of this first sentence. That rhythm is Cretic: *θεοὶ θεῶν | ὃν ἔγώ | δημιουργός πατήρ τὸν ἔργων*: with which he compares the famous opening of the *De Corona τοῖς θεοῖς | εὐχομαι | πάσι καὶ | πάσαις*. I am, however, doubtful about the cogency of this argument from rhythm, as I have noticed a number of places in the dialogue where a similar rhythm occurs to all appearance naturally:

58 Α καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν πεφυκύνα βούλεσθαι.

66 Σ ἥδιν καὶ προσφιλές παντὶ πᾶν.

70 Α τίνι τε δὴ καρδίαν ἀμπάτων.

77 Α τῆς γάρ ἀνθρωπίνης συγγενῆ.

81 Β σύγκλεισι αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα κέκτηται.

As to the hiatus, I think that the natural pause after the vocative renders it unobjectionable.

Nevertheless I think that Cornford's defence of the text is ingenious, and the best attempt that has been made to deal with the passage. Whereas Taylor, Burnet, and Rivaud (the Budé editor) all follow the single MS. F in omitting the *δ* before *δι'* *ἑμοῦ*, Cornford changes it to *τά*, and takes *θεῶν* and *ἔργων* as partitive genitives dependent on *τὰ δι' ἑμοῦ γενόμενα*, translating the whole 'Gods, of gods whereof I am maker and of works the father, those which are my own handiwork are indissoluble, save with my consent'. This partitive idea gives suitable sense: the Demiurge has with his own hands created the soul and body of the Universe, and the gods both astral and Olympian: the creation of all else, namely of man and other mortal creatures, he delegates in the address now being delivered to the gods he has just created. And indeed if the word *θεῶν* were absent as antecedent of the relative, if we had *ἔργων* as the only noun, this interpretation would be acceptable, though the sentence might seem a trifle clumsy, as a literal English translation certainly does. But the fatal objection surely lies in *θεῶν*. For Cornford's rendering implies that amongst the *θεοὶ*, no less than amongst the *ἔργα*, of which the speaker is the maker, some are, and some are not, the work of his own hands. But that is not so: there are no gods save those already created directly by him.¹

¹ Some people indeed believe that the section (40 D-41 A) about the Olympians is wholly ironical, and that in Plato's real opinion there are 'no such persons'. I do not agree; but if it were so, a discrimination between gods created by the Demiurge's own hands and other gods

The suggestion I would make is so absurdly simple that I cannot help feeling that it is open to some obvious objection that I have failed to notice. In the recapitulatory account at 69 c, which Cornford quotes in his Appendix on our passage, Timaeus says *καὶ τῶν μὲν θείων αὐτὸς γίγνεται δημιουργός, τῶν δὲ θυητῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γεννήμασιν δημιουργεῖν προσέταξεν*. Does not this invite us to read *θείων* in place of *θεῶν ὁν*, to retain the *δ* of nearly all the MSS., and to translate :

'Ye gods, of works *divine* I am the maker and father, which, seeing that they are the works of my hands, are indissoluble save with my consent.'

If this is so, the corruption must have occurred very early, even before the time of Cicero, who evidently read *θεοὶ θεῶν*, which he translates *vos qui deorum sicut orti estis*. I do not, however, think early corruption impossible: all that is involved is dittoigraphy of *-ων* and the substitution of *ε* for *ει*. The omission of *δ* by F is doubtless due to the recognition that a second relative clause (the first having already arisen out of the corruption) left the whole sentence hanging in the air.

I had hoped to strengthen my suggestion by another occurrence of *θεῖα ἔργα*, but I have failed to find one. The nearest expression in Ast's Lexicon is *θεῖας ἔργα ποιήσεως* at *Soph.* 266 c, but of course works of divine making are not necessarily themselves divine, though indeed it is part of the purport of the Demiurge's speech that those of the supreme deity's making are so in fact.

II

48 C *νῦν δὲ οὐν . . . Δ Ι ἐπιβαλλόμενος ἔργον*

Timaeus has just been complaining that his predecessors have given no account of the *γένεσις* of fire, air, water, and earth, but have wrongly treated them as ultimate *ἀρχαὶ* or *στοιχεῖα* (elements). The sentences with which I am concerned are translated and interpreted with substantial identity by Rivaud, Taylor, and Cornford, and it will make for clearness if I begin by quoting Cornford's translation :

'On this occasion, however, our contribution is to be limited as follows. We are not now to speak of the "first principle" or "principles"—or whatever name men choose to employ—of all things, if only on account of the difficulty of explaining what we think by our present method of exposition. You, then, must not demand the explanation of me; nor would I persuade myself that I should be right in taking upon myself so great a task.'

In his explanatory comment (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 162) Cornford writes : 'He intends to construct the geometrical shapes of the four primary bodies from triangles which he takes as elementary. Only he adds that even this analysis will not claim to have reached "the first principle or principles of all things".'

This interpretation seems at first sight to be supported by a sentence at 53 D, where having stated that the respective shapes of the particles of the four elements are constructed out of two types of triangles (the half-equilateral and the rectangular isosceles) Timaeus says *ταῦτην δὴ πυρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἀλλων σωμάτων ὑποτιθέμεθα κατὰ τὸν μετ' ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορεύμενον τὰς δ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀρχὰς ἀναθεν θεὸς οἰδεν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἂν ἐκείνω φίλος γένεται*. But is this last clause really anything more than a modest admission that there may conceivably be a more ultimate physical analysis than that which he is giving?¹ It seems to me that Plato is telling us what he firmly believes to be the *ἀρχαὶ* of the so-called four elements, and that if he had really said at 48 c 'I am not now going to say what I think about *ἀρχή* or *ἀρχαῖ*' he could hardly have written *ταῦτην πυρὸς ἀρχὴν . . . ὑποτιθέμεθα* in the later passage.

would be equally impossible; for then the astral gods would be the only ones.

¹ This modest diffidence is re-echoed at 54 A,

ἀν οὖν τις ἔχει κάλλιον ἐκλεξάμενος εἰπεῖν εἰς τὴν τούτων σύστασιν, ἐκείνος οὐκ ἔχθρος ὁν ἀλλὰ φίλος κρατεῖ.

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I believe that what he is saying is that he must be excused from discussing the mistaken views current about physical first principles. I would take *τὸν νῦν* in 48 c 4 not with *ἡγέτεον* (as all the editors do) but with *ὅπῃ δοκεῖ*, and both that phrase and *τὰ δοκοῦντα* in c 6 as meaning not 'what I think' (though I do not deny that, as far as usage goes, *ἐμοί* could be understood in both places), but 'what is commonly thought': that is of course the regular Aristotelian usage. Such critical discussion would be a lengthy business and unsuited to the character of the *Timaeus* (not *κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου*), which is not critical or polemical, but expository.

The fact that he has actually allowed himself a moment's criticism just before (B 3-c 2) makes it all the more natural to excuse himself from such a task.

III

48 D *τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς . . . συμπάντων λέγειν*

I agree with Taylor and Cornford that the text as it stands is untranslatable. The difficulty lies in the words *μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐμπροσθεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. Taylor inserts *τῶν* after *μᾶλλον δέ*, takes *μηδενός* as neuter and *τῶν ἐμπρ. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* as partitive genitive dependent on it, and translates: 'I shall try to make a statement which is not less but more probable than anything which has been said before since we began.'

Cornford inserts *ἡ* in the same place, and translates: 'I will try to give an explanation of all these matters in detail, no less probable than another, but more so, starting from the beginning in the same manner as before': and in his note writes 'Compare 48 B 2 *καθάπερ περὶ τῶν τότε . . . πάλιν ἀρκτέον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. But just below at E 2, it is added that the new starting-point must be a fuller classification than the one we started from "before" (*τῆς πρόσθετην*).'

I think both these readings and renderings are possible, but I would suggest that the last words of C.'s note point to another, and perhaps a better, viz. *μᾶλλον δὲ <ἢ> καὶ ἐμπροσθεν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, with *μᾶλλον* going closely with *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* in the sense of 'more thoroughly', 'getting more to the bottom of the matter'. For I do not agree with Taylor's insistence that *μᾶλλον δέ* must mean *μᾶλλον δὲ εἰκότα*.

At *Laches* 189 E we have *μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς* used in this way: *ἢ τοιάδε σκέψις εἰς ταῦτα φέρει, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν*, which Jowett translates 'But the other method of carrying on the inquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles', and Fowler (Loeb) 'But this other way of inquiry leads to the same thing, and will probably also start more from the beginning'.

At *Theaet.* 179 D Theodorus says 'The followers of Heraclitus are very vigorous pioneers of this argument', and Socrates rejoins *τῷ τοι, ὁ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται*, which Cornford translates 'All the more reason to look into it carefully and to follow their lead by tracing it to its source'. This rendering disjoins *μᾶλλον* from *ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, and may well be right; but here too it seems quite possible to take them together in the meaning 'Consequently we ought to look into it more thoroughly, following up their suggestions'.

The conjunction of *μᾶλλον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* in our present passage seems to me, apart from one certain and one possible parallel, to be recommended by the fact that the sense would be virtually restated in the sentence introduced by the recapitulatory *δέ* *οὖν* at E 2: 'so then, let us have our account of the beginning of the Universe stated with fuller analysis of detail (*μειζόνως διηρμένη*) than it was before'.

IV

49 E 4 ff. *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔκαστα κτλ.*

From 49 B 7 to 50 B 5 Timaeus is developing the doctrine that the four commonly recognized 'elements', fire, air, water, and earth, are not substances but characters

or qualities occurring in a receptacle (*ὑπόδοχη*); and that therefore it is the latter alone that should properly be designated by pronouns such as *this* or *that*, while the characters or qualities should be called such-and-such, i.e. designated by adjectives.

I translate from 49 E 4 as baldly and literally as I can:

But it is safest not to speak of the several things in question (viz. fire, etc.) as 'these'; rather, that quality which in the case of each and all of them is from time to time recurring (sc. in the *κύκλος*, the cycle of transmutation spoken of at C 6) as a similar quality we ought to designate accordingly (i.e. the right way to indicate a quality is by an adjective, such as *πυρώδες* or *νέαρες*); and in point of fact fire is perpetual quality, as also is everything that comes into being. It is only that in *which* the several things in question arise and present their appearances, thereafter passing away out of it, that we ought to designate by the employment of terms like 'this' and 'that'; to a qualitative entity, whatever it be, hot or white or any of the opposites, as also to compounds thereof, we must not apply any of these terms (i.e. terms like 'this' or 'that').

The latest translators, Taylor and Cornford, as well as the older versions by Jowett and Archer-Hind, take the *καλεῖν* of E 6 to be carried on into the following clause *καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . γένεσιν*, regarding *πῦρ* as secondary object of *καλεῖν*. Hence Cornford translates:

'In fact, we must give the name "fire" to that which is at all times of such and such a quality: and so with anything else that is in process of becoming.'

and Taylor:

'Thus, for example, we should give the name "fire" to that which is uniformly of such and such quality, and so with all names for what becomes.'

The objection to this is that the purpose of the whole context is not to correct our ordinary *reference* of the terms fire, air, etc.—not to say that we ought to apply them to something other than that to which we ordinarily do apply them, but to correct our notion that fire, air, etc., are substances. It is because they are not substances, but qualities appearing in cyclical succession in the receptacle, that we are told not to use the pronouns 'this' or 'that' in reference to *them*, but only to the receptacle itself.

Taylor seems conscious that his interpretation involves a meaning which we should not expect: for he writes 'We might have supposed, but for the example about *πῦρ*, that the meaning is that we should avoid *nouns* altogether and only use adjectives, speaking not of fire but of "fiery" appearances, and so forth. But the example shows that Timaeus does not propose to banish the nouns of common speech, only to make it clear that they are not to be mistaken for names of anything substantial or permanent'.

I agree that Timaeus (or, as I should say, Plato) does not propose to banish the words 'fire', etc., from the vocabulary; on the other hand, the current interpretation makes him give not a permissive sanction to the retention of such words, but a positive injunction that they are to be used in a new reference. It is this that seems to me improbable, and out of accord with the general trend of the whole passage.

I suggest that the required sense can be obtained by putting a colon instead of a comma after *καλεῖν*, and taking *πῦρ* as subject in the following clause, and *τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον* as the predicate of *ἐστίν* understood. The effect of this will be that *καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . γένεσιν* will stand to the preceding sentence in the relation of a minor premiss to a major. The syllogism, fully expressed, will be:

All uniform recurrent qualities should be referred to by correspondingly qualitative terms (viz. by adjectives).

Fire, and all other *γυγνόμενα* (as contrasted with the Forms, *τὰ δὲ ὅντα*) are uniform recurrent qualities.

Therefore fire, etc., should be referred to by qualitative terms.

In thus formulating the syllogism I have implied that I understand *τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον* as an abbreviated equivalent of *τὸ τοιοῦτον δέι περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον*.

The collocation *καὶ δὴ καὶ* seems appropriate to this relation of clauses: Denniston recognizes as one of its common meanings 'and in particular'; Taylor says 'καὶ δὴ καὶ introduces a particular example of the general rule just laid down, a regular use of this combination of particles'. I do not think it here introduces a particular example of a foregoing general rule, but a further statement enabling the general rule to be applied to a particular case or cases.

As to the meaning of *οὗτως καλεῖν*, both Cornford and Taylor are determined in their renderings of these words by that interpretation of the *καὶ δὴ καὶ* sentence which I have rejected. Thus Taylor writes 'The exact meaning of *οὗτως καλεῖν*, "to give these names to", is made clear by the example which follows immediately. It means "to give the names of *πῦρ, ὕδωρ, λίθος*" and so on to the various "phases" or "occurrences", not to the supposed substantial "thing"'. Cornford takes *οὗτως* (I quote the words of his note) 'as resuming the long phrase that precedes': and translates (from *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα*) 'We should not use these expressions of any of them, but "that which is of a certain quality and has the same sort of quality as it perpetually recurs in the cycle"—that is the description we should use in the case of each and all of them'.

The clumsiness of the Greek, thus understood, seems to me too great even for the obscure style of parts of our dialogue.

For the sense of *οὗτως* which I have proposed, 'in a corresponding fashion' or 'accordingly', it might be desirable to furnish a parallel. This I cannot do, but *οὗτως* is in usage the adverb of *τοιοῦτος*, and *τοιοῦτος* is often used in this way (see Riddell's *Digest*, § 54); e.g. *Phaedo* 80c ἐάν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, where *τοιαύτῃ* repeats the sense of *χαριέντως ἔχων*, or (as Burnet puts it) stands for *καλῇ* implied in *χαριέντως*. *Ibid.* 67 Α καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης . . . μετὰ τοιούτων (= *καθαρῶν*) ἐσόμεθα. The peculiarity of our present passage is that *τοιοῦτον* is itself the word whose sense has to be repeated, and it is quite natural that the repetition should be given by *οὗτως*.

V

52c ὡς εἰκόνι . . . φέρεται φάντασμα

The speaker is arguing that, though there must be a receptacle or place in which the objects of sense are presented, this does not hold good of the objects of thought: the Forms are not in place at all.

The words with which I am directly concerned are c 2-3 *ὡς εἰκόνι μὲν . . . φέρεται φάντασμα*. I will begin by giving Cornford's translation from 52a 8 *τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸν γένος* to c 5 *αὐτὴν εἶναι*, omitting the words in question.

'Third is Space, which is everlasting, not admitting destruction, providing a situation for all things that come into being, but itself apprehended without the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning, and hardly an object of belief.

'This, indeed, is that which we look upon as in a dream and say that anything that is must needs be in some place and occupy some room, and that what is not somewhere in earth or heaven is nothing. Because of this dreaming state, we prove unable to rouse ourselves and to draw all these distinctions and others akin to them, even in the case of the waking and truly existing nature, and so to state the truth: namely that . . .' (here comes the doubtful part) 'it is proper that it should come to

be *in* something else, clinging in some sort to existence, on pain of being nothing at all.'

I agree with Cornford in rejecting the version of Archer-Hind, which involves (as C. says) making *éph' ὃ γέγονεν* = *ὅτι εἴκασται* or *ἀφωμοίωται*. What, asks A.-H., is meant by *αὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐφ' ὃ γέγονεν*, and replies: 'Of course the *παράδειγμα*, and the whole phrase governs *ἴαντης* just as if *παράδειγμα* had been written: "since it is not the original-upon-which-it-is-modelled of itself".'

In addition to the impossible sense attributed to *ἐπί* + dative, one wonders why Plato should have adopted this fantastic and obscure periphrasis.

Cook-Wilson, followed by Taylor, takes the phrase as meaning not *παράδειγμα*, but its very opposite, *εἰκάνων*. But they too take the whole phrase to govern *ἴαντης*, and translate 'since it is not the very-thing-it-was-meant-for of itself'. Here again C. gives adequate reasons for rejection, the chief being 'that the resulting sense is wrong. If an image were an image of itself—a supposition which borders on nonsense—it would require a medium in which to exist just as much as it does being an image of something else'.

Rivaud (Budé) translates: 'Car l'image, à laquelle n'appartient même pas ce qu'elle représente, mais qui est comme un fantôme changeant d'une autre réalité...' This appears to follow A.-H. in giving a false meaning to *ἐπί* + dative, though it differs from him in taking *ἴαντης* as possessive genitive. I do not see why the clause, so understood, should account for the necessary existence of a medium or seat of the image.

Cornford himself takes *ἐπί* to mean 'on condition of', and *ἴαντης* as possessive. He translates 'For an image, since not even the very principle on which it has come into being belongs to the image itself, but it is the ever moving semblance of something else, it is proper that it should come to be *in* something else': and comments 'An image comes into being on the same principle or conditions as a reflection; there must be an original to cast it and a medium to contain it. Neither condition "belongs to" the image itself'.

This seems to me much better than those versions which take *αὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐφ' ὃ γέγονεν* as equivalent to a noun governing *ἴαντης*; but the genitive remains difficult: one cannot easily say that the condition of a thing's existence *belongs* (or does not belong) to the thing itself: *ἐν* *ἴαντῃ* or *ἐπί* *ἴαντῃ* would surely be the natural expression.

Taylor and Cook-Wilson are, I believe, right in taking *ἐπί* to express purpose, but wrong otherwise. I suggest that *ἴαντης* is governed by *φάντασμα*, and that *φάντασμα* is not, as everyone seems to suppose, a synonym of *εἰκάνων* ('reflection': Taylor, 'semblance': Cornford, 'fantôme': Rivaud), but has the verbal sense of *τὸ φαντάζειν*, the making something to appear, the *presentation* of something. The very purpose, says Timaeus, of an image, its very *raison d'être*, is the presentation not of itself, but of something other than itself; and this presentation of something else must involve motion in space, *τὸ φέρεσθαι*. We are not to think of the motion of light, or (as Timaeus calls it) fire, involved in vision, the light from an object of vision that coalesces with the visual ray coming from the spectator's eye; for that sort of motion is involved in seeing ordinary objects (the objects that common sense regards as real) as well: it is not confined to seeing images. Plato is not thinking of the image in relation to an *observer* at all; he is thinking of it, by abstraction, merely in relation to its original, its *παράδειγμα*. And his point is that because the *παράδειγμα* is reproduced not where it itself is but somewhere else, movement must take place—a movement of light between the two places, so that the image cannot exist save *in* this other place.

Here I foresee that it will be objected that there cannot be two places in question, since Plato's whole doctrine is that whereas the *εἰκάνων* is in place, the *παράδειγμα* is not. I would reply that the argument from the nature and purpose of an image is

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on the level of sense-experience, not on that of metaphysical truth: on that level originals are in place. It may be that this introduces some obscurity into the argument, but it is the kind of obscurity that inevitably results from attempts to express in words the relation of Ideas to 'things'. Let us remember the simile of the Line in *Republic* VI, and for the sake of simplification ignore the distinction between the objects of the two higher segments. The lowest segment represents *elkónes* (reflections in water, etc.): the objects of the next higher segment are 'originals' in relation to the lowest segment, and they are unquestionably 'in place'; but they are themselves images in relation to the *voúrā* of the segments above them (510 B). I mention this simply to show that it is natural for Plato to illustrate the relation of Ideas to 'things' in terms of the relation of 'things' to images, and hence to defend my postulate of the two places implied in our present passage.

On the level of metaphysical truth, all sensible things are images, and are therefore in the receptacle; the only things not in the receptacle are the only things that are not images, viz. the *voúrā* *εἴδη*.

Now a simple way of expressing Plato's meaning (if I have understood it aright) would be *ἐπείπερ οὐδὲν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐφ' ὧ γέγονεν τὸ ἔαντρην φαντάζειν ἔστιν, ἔτερον δέ τι φαντάζειν δεῖ διὰ φορᾶς*.¹ But *φαντάζειν* in the active is late Greek, and it is natural to replace it by a noun-construction. If there were a noun *φάντασις* Plato might well have used it: instead he uses the noun in *-ma* as the equivalent of a noun in *-os* (for which it would be easy to find parallels: our word 'presentation' is similarly used both of the object presented and of the process of presenting); this is the more natural inasmuch as in relation to the nearer genitive, *ἔτερον τινός*, the *-ma* noun in its original meaning (appearance) is equally appropriate with a *-os* noun (making to appear, presenting): though with the remoter genitive *ἔαντρης* the sense properly belonging to a *-os* noun is alone appropriate. In this way we can avoid what Cornford rightly calls a supposition bordering on nonsense, namely that an image might be an *image* of itself.

The expression *φέρεται φάντασμα* is not, I think, really difficult; it would of course be nonsense to say that the purpose for which an image exists moves: what moves is not the purpose but the product of the purpose; in other words, in so far as *φάντασμα* stands for *φάντασις* the *φέρεται* is illogical and unmeaning; but in so far as it retains its *-ma* sense *φέρεται* is logical and correct.

My translation then will be:

'Seeing that for an image, inasmuch as the very purpose for which it has come into existence is to present, not itself, but something else which it presents by way of continual motion, it is accordingly appropriate that it should occur *in* something else,' continuing (with Cornford) 'clinging in some sort to existence on pain of being nothing at all'.

VI

52 C 5 *τῷ δὲ ὄντως . . . δύο γενήσεοθν*

This sentence follows immediately on that just discussed, but I have found it more convenient to treat it in a separate note.

The 'argument expressing exact truth' is evidently intended to support (*θορθός*) the thesis that the Forms cannot be in a place, and I would paraphrase or expand it as follows:

To say that B is in A (or vice versa) involves an antinomy: for if B enters A,

¹ By the last words of this paraphrase I am seeking to indicate that if an 'original' (whether in the higher sense of the Idea or in the lower

sense of the sensible thing) is to be presented through an image, such presentation involves motion in space.

then where one thing was there are now two things, A and B; and yet there is at the same time only one thing, viz. an A of which B has become a part.

The only possibility of 'this' entering 'that' is when this is not distinct from that,¹ but either a part of it which has been removed or a substance homogeneous with it. Under these conditions we shall have some more A added to the original A, so that there will not be two things resulting, but still only one thing.

The absence of such conditions is expressed by the words *ἔως ἂν τι τὸ μὲν ἄλλο γί, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο*.

Cornford (P.C., p. 195) calls attention to somewhat similar arguments in Gorgias *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* frag. 3 and in *Parmenides* 138 A. But these passages do not seem to me directly relevant: for our passage is not concerned, as they are, with the possibility of a thing being contained in or by itself. Nor am I personally helped by Taylor's discussion with its references to the philosophy of Whitehead.

But if a B distinct from A cannot enter A, how is it that *anything* can be in the receptacle?

I suggest that the answer is this: the *εἰσούντα* (50 c) are not substances, but reflections (images) of substances (i.e. of the Forms), images which 'enter' the receptacle in a different sense of 'enter' from that which is appropriate to substances. In fact *εἰσούντα* (and *ἔξιόντα*) are words used inexactly, though quite naturally, in this reference. An image flashed on a screen does not really enter the screen, for it does not penetrate its surface nor make contact with it as a liquid thrown at it, or a pellet discharged at it would. Yet the screen is the 'place in which' the image occurs, and from which it vanishes.

Finally, I do not think we need suppose with Cornford that whereas 'we should expect merely the statement that the Form, since it is self-subsisting, requires no medium and so is not in space, Plato complicates matters by adding the statement that neither is space in the Form'. The words *οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ* probably mean no more than that neither A entering B, nor B entering A, can be conceived without an antinomy on the assumption that A and B are *τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο*: in other words, *οὐδέτερον* and *οὐδετέρῳ* are just as general in reference as *τὸ μὲν* and *τὸ δέ*.

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¹ I do not think C. is right in making *τὸ μὲν* and *τὸ δέ* refer directly to the Forms and space: I take them to mean simply A and not-A.

NOTES ON PLOTINUS, ENN. I-III

[The page references are to Volkman's Teubner edition]

Enn. I. vi. 1. (p. 87, l. 6) *πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀμορφὸν, πεφυκὸς μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος δέχεσθαι, ἀμοιρὸν ὃν λόγον καὶ εἴδους αὐσχρὸν καὶ ἔξω θείον λόγον.* It is strange that no one seems to have questioned ἔξω θείον λόγον, which, after ἀμοιρὸν ὃν λόγον, is merely tautologous: and what point is there here in 'divine reason'? Since, in these chapters on 'beauty', Plotinus has the *Phaedrus* much in mind, it is natural to suppose that what he wrote was ἔξω θείον χόρον, borrowed from *Phaedr.* 247 A.

I. viii. 12 (p. 111. 19): If evil in the soul is not a complete, but only a partial, privation (*στέρησις*) of good, then the soul τὸ μὲν ἔχοντα, τοῦ δὲ ἐστερημένη, μικτὴν ἔξει τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ οὐκ ἄκρατον τὸ κακόν. On τὴν αἰσθησιν V.K. comments 'vix sanum', which seems undeniable. It is an error for τὴν διάθεσιν: for ψυχῆς διάθεσις in Plotinus, cf. I. ii. 3.

II. iv. 5 (p. 154. 23): *πρὸν δὲ ἀόριστον ἡ ὥλη καὶ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ οὕπω ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἀφώτιστον ἐκείνου.* Bréhier rightly retains ἡ ὥλη, excised by V.K. after Vitringa. We have just been told that ἡ ἔτερότης ἡ ἐκεὶ τὴν ὥλην ποιεῖ, and that this 'difference' is ἀρχὴ ὥλης: also that it is ἀόριστον until in contact with τὸ πρῶτον (=ἐκείνο). Here a similar statement is made about ἡ ὥλη itself, on the ground of its connexion with 'difference'. This being so, for καὶ τὸ we must read καθὸ (cf. Sleeman's c.j. καθὸ ὅτι for κατά τε in C.Q. xxii. i. 33).

II. iv. 12 (p. 162. 5): 'Matter' is devoid of the quality of 'corporeality' (*σωματότης*), εἰ δὲ ἡδὸν ποιήσασα καὶ οὖν κραθεῖσα, σῶμα φανερῶς ἀν εἴη καὶ οὐχ ὥλη μόνον. It is difficult to tolerate ποιήσασα, which does not fit in well beside κραθεῖσα, but ποιὰ οὖσα (or ποιωθεῖσα, cf. IV. iii. 26) makes good sense. 'Matter' plus 'quality' constitutes 'body'.

II. iv. 16 (p. 166. 2): ὁ γὰρ πέφυκεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ τελείωσιν ἀγει (sc. τὸ πέρας), ὥσπερ τὸ ἀσταρτὸν ὅταν σπείρηται καὶ ὅταν τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος, καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θηλύνεται. Vg., V.K., and Bréhier give us ὅταν τὸ θῆλυ (ἐκ) τοῦ ἄρρενος κυῆ, οὐκ, κτλ. All that is necessary is to insert ὑπὸ between θῆλυ and τοῦ, σπείρηται being carried on from the preceding clause.

II. ix. 9 (p. 197. 13): τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἡδὸν ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πεσεῖν. Is P. here recalling Plato's pun in *Laws* 701 D, ἀπ' ὅντο πεσεῖν? He plays again with νοῦ at p. 162. 3 (λογισμῷ οὐκ ἐκ νοῦ ἀλλὰ κενῷ).

II. ix. 15 (p. 205. 16): καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἀνηρημένην τὸ τε σωφρονεῦν τοῦτο ἐν γέλωτι θέμενος . . . ἀνεῦλε τὸ σωφρονεῖν. Since the virtue menaced by Epicurean doctrine is itself temperance, we should read τὸ γε σωφρονεῖν (between commas), in explanatory apposition to τὴν ἀρετὴν.

II. ix. 16 (p. 206. 17): οὐδὲ ἀν τὸ καταφρονῆσαι κόσμον . . . ἀγαθόν ἐστι γενέσθαι. V.K. and Br., after Fic., print τῷ for τὸ, but forget to alter ἐστι to ἐστ.

III. i. 1 (p. 216. 13 ff.): (*αἰτία*) τοῦ τέκνου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ εἰ τι συνεργὸν ἔξωθεν εἰς παιδοποίαν . . . οὖν σιτία τοιάδε ἡ καὶ ὀλίγῳ προσώπερα εὑρούσας εἰς παιδοποίαν ἡ γυνὴ ἐπιτίθειος εἰς τόκους. V.K. and Br. adopt Kirchhoff's εὑρούσα for εὑρούσαι and ἡ for ἡ. Fic.'s *ceu* *femina* suggests γ. We should keep εὑρούσα, alter προσώπερα to προσωτέρα (sc. αἰτία), and put γ or γ for ἡ.

III. v. 1 (p. 269. 1): τὸ δὲ ἐφίέμενον ποιῆσαι καλόν τε ἐθέλει ποιεῖν . . . καὶ, εἰπερ ποιῆσαι τοιοῦτον, οἴεται, εἰ ἐν καλῷ γεννήσεται. If εἰπερ is to be retained, we should write ποιῆσαι and repunctuate thus—καὶ, εἰπερ, ποιῆσαι τ. οἴεται εἰ, κτλ.

III. vi. 5 (p. 288. 11): εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, πᾶς οὐ κάθαρος; καὶ

χωρισμός γε πρός τῆς ψυχῆς, κτλ. Vk. deletes *τὰ ἄνω ἀπό*, and *τὰ ἄνω* may well be a gloss on *θάτερα*. But we should also, with Fic., shift the question-mark after *κάθαροις* to the end of the sentence, since *πρός* is here an adverb. For *καὶ . . . γε πρός* cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 469 B, *Soph.* 234 A. Another ex. of adverbial *πρός* occurs in III. ii. 8 (p. 236. 2).

III. vi. 19 (p. 308. 28): *ἢ δὲ μήτηρ οἰον εἴρηται οὐδὲν γάρ αὐτῇ γεννᾷ.* Vk. marks a lacuna after *οἰον*, and suggests *⟨ἄγονος⟩* or *⟨στείρα⟩*. We need only write *ποιον εἴρηται;* ('in what sense is "matter" called "mother"?' cf. Fic. 'quoniam ratione mater etiam est appellata?')

III. vii. 6 (p. 316. 24 ff.): *ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀεὶ τάχ' ἀν οὐ κυρίως λεγόμενον . . . πλανῶ ἀν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔκβασιν τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἔπι ὡς μὴ ἐπλείφοντός ποτε.* This passage has been discussed by Prof. Dodds in *C.Q.* xvi. 2, p. 95, where he cites I. v. 6 as throwing light on the meaning of *τοῦ πλείονος*, as applied to time, and proposes *ἐπίδοσιν* for *ἔκβασιν*. An easier correction would be *ἔκτασιν*, a word used by P. in IV. iv. 28, VI. iv. 13 of extension in space, but equally applicable to time (cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1402, Eur. *Suppl.* 1109).

III. vii. 9 (p. 322. 2): *τί γάρ μᾶλλον ὁποτεροῦν θάτερον;* Read *⟨ἢ⟩ θάτερον* or *θατέρον*.

III. vii. 11 (p. 324. 32): *χρόνος δὲ οὕπω ἦν, ἢ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἦν, γενησόμενον δὲ χρόνον λόγῳ καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου.* Müller and Vk. delete *χρόνον* (but then, why not *γενησόμενος?*) while Bréhier assumes a lacuna after it. I should prefer to read *γενησομένον δὴ χρόνου*.

III. viii. 2 (p. 332. 24): *ἄλης δὲ δεῖ, ἐφ' ἣς ποιήσει καὶ ἦν ἐν εἴδει ποιεῖ.* This is said of the *φυσική ποίησις* of 'nature', which has no hands or tools wherewith to work. *ποιήσει* for *ποιεῖ* is an obvious correction in Vk.; but what is to be made of *ἄλην ἐν εἴδει ποιήσει?* I fear it is impossible Greek for Bréhier's 'à laquelle elle donne une forme', which is the sense required. Hence I propose *ἐνειδοποιήσει*—apparently not found elsewhere, but other compounds of *ποιέω* are frequent, and cf. *ἐνειδοφορέω*.

III. viii. 10 (p. 344. 23): *τοιοῦτο μέντοι οἰον μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖσθαι δυναμένου . . . τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντα ταῦτα εἰναι.* This is said of the supreme 'principle', of which nothing can properly be predicated. But for *τὸ* we should read *τῷ*, with Fic. (*propterea quod . . . sit*).

R. G. BURY.

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OLYMPIODORUS OF THEBES

IT is customary to consider late Imperial historiography as a barren waste of meagre and inaccurate chronicles and incompetent rhetorical epitomes, all overshadowed by the giant figure of Ammianus Marcellinus, the greatest literary genius, as E. Stein has called him (with some exaggeration), between Tacitus and Dante. In fact, however, the fifth century A.D. produced at least one writer who was, in the words of Niebuhr, 'second to no historian even of the best ages in talent, good faith and wisdom; elegant and very pure in style, he justly acquired praise and glory both among contemporaries and succeeding ages'.¹ Niebuhr was referring to Priscus of Panium in Thrace, but Priscus was a member of a school of historical writing which had been founded earlier in the fifth century by Olympiodorus,² an historian of scarcely less merit than Priscus and author of what J. B. Bury called 'a highly important work'.³ Since even Schmid-Stählin⁴ are not able to refer to a single essay or monograph on Olympiodorus, it may not be amiss to assemble the facts which are known about him and to try to discover, so far as the scanty materials permit, what sort of man he was and what sort of work he produced.⁵

Born at Thebes in Egypt several years before the close of the fourth century A.D., Olympiodorus was a pagan. In view of the great attraction of Neoplatonism at the time, we might well suspect him of being a member of that school, and this seems to be confirmed by a phrase of his which has survived in the paraphrase of his book by Zosimus.⁶ Further, he was interested in the fortunes of a Neoplatonist thaumaturge called Libanius whom the Empress Placidia did to death, *fr. 38*, and he seems to have had considerable influence in Neoplatonist Athens, *fr. 28*.⁷

He appears to have secured employment in the civil service of the Eastern Empire and to have been sufficiently noteworthy for his reputation to spread to the barbarian Blemmyes who lived not far from his native Thebais, *fr. 37*; at any rate, about A.D. 412-13 he was chosen to go on an embassy to the Hun king Donatus, a task which involved a dangerous sea voyage.⁸ On this journey he did not fail to observe the habits of the barbarians, and he remarked on the excellent archery of the Hun leaders. He also distinguished carefully between the status of the military commander of an individual tribe and that of the military leader of a confederacy of tribes, calling the former *ρῆξ* and the latter *φιλαρχος*.⁹ In A.D. 415 we find him again at sea, travelling

¹ Quoted in Müller, *F.H.G.* iv. 69.

² So Mendelssohn, ed. Zosimus, p. xxxv, n. 1; we may see reason to alter this judgement somewhat at the end of our paper. Mendelssohn is certainly right in denying the claims of Eunapius upheld by A. v. Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften*, v. 412.

³ Ed. Gibbon, vol. ii, Appendix I, p. 483.

⁴ *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, 1924, ii. 2, 1035 f. The article on Olympiodorus by Walter Haedicke in P.-W. xviii. 1. 201-7 did not come into my hands until the present paper was completed, but I have been able to refer to it in the footnotes.

⁵ We know of him from (a) the fragments preserved in paraphrase by Photius, Cod. 80; (b) Zosimus, who mentions him once, v. 27. 1, and used him as his chief, if not his sole, authority from v. 26 to the end of his work; (c) Sozomen, who drew heavily on Olympiodorus in his ninth book;

(d) Philostorgius, for Bidez, ed. Philostorgius, pp. xv, cxxxix, and nn. on pp. 140 ff., seems right in returning to the view that Olympiodorus was a source of Philostorgius; but Haedicke, col. 203, 49 ff., rejects this opinion.

⁶ Zosimus, v. 35. 5, with Mendelssohn's note.

⁷ The omens and dreams which heralded a king's death found a place in his work, *fr. 36*, as in Ammianus'. Like Ammianus, he shows no partiality in religious matters, perhaps because it was unsafe to be too openly and strongly anti-Christian; cf. Bidez, op. cit., p. cxliv. *Δίκη* is personified in *fr. 8*.

⁸ *Fr. 18*. Seck, P.-W. v. 1545, s.v. 'Donatus', makes a curious mistake in saying that the ambassador to Donatus was the unknown historian who was Olympiodorus' source. There is no hint of this in *fr. 18* and no likelihood that Olympiodorus used written sources.

⁹ *Fr. 3, 18*; so Wallia, *fr. 31, 35*, and Guntarius

this time to Athens, which he reached after once more passing through many dangers. Here he secured a professorial chair for one Leontius and found time to study with appreciation the curious habits of a university town, *fr. 28*. About A.D. 421 he undertook a third sea journey to visit his native Egypt. On the way he encountered a storm of such violence that he all but perished, *fr. 36*. He visited Thebes where he had been born, and penetrated farther south to Syene to satisfy his thirst for knowledge, *ἰστορίας ἔνεκα*, *fr. 37*. Here his fame had spread before him, as he proudly relates, and came to the ears of the chieftains and priests of the barbarian Blemmyes who inhabited Talmis, Taphis, and other places in lower Nubia, and who wished to meet him. So he penetrated a journey of five days into barbarian country and learned that emeralds could be found there. The priests wished him to see the exact spot where the emeralds were found, but apparently he could not obtain the local king's permission.¹ He even made his way to the great Oasis of Siwah about which he has so much to say (including a deduction from the observation of fossils).²

From the little we know of his friends, we can see that they were men of literary interests, such as the Leontius for whom he performed such a service at Athens, and Philtatius, *εὐφνάς περὶ γραμματικὴν ἔχων*, a companion of his who discoursed on colometry at Athens to such effect that the Athenians raised a statue in his honour.³ In some cases they held administrative positions, such as Valerius, governor of Thrace under Constantius III, from whom he heard about some interesting silver statutes which had been found in Thrace, *fr. 27*.

As became one who had fared the seas so often and was in the habit of spinning what appeared to be sailors' yarns,⁴ Olympiodorus kept a parrot for twenty years, and after its death recorded with affection that it could imitate practically everything that men do, and, in particular, could dance, sing, and call its owner by his name 'Olympiodorus!' *fr. 36*.

We have no information as to the date at which Olympiodorus published his historical work, but I suspect that it appeared within a couple of years of the last events which it described, that is, very soon after A.D. 425. For even in the few meagre fragments of the work which Photius has paraphrased for us Olympiodorus repeatedly expresses his admiration for Boniface, *ὁ γενναότατος*, *fr. 21*, *ἀνὴρ ἡρωϊκός*, *fr. 42*, *cf. 40*. But Boniface was declared a public enemy in A.D. 427, and in 429 issued his infamous invitation to the Vandals to enter Africa, an action which had such disastrous and loudly lamented results. It can scarcely be that Olympiodorus maintained his admiration for him after that. He had disapproved of Alaric's suggestion that barbarian troops should be sent to Africa in A.D. 409 to quell the usurper Heraclian, and Alaric's proposal was less iniquitous than Boniface's action.⁵ The evidence is pitifully slight, but would appear to indicate that Olympiodorus' history was published early in A.D. 427 at the latest.⁶

the Burgundian, *fr. 17*; *cf. 26 μοίρας Γοτθικῆς ῥῆς*, *18 Χαράτων ὁ τῶν ῥηγῶν πρῶτος*. The word *βασιλέως* was generally reserved for the Emperor.

¹ *Fr. 37*. The priests at Talmis would be those of Isis and Mandulis, P.-W. (Zw. R.) iv. 2079 f.

² *Fr. 33*, obviously from an excursus of the kind we find in Ammianus. Olympiodorus is the first writer to distinguish between "Οασις μεγάλη ἔσωτέρω" and "Οασις μεγάλη ἔξωτέρω", where a small Roman garrison was still maintained, P.-W. xvii. 1683 f., which would make his journey possible. Haedicke, col. 201. 38 ff., suggests that Olympiodorus' intimate knowledge of Rome and

Roman affairs indicates a period of residence there and at Honorius' court at Ravenna. This is very possibly true.

³ *Fr. 32* with Dindorf's text.

⁴ Photius uses *ἐκτραγῳδεῖ*, *fr. 18*; *πολλὰ παραδοξολογεῖ*, *fr. 33*; *τεραταλογεῖ*, *fr. 36, 38*, unjustly, no doubt.

⁵ *Apud* Zosimus, vi. 9. 1. His praise of Boniface would seem to contradict Haedicke's statement, col. 206. 64 f., that Olympiodorus set forth the facts in his history 'ohne sich zum Richter aufzuwerfen'.

⁶ Being divided into decades (*v. infra*), it may have been published in instalments, and if

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We learn with some surprise that Olympiodorus referred to himself, not as an historian, but as a poet. All trace of his poetry has been lost, but it is noteworthy that in one part of his history he made his point by throwing out an epigram in the form of a hexameter. Noting that wealthy residences at Rome contained every attribute of a moderate-sized town, hippodromes, market-places, shrines, fountains, and baths, he cried,

εἰς δόμος ἀστυ πέλει· πόλις ἀστεα μυρία κεύθει.

As the hexameter was an intentional one of his own composition, the phenomenon is probably unique among the ancient historians, *fr. 43*.

He had read widely both in verse and prose authors. With pardonable patriotism he gave it as his opinion that Homer's stock was derived from the Thebais in Egypt, *fr. 33 fin.*, and he had decided views on the subject of Homeric geography, views which he supported with considerable erudition and which, according to Photius, were accepted by many succeeding scholars, *fr. 45*. On a question of Egyptian geography he is able to balance the views of Herodotus and the Herodorus who wrote the story of Orpheus and Musaeus.¹ He had studied Ammon ὁ γεωμέτρος, who measured the walls of Rome in the first years of the fifth century.² He was also able to quote in his work the views of Asinius Quadratus (whose works were popular at the time, especially among geographers) on the foundation of Ravenna.³ Finally, Olympiodorus is one of the few authors to mention the poet Pisander from whom Macrobius curiously alleged that Virgil filched *Aeneid* ii.⁴ In his case, too, it is noteworthy that Olympiodorus was interested in some geographical remarks. To sum up what we know of Olympiodorus' wide reading, it would appear to have had a distinctly geographical bias, and even the geography of poets was pressed into his service. This was becoming in a man who had travelled so widely over the eastern Mediterranean *ἰστορίας ἔνεκα*, and it would seem that Olympiodorus was fully aware of the importance of geography for the historian. We shall see when we come to examine his work that this was the case.⁵

He did not claim to have written a history in the accepted sense of that word; instead, he produced the materials for a history, *ἀλη συγγραφῆς*, as he called it himself.⁶ The work was in twenty-two books and covered the history of the years 407–25, that is, from the seventh consulship of Honorius to the accession of Valentinian III, and we know that the first decade brought the narrative down to the year 412.⁷

so the date suggested above will be that of the publication of the last instalment—he will not have composed all twenty-two books in two years. Philostorgius, who seems to have read him (p. 1, n. 5, above), appears to have published his own work before A.D. 433: see Bidez, *op. cit.*, p. cxxxii.

¹ *Fr. 33.* The identity of Herodorus is unknown, but Gudeman, P.-W. viii. 988, s.v., is inclined to identify him with the Herodorus who wrote a geographical and historical monograph on the voyage of the Argonauts and who so often meets us in the scholia to Apollonius Rhodius. As the voyage of the Argonauts was a favourite subject of Olympiodorus (Zosimus, v. 29), perhaps our historian provides some reason for thinking Gudeman's suggestion correct.

² His result, 21 miles, is far too great, *fr. 43*. Hultsch, P.-W. i. 1857 f., s.v. 'Ammon' (2), writes, 'Perhaps he, like Pliny, *N.H.* iii. 66,

gave, as well as the circumference of the city wall, the sum of the distances from the *miliarium aureum* to the gates and only the sum-total of this *διάστημα* has survived in the severely compressed notice in Photius.'

³ *Apud Zosimus*, v. 27. 1 f., where Mendelssohn's note is too cautious: it is extremely unlikely that Zosimus had read Quadratus, cf. Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.* ii. C. 302, 303. Quadratus wrote in the middle of the third century A.D. Note Olympiodorus' interest in the foundation legends of Ravenna.

⁴ Zosimus, v. 29. 2 f., with Mendelssohn's notes, Sozomen, *H.E.* i. 6. 4 ff.—both from Olympiodorus. Macrobius, *Sat.* v. 2. 5.

⁵ On his interest in etymology see the references in Haedicke, col. 206. 1 ff.

⁶ Photius: Müller, *F.H.G.* iv. 68, col. 1.

⁷ *Fr. 18 f.* Reitemeier, *apud* Müller, p. 57, suggests that Olympiodorus had an introductory

Despite the fact that it was not intended as a formal history, Olympiodorus divided it up into books, wrote a preface to each of them, and dedicated the whole to Theodosius II.¹ Also, it would appear that he wrote some passages carefully enough to produce an effect of great vividness, for example, his account of the marriage of Athaulf and Placidia in A.D. 414, where an extraordinarily graphic picture is visible even through the paraphrase of Photius, *fr. 24*. Again, he included minute descriptions of the personal appearance and character of the more important people he dealt with, as we know from the portrait of the Emperor Constantius III which has survived in *fr. 23*: 'In public Constantius was downcast and scowling, with large eyes, a long neck, and a flat head. He would lean low over the neck of the horse which bore him and dart oblique glances to this side and that, so that everyone thought, in the words of the proverb, *εἴδος ἀξιον τυπανίδος*. At banquets and drinking parties he was gay and unassuming, even going the length of often contending with the jesters who played before the table.' Like Ammianus, our historian wrote after his account of an emperor's career a general description of his personality, *fr. 39*.

We have seen that Olympiodorus travelled widely around the eastern Mediterranean and was himself a native of Egyptian Thebes. It is therefore surprising to find that the history dealt exclusively with the Western Empire and only mentioned events in the East when they influenced the course of Western history or when they were relevant to the historian's own fortunes, for no Eastern history (with the two qualifications just mentioned) is to be found in the fragments or in the histories of Zosimus and Sozomen where they use him as their source. This is a more curious phenomenon than might at first sight appear, for Eunapius, a native of Sardis, who had been faced a few years earlier with the task of narrating Western history, writes as follows (*fr. 74*, Müller): 'It was not possible to include in the history any accurate information about Western affairs in the times of the eunuch Eutropius (A.D. 396-9). For the great distance of the journey by sea caused news to be stale and spoiled by time as though it had fallen into a long and chronic illness. Any persons who had travelled there on business or on military service and were in a position to obtain information on political events brought back reports which were prejudiced and partial and conformed to their own whim and pleasure. So, if one brought face to face, like witnesses in a law-court, three or four of them who gave contradictory accounts, there was a great verbal struggle and fighting was not far away, taking its beginning from fiery words [the phrase is corrupt]. Such were: "How did *you* learn that? Where did Stilicho see *you*? Would *you* have recognized the eunuch [Eutropius]?" So that it was a considerable task to compose their quarrels. Of the traders (who had been to the West) not a single one said anything that wasn't false or such as he thought would bring him profit.' [The remainder is corrupt and untranslatable.] These same difficulties must have confronted Olympiodorus, for there is no direct evidence that he ever went to the West² or that Mediterranean travel was any safer in the wild first quarter of the fifth century than in the last years of the fourth—the experiences of Olympiodorus himself prove the contrary. Yet his work was written in extraordinary detail,³ as indeed we might expect considering that the twenty-two books covered only eighteen years of Western history. Since there is no likelihood that anyone had written up the history of this period before Olympio-

chapter on events leading up to 407; and this is accepted by Haedicke, col. 202, 35 ff. I do not think that this is so: Olympiodorus does refer to events before 407 when it is necessary to his theme, but does so in the course of his narrative, e.g. events in Britain, *fr. 12*.

¹ Photius, l.c.; Schmid-Stählin, l.c., say that

it also contained speeches, but there is no evidence that it did.

² But see Haedicke's suggestion, p. 44, n. 2, above; even if it be granted, we can scarcely suppose that Olympiodorus stayed long there.

³ *Fr. 12, 13, 24, 26* and so on, and the summaries of Zosimus and Sozomen.

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dorus, it would seem that he had to collect his information from personal inquiries and perhaps official documents (cf. *fr. 25*).

But it would appear that he did not attain to the accuracy of Ammianus. Zosimus, v. 26. 3, gives the strength of the army with which Radagaisus invaded Italy in A.D. 405 as 400,000 men. This figure is utterly impossible,¹ and, unless it is an idle exaggeration of Zosimus' own, Olympiodorus must be held guilty of a gross error. The number of barbarian soldiers who joined Alaric after Stilicho's fall is given by Zosimus, v. 35. 6, as 30,000; but this may be because he has compressed his authority so much as to make him inaccurate.² Bury³ is of the opinion that Olympiodorus has confused Carthage with New Carthage (Cartagena) in *fr. 19*, but I see little reason to follow him. While it is always possible to argue that Zosimus or Photius has misrepresented our historian, it would be unsafe to conclude that *all* these cases of inaccuracy are due to them and not to Olympiodorus himself. When we remember Eunapius' complaint, however, we cannot but marvel at the diligence, good faith, and accuracy of our historian.⁴

He did not, however, fill the whole twenty-two books with historical narrative. It can be no coincidence that of the forty-six fragments which Photius has preserved no less than twelve have no historical content, but are apparently drawn from digressions on a great multitude of topics. There is a note on the name *bucellaris* which came into being under Honorius, and on *foederati*, *fr. 7, 11*; the organization of the Gothic nobility, *fr. 9*; the statue at Rhegium which prevented the barbarians from crossing the Straits of Messina, *fr. 15*; a particularly interesting account of student life at Athens, *fr. 28*; a description of the Huns;⁵ on the name *Truli* applied to the Goths by the Vandals, *fr. 29*; a long description of the Oasis of Siwah, *fr. 33*, and so on, cf. 32, 43, 44, 45. So possibly a quarter of the work consisted of miscellaneous information which Olympiodorus thought would help his readers to an understanding of the historical narrative. We are again irresistibly reminded of Ammianus Marcellinus.

The fact that he was writing, not a *συγγραφή*, but a *ἄλη συγγραφῆς*, is of the utmost importance. Because he was writing a *ἄλη συγγραφῆς* he did not feel it necessary to restrict himself to the literary language which ancient historians had employed for so many centuries and which was by this time so markedly different from the conversational idiom. In this, too, I think that Olympiodorus was an innovator. Photius describes his style as clear, far from incisive, and in general very discursive and even prolix. (This last may be a reference to the frequency of the non-historical digressions.) His language was plebeian and humble. Photius' words are *σαφῆς μὲν τὴν φράσιν, ἀπονος δὲ καὶ ἐκλελυμένος, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πεπατημένην κατεννεγμένος χυδαιολογίαν . . . καὶ . . . οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ιδεῶν καλλωπίζεται, πλὴν εἴ τις ἔν ται τῇ ἀφελείᾳ πλησιάζειν ἐκβιάσοιτο. τῷ γὰρ λίαν ταπεινῷ καὶ ἔξεντελομένῳ καὶ ταύτης ἐκπίπτων εἰς Ἰδωτισμὸν ὅλως ὑπενήνεκται.* (For all that, it contained an occasional Homeric echo, cf. Zosimus,

¹ Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, i. 167, n. 3. Bury considers Orosius' 200,000 (vii. 37) and even Augustine's 100,000 (*De Civ. Dei*, v. 23) to be grossly exaggerated, and suggests that the right figure would be about 50,000. But Seeck, *Untergang*, v. 375 f. and n. on p. 588, is not so sceptical.

² See Bury, *op. cit.*, 174 n. 1.

³ *Op. cit.*, 195, n. 2.

⁴ In this connexion it may be noted that *fr. 15* tells the story of the statue at Rhegium which had the particular virtue of preventing the barbarians from crossing the Straits of Messina.

From Photius' expression, *ώς μυθολογεῖ*, it might be argued that Olympiodorus simply gave the story as an old tale and did not require his readers to swallow it. But the gullibility of the later Neoplatonists needs no emphasizing. The myth had at least the merit of being suggested by an actual statue in the vicinity, *C.I.L.* x. 6950; and Seeck, *Untergang*, v. 602, interprets *fr. 15* as meaning that natural and not human powers kept the Goths from Sicily. Further superstition in *fr. 27 ad fin.*

⁵ This is implied by Photius in *fr. 18*.

v. 32. 1.) In the paraphrases of parts of his work which have survived in Photius it is, of course, impossible to analyse this judgement, but one feature of his writing deserves attention. The importance of Latin in the Eastern Empire at this time needs no emphasis, but Greek historians found many ways of avoiding the transliteration of Roman official titles into Greek, not least the irritating device of omitting an official's title altogether. But Olympiodorus was providing the materials from which the history of his times could be reconstructed and he did not feel himself at liberty to indulge himself thus. He therefore boldly decided to transliterate each and every Roman official title into Greek. In the extant remains of Eunapius' history which was written in the rhetorical style of his day, we find only two such words, *νοτάριος*, fr. 38, and *βικάριος*, fr. 86, 87. But even Zosimus was shocked at Olympiodorus. He did indeed allow himself *δομεστικοί*,¹ *μάγιστρος*, *νοτάριος*, *πατρίκιος*, and, albeit with an apology, *κουάτωρ* and *τριβουνος*.² Olympiodorus went far beyond this. He has *φοιδέρατος*, fr. 7, *όπτιματος*, fr. 9, *πρυμκήριος τῶν νοταρίων*, fr. 13 *init.*, *πραιτόνιος*, fr. 13 *med.*, 14, *μαγιστριανός*, fr. 31, *μάγιστρος τῶν ὄφφικίων*, fr. 8, 46,³ *κουράτωρ*, fr. 40, *κεντηράρια*, fr. 44, *πραιτοῦρα*, fr. 44, and few can read fr. 23 without wincing at *ὑπατος διστύγνατος*.⁴ In addition he uses the Roman method of dating (examples below) and gives distances in *μίλια* as well as stades. These great masses of Latin terms will have been one of the features of his style to which Photius objected, and there can be little doubt that Olympiodorus was the first Greek historian to employ them on such a scale and with such ruthlessness.

The Latin element in his style does not end here, however. Africa is simply *Ἀφρική*, fr. 40, 42, which Zosimus always changes to *Λιβύη*, although Sozomen, ix. 8. 3, uses both forms side by side.⁵ Spain is *Ισπανία*, fr. 30, which Sozomen retains, ix. 11. 4, although Zosimus always changes it to *Ιβηρία*.⁶ Olympiodorus has *φόρους* when he means *ἀγοράς* in fr. 46, and *έξοτης* is his form of *sextarius*, fr. 29. A very surprising matter, however, is that when Zosimus begins to follow Olympiodorus as his source, Latin words, phrases, and whole sentences begin to appear in his Greek text, and there can be no doubt that these were taken over from his authority. He quotes the saying of Lampadius when he heard the terms which Stilicho had accepted from Alaric, *non est ista pax sed pactio servitutis*; the words written on a door on the Capitol, *misero regi servantur*; the word *virtutem*; and the cry of the starving populace in the circus at Rome, *preatum inpone carni humanae*.⁷ It is clear then that Olympiodorus was to a considerable extent familiar with Latin, as we might expect from a civil servant, and liked to air his knowledge of it. (It seems from fr. 29 that he had also picked up a word or two of Vandal on his travels.)

Ancient historians did not care to include masses of statistics in their writings, as they were interested in producing, not histories as we understand that term, but works of literature, which they believed would be spoiled by pages of figures. But Olympiodorus called his work a *ὑλη συγγραφῆς* because he was unwilling to exclude

¹ Sozomen, ix. 8. 2, apologizes for using this word.

² v. 32. 4. 36. 3, 47. 1; v. 32. 6, 35. 1; v. 34. 7; v. 47. 1; v. 32. 6; v. 40. 2. Contrast his practice in iii. 29. 3, v. 20. 3, etc., where he is not following Olympiodorus. There are no examples in the unrevised fragment of Book VI.

³ *Μάγιστρος* even when unqualified meant *magister officiorum*, and so Zosimus in the corresponding passage, v. 35. 1, omits *τῶν ὄφφικίων* which Mendelssohn wrongly inserts to avoid hiatus.

⁴ But perhaps numbers establish the point: see fr. 8, 46; fr. 12 *fin.*, 34, 46; fr. 13 *init. bis*, 46;

fr. 13 *init.*; fr. 16, 17; fr. 31, 40. For the word *ρῆτες* see p. 43, n. 9 above.

⁵ Note Eunapius, *Vit. Soph.*, p. 440 Loeb ed. by Wright, *Λιβύη*, ἦν *Ἀφρικήν καλοῦσι Ρωμαῖοι κατὰ τὸ πάτριον τῆς γλώσσης*.

⁶ Cf. Philostorgius, ix. 17 (ed. Bidez, p. 124. 17) *τὰς Ισπανίας . . . ἀσ νῦν Ιβηρίας καλοῦσι*.

⁷ Zosimus, v. 29. 9, 38. 5, 41. 7; vi. 11. It may be noted that Zosimus only quotes Latin in that part of his work which is based on Olympiodorus: elsewhere he either translates or transliterates, e.g. ii. 3. 2-3 (from Phlegon's *περὶ τῶν παπαὶ Ρωμαῖοι ἔστρων*).

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the masses of figures which could not have found a place in a formal *συγγραφή*. Consequently we find even in the scanty remains of his work a great number of statistics which are of value to modern historians and which doubtless helped Photius to his unfavourable view of Olympiodorus' style. The opposing forces of Athaulf and Sarus are accurately given, *fr. 17*. The amount of booty taken from Heraclian is given as twenty *centenaria* of gold and 2,000 lb. of immovable property, *fr. 23*. The birth-rate at Rome is quoted (if the text is correct) from an official report of the City Prefect Albinus as 14,000 a day.¹ The number of marble seats in the Antonine baths was 1,600, while the baths of Diocletian contained twice as many, *fr. 43*. The length of the walls of Rome as measured by Ammon has already been mentioned, *fr. 43*, and so on.²

A ὄλη *συγγραφῆς* might also contain a more accurate chronology than could be allowed in a formal history. Müller, op. cit., p. 57, col. 1, says that since he was writing a mere ὄλη *συγγραφῆς* Olympiodorus was careless about his chronology, but of this I can see no evidence whatever. On the contrary, it seems to me to be the case that he called his work a ὄλη *συγγραφῆς* precisely because he wanted to include such data fully. Müller was led astray perhaps by the remark of Reitemeier which he quotes, namely, that Olympiodorus tended to narrate events on a topographical basis rather than annalistically, as can be seen, for instance, from Zosimus' account of the usurper Constantine. This was the procedure adopted by Ammianus when he came to narrate the complicated events of A.D. 365–78, xxvi. 5. 15, xxviii. 1. 43, xxix. 5. 1. In fact, Olympiodorus uses the accurate Roman system of dating, and even in the scanty remains paraphrased by Photius we find Placidia's marriage to Athaulf dated to the month of January, *fr. 24*, while the date of Honorius' death is given as πρὸ ἐξ καλανδῶν Σεπτεμβρίων, *fr. 41*.³ Under his influence even Zosimus can produce v. 34. 7 Βάστον μὲν ἦν ὑπατεία καὶ Φιλίππου, καθ' ἦν καὶ Ἀρκάδιος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔτυχε τῆς εἰμαρμένης, τῇ πρὸ δέκα καλανδῶν Σεπτεμβρίων ἡμέρᾳ,⁴ cf. v. 42. 3, vi. 2. 1, etc. With this we may contrast the preface which Eunapius, the best Greek historian of the age immediately preceding that of Olympiodorus, wrote to his history arguing the worthlessness of accurate chronology and supporting his argument by the following curious questions: 'What does chronology contribute to the wisdom of Socrates or the cunning of Themistocles? Were they great men only in the summertime? Did they display virtues which increased or faded away like leaves according to the season of the year? . . . How then does it profit history to know and recognize that the Greeks won the battle of Salamis when the dogstar was rising? '⁵

We saw above that Olympiodorus' reading was dominated by an interest in

¹ The figure is altogether impossible. We may suppose (a) that Olympiodorus misunderstood the document, which is perhaps unlikely; (b) that Photius misunderstood Olympiodorus or has so severely compressed him as to make him inaccurate, which is perhaps the most likely explanation; or we may alter the text (c) to *τερέχθαι*, which is favoured by Hodgkin, *Invaders of Italy*, vol. i. 841 n. 2 (a reference which Dr. W. B. Stanford kindly transcribed and communicated to me), or (d) to *θεδέχθαι*, the suggestion of E. Stein, which Haedicke, col. 206. 35 ff., accepts. If we accept either of these readings we must understand the figure to be that of the fugitives who returned to the city. (It seems scarcely possible that the Prefect himself made such a mistake in his official report.) Albinus

held office from shortly before 17 September 414 to shortly before 25 July 415, Seeck, *Untergang*, vi. 397. His predecessor was Rutilius Namatianus.

² *Fr. 44* is discussed below; cf. *frs. 3, 5, 9, 31, 33*, to which must be added some of the geographical details given below. Cf. also many passages of Zosimus, especially v. 41. 4; Sozomen, ix. 8. 6, etc.

³ See also *fr. 12, 23, 34 bis*. Of course, the last, unrevised book of Zosimus, which swarms with errors of all kinds, is not evidence of inaccuracy on Olympiodorus' part: see Mendelssohn, p. xlvi.

⁴ Seeck, *Untergang*, v. 593 n. on 389. 31, suggests ἔθεκα for δέκα of the MSS.

⁵ *Fr. 1*, Müller, p. 12, col. 2.

geography. This interest is clearly reflected in his own work, for the fragments and the derivative narratives contain an accuracy of geographical information which is unsurpassed in ancient historiography. Thus, Zosimus, v. 26. 1, writes on his authority, 'Alaric retreated, as I said before, from the Peloponnesus and all the country that the river Achelous flows through, and, lingering in Epirus which is inhabited by the Molossi, the Thesprotians, and those who dwell in these places as far as Epidamnus and Taulantii, . . .' or again, 29. 1, '[Stilicho] passed the defiles which make the crossing from Paeonia to Venetia difficult and pitched his tents at the city of Emona between Upper Paeonia and Noricum.'¹ What better should we find in a modern history book? Bologna is described as a city of Aemilia seventy miles distant from Ravenna.² Ariminum lies thirty miles from Ravenna, according to Zosimus, v. 48. 2, although Sozomen, ix. 7. 1, from the same source, says it was 210 stades away;³ but Olympiodorus can hardly be blamed for the discrepancy. Our historian also gave figures of distances and so on in cases where another writer would not have thought it worth while to mention them at all. Honorius had Constantine and his son slain thirty miles from Ravenna, *fr.* 16. Singeric made Athaulf's widow walk with other captives in an ignominious procession for a distance of seven miles, *fr.* 27. Boniface, to avenge the honour of one of his subjects, went to a field which lay seventy stades away, *fr.* 42, and so on. When we consider how little of Olympiodorus has survived, the amount of such data becomes impressive and we cannot but conclude that the author inserted figures of dates, distances, and the like on a scale far above that usual in formal histories. Full and accurate geographical and chronological information will have been one of the characteristics of the *συγγραφής*.

Can we learn anything of his social attitude? Olympiodorus, perhaps after the model of the famous chapters of Ammianus, xiv. 6 and xxviii. 4, appears to have included among his digressions an analysis of social life at Rome, and two fragments have survived from this part of his work. We have already paraphrased one of them, *fr.* 43, that containing the hexameter on the incredible wealth of a rich Roman's house, a phenomenon which Olympiodorus evidently looked upon with no very favourable eye. This fragment it is which also gives the information on the seating accommodation of the Antonine and Diocletianic baths and on the size of the circumference of the city walls. Evidently then this excursus was more factual, less rhetorical and subjective than those of Ammianus. This view is confirmed by the second of the fragments in question, 44. Here Olympiodorus gives us information of a kind unparalleled in any other ancient historian. He set himself to find out the exact income of the great landowners who formed the senate at Rome, and some of these figures with samples of their expenditure have survived in *fr.* 44. I give a translation of this invaluable document, transposing the figures into their equivalent in English money as calculated by J. B. Bury:⁴ 'Many Roman houses received a yearly income from their estates of £180,000 apart from grain, wine, and other goods in kind the marketable value of which was equal to one third of the cash income. The revenue of second class (senatorial) houses at Rome was £60,000 and £40,000 per annum. Probus, the son of Olybrius, when celebrating his praetorship in the time of the tyrant John (A.D. 423-5), spent £52,000, and Symmachus the orator, a senator with a moderate income, expended £80,000 on the praetorship of his son Symmachus

¹ The geographical confusion in v. 29. 1-5, for which see Seeck, *Untergang*, v. 592 n. on 381. 5, is doubtless due to Zosimus, not to Olympiodorus.

² Zosimus, v. 31. 1, who apologizes for using the word *μῆλα*.

³ Cf. Sozomen, ix. 9. 2, 11. 3, etc.

⁴ *History of the Later Roman Empire*, i. 50 n. 4. It will be borne in mind that at best such calculations can only give very approximate results.

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before Rome was captured (in A.D. 410). But Maximus, one of the wealthy, spent £180,000 on the praetorship of his son. The usual praetorian games lasted seven days.¹ Now it is clear that no one would investigate such matters and publish the results in such detail (the fragment is merely a paraphrase by Photius) if he did not think them of considerable significance, and Olympiodorus evidently thought them a crying scandal in a world where the vast majority of the population were living in such misery that they actually welcomed the arrival of the barbarians, finding their domination preferable to that of the Emperors. This hostility of Olympiodorus to the parasitic and incredibly wealthy senate is explicit in a passage which Zosimus took over from him. Olympiodorus was discussing the state of Rome at the end of A.D. 409 after the second siege by Alaric. Attalus, the City Prefect, was enthroned as Emperor by the barbarian, and several Roman officials were appointed to high office under him. Zosimus' paraphrase of Olympiodorus goes on (vi. 7. 4): 'The inhabitants of Rome were in good spirits since the men appointed by Attalus were good administrators and the appointment of Tertullus caused especial joy. The house of the Anicians alone was grieved by these measures which seemed to everyone to be to the common advantage; for, since they had in their hands the wealth, one might say, of the whole community, they were angered at the universal good fortune.' It cannot be argued that it was the Anicians alone whom he wished to expose, for the examples of great fortunes which he gives in *fr. 44* are not taken exclusively from the Anicians, but from the senatorial class indiscriminately.² Finally, we may note our historian's attitude to Stilicho. The senatorial class was bitterly opposed to him—we need merely refer to the poem of Rutilius Namatianus, ii. 41 ff. It can scarcely be a coincidence that Stilicho's staunchest supporters were the two minor officials Claudian and Olympiodorus.²

That Olympiodorus' hostility to the class of great landowners was matched by considerable sympathy for the lower classes is indicated by the episode recounted after him by Zosimus, vi. 11, as having taken place during the usurpation of Heraclian in Africa when the grain supplies on which Rome lived were all but cut off, A.D. 410. Zosimus' adaptation reads as follows: 'When Heraclian beset with all kinds of guards every harbour of Africa and neither corn, oil, nor any other provision was being brought to the harbour of Rome, the city was exposed to a more terrible famine than the former one. The reason was that those who sell foodstuffs in the market-place concealed their goods in the hope of extorting everyone's money by insisting on the utmost possible price. The city arrived at such a degree of shortage that, in the expectation that they would have to lay hands even on human flesh, the following words were shouted out in the circus, *pretium impone carni humanae*, which means, "set a price on human flesh".' The fact of his relating this incident at length in his book illustrates incidentally the difference between our historian's attitude and that of Ammianus, for Ammianus thinks fit to observe that a food-riot at Rome was too trifling an affair to deserve inclusion in his history, xvii. 11. 5.

To sum up what we know of Olympiodorus' social attitude, he was far enough below the social status of the senatorial landowners to take an objective view of their place in the Roman world, and what he saw compelled him to attack and expose

¹ Seeck, *Untergang*, v. 597 n. on 405. 34, writes, 'The restoration of the pagan worship will have been the reason why the Christian Anicians were hostile to Attalus.' There is no evidence of this, and Olympiodorus, with his all but explicit mention of an economic motive, is much more convincing.

² Stilicho is an extortionate traitor in Zosimus

when Zosimus is following Eunapius (e.g. v. 1 from Eunapius, *fr. 62*), but *πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἐν ἑκείνῳ δυναστευσάντων τῷ χρόνῳ μετριώτερος* in v. 34. 5, as Mendelssohn points out, n. on v. 26. 3. The attack on Stilicho and Serena in v. 38 is probably from Eunapius: see Mendelssohn *ad loc.*

their privileged and oppressive position. He carried out his attack in a far more telling way than Ammianus, who himself also belonged to the middle classes and assailed the senators, especially the Anicians, in passages of bitter satire.¹ Olympiodorus' merit was to have produced the facts and figures which exposed the situation more pointedly than the angry and subjective rhetoric of the Antiochene.

I would suggest that serious consideration should be given to the view that Ammianus was the founder of the great school of fifth-century Greek historians to which Olympiodorus and Priscus belonged, and that Mendelssohn's statement, quoted in the first paragraph of this paper, should be emended to that effect. In scale and in the inclusion of a great number of disquisitions on geographical, social, and other more or less kindred subjects, the works of Ammianus and Olympiodorus were curiously alike. Both authors were apparently drawn from the middle strata of society and in their social views as in their religious beliefs were strikingly similar; and in the course of the present study we have noticed several other matters in which their views and practices coincide. It may be that all these are merely coincidences. But Olympiodorus was obviously a man of the widest reading, and we have seen good reason for believing that he was familiar with Latin. Now Ammianus' history was very popular and very widely read, not only at Rome where it was written, but also at his birth-place in the East, Antioch.² What could be more probable than that Olympiodorus read it and digested its lessons? I would submit that Olympiodorus was the medium through which the work of Ammianus reached and for many years influenced the historical writings of the Greeks.

Of Olympiodorus it can be said that he had original and striking views on the way history should be written. In the first place, he broke the tradition which had lasted for more than a century that Greek historians should confine themselves to epitomes of world history, adulatory biographies, and accounts of isolated campaigns like those of Julian in Gaul and Persia.³ Olympiodorus' choice of a limited period of contemporary history for treatment in great detail had vast influence throughout the fifth century. Again, the rhetoric and vague subjective generalities of Eunapius and his predecessors had no attraction for him. His purpose was to give a clear, factual, and unadorned account of the events which had occurred in his period, with precise and detailed information couched in technical and yet easily understandable language. He rammed home his points with masses of statistics drawn from the best available authorities. His inclusion of figures of private incomes and so on was a novelty in ancient historiography. Whether or not he was influenced by Ammianus, he believed that his period could not be understood without lengthy disquisitions on social, ethnological, and geographical subjects relevant to his theme. Finally, the value of the whole was increased by the sturdily independent attitude of the author towards the class divisions of the Empire. Olympiodorus consciously emphasized the difference between his conception of the duty of an historian and that of his forerunners by the new title which he gave to his work.⁴

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¹ I shall develop this and other relevant points in a book which I hope to publish on Ammianus.

² Libanius, *Ep.* 1063 (A.D. 392).

³ But see Schmid-Stählin, op. cit., p. 802. In fairness to Eunapius it must be admitted that he had prepared the ground to some extent in

this respect for Olympiodorus.

⁴ I am grateful to the Editors and to Professor Hugh Last for correcting some errors in this paper and for drawing my attention to references which I should otherwise have missed.

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THE PHOKAIANS IN THE FAR WEST: AN HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION*

The background

THE far west in Hesiod's world is confused, and probably reflects a dim knowledge drawn from the Phoenicians in Sicily, where the Greeks bought Tartessian silver. Beneath myths and traditions we may discern a few historical facts: the dynasty of the Tartessian kings, the Phoenician wars with King Geron of Tartessos (about the turn of the ninth to eighth centuries), followed by the 'Phoenician Thalassocracy' and a Tartessian attempt to establish direct commercial relations with Sardinia.¹

In 630 B.C. Kolaios of Samos discovered Tartessos. Archaeological evidence of some such contact may be seen in the Corinthian bronze helmet found by the Guadalete river near Jerez de la Frontera (prov. Cadiz) and dated 650-625 B.C.² Then, at the end of the seventh century, the Samians and Chalkidians granted free passage through the Straits of Messina to their friends the Phokaians, who may have heard from them the story of Kolaios' voyage. The Phokaians, having founded Massalia about 600 B.C., proceeded from the new colony to explore the Iberian coast. They also sailed by a second route, traced by the series of place-names in *-ovosa*, from Corsica and Sardinia to the Balearics and to Hemeroskopeion (the rock of Ifach south of Cap Nao), and on to the south of Spain, where they discovered the market of Tartessos in the island of Erythia between the arms of the Guadalquivir (Coto de Doña Ana).³ Phokaians at Naukratis may have heard of Necho's circumnavigation of Africa and the return through the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Phokaian Thalassocracy

It may have been after Cyaxares' wars with Alyattes,⁴ or later after the Battle of the Eclipse (585), that Arganthonios offered to finance the Phokaian wall. At any rate, between the Battle of the Eclipse and the destruction of Phokaia by Kyros (540 or later) must be placed the forty-four years of the Phokaian Thalassocracy, which coincides with a weakening of Phoenician power through the wars of Tyre with Nebuchadnezzar. Carthage, busy in Sardinia, and otherwise engaged in securing control of the markets of the Syrtes, could not help the Spanish Phoenicians, and the way was clear for a development of Phokaian trade with Tartessos.

Between 584 and 570 colonies were founded in southern Spain: Hemeroskopeion (Ifach); Mainake (near Torre del Mar and Velez Malaga, west of the Phoenician Malaca); perhaps also the shrine of Artemision (on Montgó near Denia), and other minor establishments like Herakleia (Carteia, now Algeciras) and the Port of Meneleus near the mouth of the Guadalete.⁵

Massalia too was beginning to take an interest in Tartessian markets. A Massaliot

* The editors wish to express their gratitude to Sir John Myres and especially to Mrs. M. I. Henderson for help with this article.

¹ 'Phoenician Thalassocracy', 709-664 or earlier (v. J. L. Myres, *JHS*, 1905). Foundation of Nora in Sardinia, c. 700.

² On the Helmet of Guadalete v. C. Peman (*Archivo Esp. de Arqueología*, 1941, p. 407), Schulten (*Forschungen u. Fortschritte*, 1929); and on the later helmet of Huelva, Schulten (*Investigación y Progreso*, 1931).

³ Schulten, *Tartessos* (Hamburg, 1922), and in *Arch. Anzeiger*, 1923-7, and in *RE*, s.v. 'Tart-

tessos'.

⁴ Radet, 'Arganthonios et le mur de Phocée' (*Bull. Hispanique*, 1903); Déonna, *Dédale II* (Paris, 1931), p. 300.

⁵ Cf. Bosch, *Etnología de la Península Ibérica* (1922), chap. xii, and 'Problemi della colonizzazione greca in Spagna' (*Historia*, iii, 1929, p. 572); R. Carpenter, *The Greeks in Spain*; A. García Bellido, 'Las primeras navegaciones griegas en Iberia' (*Arch. Esp. de Arqu.*, 1940).

sailor, Meidokritos, ventured to explore the Atlantic coasts. He reached the Breton Kassiterides, well known to Tartessians, and was the first to bring back tin from that market.¹ His voyage, or another like it, may be the source of the information compiled in the Massaliot *Periplous* (preserved by Avienus), which mentions this tin market and the northern lands of Hierne and Albion. Normally the Greeks would sail no farther than Tartessos, to pick up tin carried down the Atlantic by Tartessians. Their comparative ignorance of the western coasts is reflected in the *Periplous*.

In the course of their normal sailings down the east and south coasts of Spain they founded the Palaiapolis of Emporion, as a refuge against the *tramontana* rather than for commercial purposes, on the small island of Sant Marti d' Empuries which is now joined to the mainland. Its earliest finds include Cypriote, Italo-Corinthian, proto-Corinthian, Corinthian, Ionian, and Chalcidian ware, and small glazed aryballi from Corinthian or Rhodian factories, now recognized as imitations of Egyptian glazed vases. The oldest specimens of this pottery—related to the types of Massalia itself—are to be dated in the second third of the sixth century B.C.²

In view of the detailed description of the Gulf of Rosas in the *Periplous*, the fact that Emporion is not mentioned still seems to me a sufficiently strong argument for dating the *Periplous* before the foundation of Emporion. But Schulten, who first pointed this out, did not recognize the early date of the Palaiapolis, which may push back the *Periplous* to a period as early as 570–560, instead of c. 535 as he believed. Schulten conjectured that the *Periplous* was based on the voyage of Euthymenes, which he dated, without much evidence, about 550; but Euthymenes, whatever his date, probably explored only the coast of Africa down to Senegal.³

This period is illustrated by a number of Greek finds in Spain. With a mid-sixth-century helmet from Huelva, we may cite the Rhodian bronze hydria with silver incrustations found in the province of Granada (parallel to Greek finds dispersed through the European late-Hallstatt world by Massaliot traders, as described by Dr. Jacobsthal)⁴; and the Corinthian and proto-Corinthian vases of Villaricos.⁵ Another illustration, perhaps, is the supposed archaic East Greek influence on Iberian bronzes of Santa Elena.⁶ Greece in its turn received something from Spain when Myron, about 550, dedicated some Tartessian bronzes in the Treasury of the Sikyonians at Olympia.⁷

Alalia to Himera

After the disaster of Alalia and the abandonment of Corsica, the Phokaians dispersed, some to Elea and some perhaps to a 'second foundation' of Massalia.⁸ For Spain the consequence of this movement was the establishment of the Neapolis of Emporion. Good Athenian black-figured pottery, found in the lowest stratum, dates the new town to 535–530. The great extension of its town walls, built in a very archaic technique, cannot be explained only by the natural growth of the old sailor-settlement at Palaiapolis: it points to a sudden new influx of population.⁹ The refugees from Corsica may possibly have been responsible for other new foundations besides this, in the Gulf of Alicante south of Hemeroskopeion: such, probably, were Alonis

¹ Pliny, *NH* vii. 197; cf. Warmington, *Ancient Explorers* (1929), pp. 30–1.

² Bosch, *Etnología* and *L'Art grec a Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1938).

³ Schulten, *Tartessos*, pp. 25–6; Warmington, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴ J. R. Mélida . . . 'Bronces de D. Antonio Vives' (*Revista de Archivos, etc.*, 1910); cf. Jacobsthal in *Jahrb. des Deutsch. Arch. Inst.*, 1929, p. 1931.

⁵ Pericot, *Historia de España*, i, p. 277.

⁶ R. Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 37–46; cf. Cabré in *Mems. de la Junta de Excav.*, 1916, 1917, 1918.

⁷ Paus. vi. 19. 2–4.

⁸ If such an event took place: cf. Clerc's *Massalia* for a statement of the case and for arguments against it.

⁹ Pericot, *Historia de España* (Barcelona, 1934), vol. i; Bosch, *Etnología* and *L'Art grec a Catalunya* and 'Ausgrabungen von Emporion' (*Arch. Anzeiger*, 1936); Bosch, Serra Rafols, and Castillo, *Emporion* (guide-book, Barcelona, 1934).

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(Benidorm, then on an island), and Leuke Akra (remains of which have been found in the Albufereta north of Alicante).¹

The last third of the sixth century seems to have been a flourishing period of commerce for the Greeks in Spain. It is illustrated especially by the finds from Tomb No. 20 at Galera (prov. Granada).² Over the whole period from Alalia to Himera the continuance of trade is attested by Greek finds in Andalusia, south-east Spain, and Mallorca (archaic bronzes, including the well-known Athene Promachos of Mallorca; also a Greek statue from Verdolay in prov. Murcia),³ and by the increased circulation of Greek coins (e.g. the hoards of Pont de Molins near Emporion and Morella in prov. Castellon).⁴ Etruscan bronzes which reached Spain at this time may possibly have been carried by Greek traders.⁵

There is no evidence for the supposed Carthaginian destruction of Mainake c. 500.⁶ Carthage was not yet in a position to interrupt Greek influence along the route from Massalia to the south, and was satisfied with the expulsion of the Phokaians from Corsica and the destruction of their colony Olbia in Sardinia. Carthaginian trade competition in Spain, during the later sixth century, may be illustrated by some finds at Galera and others at Setefilla (Lora del Rio). Both Greek and Carthaginian products passed beyond the immediate hinterland to the Celtic regions of Extremadura (hoard of Aliseda); while Carthaginian goods are found in spheres of strong Greek influence (tombs of El Molar in SE. Spain).⁷

The situation began to change during the penultimate decade of the sixth century, when a Greek offensive started in Africa and Sicily. Its opening stages may be related to the short 'Spartan Thalassocracy' (517-515). Led by Dorieus, the Greeks of Kyrene launched an attack on the Carthaginian *ἐπτόποια* of the Syrtes; Dorieus then intervened in the Sicilian-Greek war against Carthaginians and Elymians; both attacks failed, and Carthage, after consolidating the position in Sicily, closed the Syrtes to foreign trade, negotiating with the Etruscan cities and Rome⁸ treaties which forbade regular navigation 'beyond the Kalon Akroterion' (508). If, as has been convincingly argued, this is to be interpreted as meaning 'south of Cape Bon', Spain is not mentioned in the treaty⁸; but after its conclusion Carthage seems also to have attempted a new and more exclusive commercial policy in the region of Tartessos. Such an hypothesis accounts for the scattered evidence of conflicts from which we may deduce a new outbreak of war in the west, followed by a settlement which defined spheres of influence between Greeks and Carthaginians, and lasted for some 150 years.

Justin⁹ records a Massaliot war against Carthage, arising out of the seizure of

¹ J. Lafuente, 'Excavaciones en la Albufereta' (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1933).

² Cabré and Motos (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1920).

³ Thouvenot, 'Catalogue . . . objets de Bronze du Musée de Madrid' (*Bibl. Éc. Hautes Études Hisp.* xii); P. Paris, *Essai sur l'Art et l'Industrie de l'Espagne primitive*, i, figs. 86-90. Verdolay statue: García y Bellido (*Arch. esp. Arqu.*, 1941, p. 320).

⁴ J. Amorós (*Publicacions del Gabinet Numismatic de Catalunya*, 1933 and 1934) writes on coins of Emporion and connected finds. In Spain and S. France Greek coins of the so-called Phokaian-Mitylenian Hansa were current together with Massaliot coins from the time of the Phokaian Thalassocracy. Amorós believes that Emporion, and probably the SE. Spanish colonies, early began minting their own coinage;

but *v. also* G. F. Hill, *Notes on the Coinage of Hispania Citerior*, p. 12 f.

⁵ A. García Bellido, 'Relaciones entre el arte griego y el ibero' (*Arch. Esp. de Art. y Arqu.*, 1931); Lantier, 'Bronzes votifs ibériques' (IPEK, 1930).

⁶ Schulten (*Tartessos*, p. 46) thinks Mainake was destroyed about this time.

⁷ GALERA: Cabré and Motos (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1920); SETEFILLA: Bonsor and Thouvenot (*Bibl. Éc. Hautes Études Hisp.* xiv, 1928); ALCORES: Bonsor (*Rev. arch.*, 1899); ALISEDA: Mélida (*Arch. Anz.*, 1928, p. 497); EL MOLAR: Senent (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1929).

⁸ Cf. R. A. Beaumont (*JRS*, 1939, pp. 74-86), where it is argued that the First Treaty of Carthage with Rome is one of a series of treaties negotiated then with Etruscan cities.

⁹ *xliii. 5. 2.*

some fishing-boats, and ending, after a long struggle and a series of Massaliot victories ('saepe fuderunt'), in a peace imposed by Massalia. This sounds like the war mentioned by Thucydides (i. 13): *Φωκαῖς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκιζούτες Καρχηδονίους ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες* (ἐνίκων corresponds well with Justin's 'saepe fuderunt'). Many scholars connect Thucydides' war with the original foundation of Massalia (c. 600). But there is nothing to suggest a clash of interests between Carthage and Massalia at that time; nor does it seem any more credible if we refer the war to the 'second foundation' (supposing that such an event took place after Alalia). If the Phokaians had hit back at once with such effect, we should surely have heard something definite about it. Thucydides, in fact, implies a date which fits neither foundation. He is giving a chronological survey of naval warfare, and he places the war between Polykrates' sea-power, which he puts in the days of Kambyses (529-525), and the last years of Dareios (say 490-486). It is easier to suppose that he had mistaken the *casus belli* than that he was deviating from the sequence of naval developments which is the subject of this passage. As we have seen, the peaceful competition of Greek and Carthaginian trade in Spain seems to have continued without interruption after Alalia; and this would support the view that hostilities did not begin until later.

A fragment of Sosylos¹ may suggest a more precise date for at least one incident of the war. J. A. R. Munro acutely points out² that the Battle of Artemision, at which Herakleides of Mylasa executed a *διεκπλοῦς*, cannot have been the battle fought against Xerxes in 480. He conjectures that Herakleides of Mylasa was the man of that name who appears in the Ionian Revolt, that he fled to the west like Dionysios of Phokaia, and that the battle in question was fought against Carthage off the Spanish Artemision (Dianium = Denia)—to be remembered by the Massaliots, according to Sosylos, in a later battle against the same enemy. A battle in which Herakleides fought must have taken place after 494.

The garbled and undated story of an attack on Gades by Tartessos, recorded by Justin and Macrobius,³ might be referred to the earlier incidents of this war. Carthage sent help to the Phoenicians of Gades, and probably destroyed Tartessos soon afterwards.⁴ There may also have been an attack on the Phoenician settlement of Villaricos—the port for the silver and copper of Herrerías—where Louis Siret conjectured some such incident from a black stone head in Egyptian style which appears to have been intentionally mutilated.

Finally, Gelon's campaign against Carthage before his tyranny forms part of the same struggle. Here the question arises, what *ἐμπόρια* was Gelon liberating? The balance of probability is perhaps in favour of the Syrtes; but Gelon, in Herodotos' account, implied that he was successful: *τὸ κατ' ὑμέας τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ βαρβάρους νέμεται ἀλλὰ εὐ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμεων κατέστη*.⁵ The words *τάδε πάντα* should refer, either specifically or inclusively, to *τὰ ἐμπόρια*. Although the mention of earlier Spartan activity suggests Dorieus' adventure in Africa, the possibility that these *ἐμπόρια* were Spanish need not be excluded.

Any detailed reconstruction of this Greek counter-offensive must necessarily be provisional and incomplete; but some attempt to combine the evidence may be hazarded.

After the failures of Dorieus and the closing of the Syrtes a Carthaginian attempt to apply an exclusive policy to the south-Spanish markets provoked the Tartessian attack on Gades and perhaps on other Punic settlements—doubtless in conspiracy with the Greeks.⁶ Fishing incidents then provoked a war in which Massalia won many

¹ Bilabel, *Die kleineren hist.-frag. auf Papyrus*, 10; U. Wilcken in *Hermes*, 1906, 1907.

² *CAH* iv, p. 389.

³ Justin, xlii. 5. 1; Macrobius, *Sat.* i. 20. 12.

⁴ Schulten, *Tartessos*, chap. iv.

⁵ Hdt. vii. 158.

⁶ Justin, xlvi. 5. 2, 'Massilienses amicitiam cum Hispanis iunxerunt', may refer to this occasion.

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victories over Carthage, including perhaps a battle off Artemision (Denia), which cannot have occurred before 494-493. It was perhaps after this that the Massaliots set up the bronze lion which Pausanias saw at Delphi, standing near the bronze Apollo with which they commemorated Krimisos.¹ Some time before 484 Gelon was projecting or conducting the liberation of certain western *ἐμπόρια*. In 480 Himera secured the Greek position in Sicily; in 474 Hiero won his victory off Kymai. The Massaliots, before or after this, 'pacem victis [Karthaginiensibus] dederunt'.² This peace established Greek trading rights along the whole Spanish coast down to the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Phokaian and Massaliot colonies entered upon a new period of prosperity lasting, as we shall see, until the great wars of the fourth century.

Fruits of the Peace

Hekataios' knowledge of Andalusia had already shown an improvement on the *Periplous*. It is followed in the fifth century by the excursus of Euktemon in Avienus' poem, by the lost *Περιπλοῦς τῶν ἔκτρος τῶν Ἡρακλέους στρατῶν* of Charon of Lampsakos, and by the information of Herodotos and Herodotus, which extends to the western Spanish peoples beyond the Straits.

That Greek products also reached the western Celtic regions is shown by a bronze statuette from Medina de las Torres (prov. Badajoz) and later, in the fourth century, by vases from Alcacer do Sal—perhaps carried by native traders or by Carthaginians, who also brought Attic vases to the coast of Morocco.³

Greek vases are frequently found in Iberian tombs in Andalusia without interruption from the end of the second third of the fifth century to the middle of the fourth, or even later (Galera, prov. Granada; Peal de Becerro, prov. Jaen; Villaricos, prov. Almeria). Athenian pottery, which is normal in the French Iberian settlements (e.g. Ensérune), was penetrating the mountain districts of Catalonia and Lower Aragon.⁴

From 480 to the mid-fourth century we may cite a marble Herakles from Alcalá la Real; jewellery from Jávea; silver utensils from Abengibre (prov. Albacete); Athenian aryballi and lecythi from Ibiza⁵; coins from the hoards above-mentioned and at Tarragona; and the continuing coinage of Emporion and Rhode, and probably also of Greek towns in southern Spain.⁶

Not less important than the Greek material itself is the strong influence of Greek art on Iberian, which presupposes something more than the trickle of trade that might be deduced from the objects actually found. This influence may be studied in sculpture (Lady of Elche, statues of Elche, Cerro de los Santos, etc., and perhaps the anthropoid sarcophagus of Cadiz); in bronzes (Castellar, Despeñaperros, La Luz); in terracottas (Ibiza, La Serreta in prov. Alcay); in vase-painting (Archena, Liria, Oliva, etc.); and also in script derived from the Ionian alphabet (lead tablets of La Bastida near Mogente, and Alcay).⁷ Iberian art did not survive the subsequent

¹ Paus. x. 8. 6, 18. 7. ² Justin, xliii. 5. 2.

³ Ps.-Skylax, 112. Beaumont (loc. cit., pp. 81-

2) argued that the Kerch vases of Alcacer must have been carried by Greeks, since they are not found at Carthage. He rightly maintained (against Schulzen's view) that Greek relations with S. Spain continued through the fifth century. (Cf. Warmington, op. cit., p. 52.)

⁴ Cabré and Motos, 'Necropoli de Tutugi' (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1920); Cabré, 'Objetos exóticos,' etc. (*Bol. de la Soc. Esp. de Excusiones*, 1920). I am much indebted to Prof. J. D. Beazley for kindly giving me his opinion on the

dates and affiliations of Greek vases found in Spain.

⁵ ALCALÁ Heracles: J. R. Mérida (*Bol. Soc. esp. Exc.* 1930, p. 108), and *Arqueología Española* (1939), pl. VIII.

ABENGIBRE silver: J. Martínez Santa-Olalla (*Invest. y Progr.* 1932, p. 163).

JÁVEA: Mérida (*Revista de Archivos*, etc., 1905); Colomines Roca, *Terracuites d'Eivissa* (Barcelona, 1938); A. Vives Escudero, *La Necrópoli de Ibiza* (Madrid, 1917).

⁶ For fuller list and dates *v. Appendix*.

⁷ Bosch, 'Relaciones del arte griego y el

destruction of the south-eastern Greek colonies which had supplied its chief inspiration.

From 348 to Hasdrubal

In the mid-fourth century Greek relations with Carthage deteriorated. The Carthaginian treaty of 348 closed the Spanish coast as far north as Mastia, and we must ask whether Carthage had not already begun an offensive in the south by destroying the dangerous Greek enclave of Mainake. In 341 Massalia, leader of the Spanish Greek colonies, reacted by intervening against Carthage in the battle of the Krimisos.

The provisions of the treaty of 348 were presumably intended to apply also to Massalia and her Spanish dependencies. North of Mastia, however, Hemeroskopeion and the other Greek posts of the Gulf of Alicante continued to exist, and the blockade of the Straits was not, of course, absolutely effective: the Massaliot Pytheas got through to explore the Atlantic coast, whether during the Sicilian war or in the last decade of the century, as Warmington suggests.¹ But occasional blockade-running is not the same as free trade.

Such was the situation down to the First Punic War. The Carthaginian power in Spain was recognized by Polybius in 270. Whether we suppose it was lost before 237 depends on the weight we attach to Polybius' word *ἀνεκτάτο*, describing Hamilcar's offensive at that date.² At all events Hamilcar's advance to Cap Nao must have meant the end of Hemeroskopeion and its Greek neighbours in the Gulf of Alicante. The destruction of Leuke Akra is attested by the burnt stratum, with archaeological material dating down to the third century, of the site in the Albufereta; this stratum is overlaid by a later Iberian village with Iberian and Carthaginian pottery.³ A Carthaginian castle was built on the hill of Alicante, which inherited the name of Leuke Akra⁴; while the Iberian Mastia became Carthago Nova, the capital of the new Barcid Empire in Spain. Refugees from the Greek cities probably went to swell the population of Artemision, which became important at this time, and was afterwards confused with Hemeroskopeion by Strabo. At the same time Iberian culture was cut off from its Greek source of nourishment in the south-east. Its decay extends not only to this region but also to the coast and hinterland of Valencia, as may be seen from the Liria vases.⁵ Greek imports gradually shrink back to Catalonia and the Ebro settlements.

The Greek coin-hoards of Cheste, Mogente, and Montgó may have circulated in the still prosperous period before the end of the First Punic War, and were perhaps hidden on the approach of the Carthaginian offensive. Continued Greek commerce north of Cap Nao is illustrated by the beginning of a native coinage in Saguntum and Ilerda; by Greek silver utensils and coins in the Iberian site of Tivissa (prov. Tarragona); by a Greek terracotta in Puig Castellar near Barcelona; and by the presence of contemporary Hellenistic pottery in the Iberian villages of Valencia, Catalonia, and the Ebro valley.⁶

ibero' (*Arch. Prehist. Lev.*, 1928); P. Dixon, *The Iberians of Spain* (1940); CERRO DE LOS SANTOS: Mélida (*Revista de Archivos*, etc., 1903-5); Pelayo Quintero, *Necrópoli anterromana de Cádiz* (1915); CASTELLAR: Lantier, 'El Santuario Ibérico de Castellar de Santisteban' (*Mems. Comis. Investig. paleont. y prehist.*); DESPEÑA-PERROS: Cabré (*Mems. Junt. Excav.*, 1916-16); LA LUZ: Bosch (*Anuario Inst. Est. Cat.*, 1921-6); LA SERRETA and ARCHENA: Bosch 'Problema de la Cerámica Ibérica', (*Mems. Comis. Investig.*, etc., 1915); LIRIA: Pericot (*Revue Archéologique*, 1936, p. 95); OLIVA: Bosch (*Arch. Preh. Lev.*, 1928); LA BASTIDA: Pericot and Ballester (*Arch. Preh. Lev.*, 1928).

¹ Op. cit., pp. 30-40.

² Schulten, *Font. Hisp. Ant.* iii, p. 9; CAH vii, p. 774.

³ v. *supra*, p. 55, n. 1.

⁴ Preserved in the Arabic *Al-lacant* (= Ali-cante).

⁵ Pericot, *Revue Archéologique*, 1936, p. 95.

⁶ J. Amorós, loc. cit. *supra*, p. 55, n. 4; G. F. Hill, op. cit.; TIVISSA: *An. Inst. Est. Cat.*,

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The situation in Andalusia is reflected in the destruction of Osuna (where the sculpture seems to flourish only until the beginning of the third century),¹ and in the monotonous repetition of stereotyped geometric patterns in the pottery.

After the south-eastern colonies were destroyed, Greek trade with Carthage trickled on in more or less restricted volume. There are still Greek finds in Ibiza; a silver coin of Emporion was found in a silver-mine of Carthago Nova belonging to the Barcid period; Carthaginian glass beads and pottery appear in Emporion itself. A secondary issue of coins in Emporion, with certain Carthaginian features, seems to represent the adjustment of Greek life to the new conditions.²

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1913-14; Gómez Moreno (*Anuario del Cuerpo de Archiveros*, etc., 1934, p. 173); PUIG CASTELLAR: Segarra (Bol. R. Acad. Buen. Letr., Barcelona, 1906) and Pijoan, *Hojas Selectas*, 1906. Hellenistic pots are found in many sites.

¹ OSUNA: Engel and Paris (*Arch. Miss. Scient. et Litt.* (Paris), 1906; Bosch (*Mems.*

Comis. Investig., etc., 1915).

² IBIZA: *v. supra*, p. 57, n. 5; EMPORION: *v. supra*, p. 54, n. 9; 'CARTHAGINIAN ISSUE' OF EMPORITAN COINS: G. F. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Amorós, *Les drachmes emporitaines*, pp. 39-42, and *D'una troballa de monedes emporitaines*, pp. 18-32.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF GREEK FINDS IN SPAIN *

Seventh Century: Corinthian helmet of Guadalete (650-625).

Sixth Century, before Alalia: Vases of Palaiopolis (Emporion); terracottas of Puig des Molins (Ibiza); Rhodian bronze hydria of Granada; Corinthian helmet of Ria de Huelva (c. 550); Corinthian vases of Villaricos; naked bronze figure of Castellar de Santisteban (Bosch, *Etnología*, fig. 290).

Alalia to Himera: Sphinx frieze of Palaiopolis (Emporion); early stratum of Neapolis (Emporion); bronzes of Mallorca and Menorca (Bosch, *Etn.*, figs. 241, 238) and of Elche, Rollos, Granada, Llano de la Consolación, Castellar; statue of Verdolay; bronze statuette of Medina de las Torres (in British Museum); Athenian black-figured pottery at El Molar; bronze hydria and alabaster statuette of Galera, tomb No. 20.

Ibzan terracottas, Emporitan pottery, and coins of Emporion, Morella, and Pont de Molins continue uninterrupted till c. 300 B.C.

480 to c. 400 B.C.: Sculptures of Emporion; Herakles of Alcalá la Real (480-450); Athena statuette of Menorca (Bosch, *Etn.*, fig. 237); terracottas and pottery of Iena painter in Albufereta; jewellery of Javea (c. 410-390); black- and red-figured pottery and gems in Ibiza; Galera tombs and related pottery (Tomb 76, painted stone urn [? Greek] and bronze Silenos handle, c. 480; Tomb 2, krater of horseman and harpy, c. 430-425; Tomb 34, krater, c. 440); kraters of Triptolemos at La Bastida and of Orpheus at Villaricos (both c. 425).

Fourth Century: Aphrodite torso and head of Skopas style at Emporion; silver of Abengibre; coinage of Rosas (410-300); gilt bronze disk with lion's head relief from Toya (prov. Jaen); Kertsch vases in Catalonia and Andalusia; also much Greek pottery from many sites, reaching as far inland as Trujillo.

Third Century: Much Hellenistic pottery found in most Iberian sites, and some in post-Hallstatt cemeteries of Castile; many coin-hoards in Catalonia; Hellenistic silver at Tivissa.

* Owing to lack of space this list has been shortened and summarized. Bibliographies given in the notes are not repeated.

A DISCUSSION OF *PHAEDO* 69a 6-c 2¹

THIS long and complicated sentence has not been correctly translated nor clearly explained by any of the editors of the *Phaedo* that I have been able to consult. Bekker, Stallbaum, Wohlrb, Geddes, Wagner, Archer-Hind, Williamson, Burnet, in their notes on the passage say much that is true, but all seem to fall into certain errors. None of them has given an accurate and coherent picture of the passage as a whole. In attempting to supply such a picture I have pointed out what I believe to be the mistakes of these editors, and on certain points of grammar, textual criticism, and interpretation I have some new suggestions to offer. So much emphasis on one sentence is not misplaced, for this is an important sentence, the culminating point of the first section of the dialogue, and containing in brief the essence of the ethics which Plato expounds through the mouth of Socrates. It is the peroration of Socrates' *Apologia pro Vita sua*, introduced by the impressive words: *ἄ μακάριε Σωκράτει*, a form of address often used by Socrates in passages of 'pith and moment'.² Ritter³ says: 'This dialogue [Phaedo] contains no new ethical principles. Yet I must discuss a certain section, so that it will not be interpreted as if it and the *Gorgias* gave definite proof that Plato energetically rejected every hedonistic foundation of moral principles.' The 'certain section' which he then quotes *in extenso* is the sentence we are now considering. Thus this sentence needs exact translation and careful analysis if we are to understand the place of pleasure and pain in the Platonic ethics.

There are three main points on which I differ from the editors.

(1) *ἡ ὁρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ*

Williamson's note expresses the consensus of opinion about this phrase. He says: 'πρὸς ἀρετὴν: πρὸς here means "in regard to", "in respect of", and is not the same as in πρὸς ἡδονάς, πρὸς λυπάς where it rather signifies "in exchange for", "in comparison with".' Then to support this view of πρὸς ἀρετὴν he has to translate ἀλλαγῆ by 'standard of exchange'. But ἀλλαγῆ means simply 'exchange', and corresponds to καταλλάττεσθαι, 'to exchange', in the next clause. And further, the balance of the clauses demands that ἀλλαγῆ πρὸς shall bear the same sense as καταλλάττεσθαι πρὸς. The longer clause explains and amplifies the shorter. In both πρὸς is constructed in the same way and has the same meaning. I therefore translate *ἡ ὁρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ* 'the true exchange for virtue', or more idiomatically 'the right way to purchase virtue'. (So Lamb in the Loeb edition.)

(2) *καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα*

The reading here has been much disputed. Burnet says: 'I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. The words *τούτου μὲν πάντα* clearly belong to *όνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα* and their meaning must be "all things bought and sold for wisdom", but it is hardly credible that Plato should use *όνούμενα* as a passive, or that he should use *πιπρασκόμενα* at all.' Accordingly he brackets *καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα* and *όνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα* as a scholium on *καὶ μετὰ τούτου*. There is not, it is true, any parallel for *όνούμενα* in the passive sense. In *Soph.* 224 b 1 *τὸν μαθήματα συνωνόμενον*, 'the purchaser of knowledge', the participle is clearly active in sense, as also

¹ References to Plato's Dialogues are by page, section, and line as given in the Oxford text.

² e.g. *Protog.* 313 e 5, another passage dealing with the buying and selling of virtue; *Rep.* 432 d 7, the dramatic discovery of the definition

of justice; *Charm.* 157 a 3, the need for tending the soul before attempting to cure the body.

³ *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, trans. by Adam Alles, p. 68.

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in *Protag.* 313 e 1, *οἱ ἀνούμενοι παρ'* αὐτῶν, 'those who buy from them'. But both these participles are *masculine* and therefore naturally active in sense. If the neuter form of the participle were found more often, one would expect it to be passive; for 'things' cannot buy, but can be bought. For instance the perfect participle ἀνημένα is found in the passive sense (it was conjectured here by Stallbaum), and in *Laws* 850 a we find τὸ ὄντεν. This last passage forms a remarkable parallel to our present sentence. There Plato is discussing the arrangements for buying and selling in his ideal community, and within a couple of sentences we have the verbs ἀλλάττεοθαι . . . τὸ δ' ὄντεν ἥ πραθὲν . . . προσγενομένου καὶ ἀπογενομένου duplicating the pattern of the sentence in the *Phaedo* where we have καταλλάττεοθαι . . . ἀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα . . . προσγυγομένων καὶ ἀπογυγομένων. These words would appear to be all *voce propriae* for monetary transactions. In at least three other places in Plato ἀλλάττεοθαι is closely followed by derivatives of ἀνείσθαι and πιπράσκεοθαι.¹ Therefore, in view of these passages, it seems that ἀνείσθαι and πιπράσκεοθαι in some form or other must be retained in the passage in the *Phaedo*. And if we grant this we may waive the objection against ἀνούμενα used passively.² With regard to πιπρασκόμενα Burnet quotes Cobet's dictum: 'Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud sequiores protrita est' (*Nov. Lect.*, p. 158). But πιπρασκομένη does occur in *Soph.* 224 a 3. Burnet brackets it there too as an interpolation, but again it seems necessary to the balance of the sentence in which ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην are picked up by τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πιπρασκομένην. A further argument against Burnet's excision of the words in the *Phaedo* is that τούτον μὲν πάντα is balanced and answered by χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως a few lines below.

This brings me to an important point which has not been made by any of the editors, namely the construction of τούτον. Burnet, in the note quoted above, says that the words τούτον μὲν πάντα clearly belong to ἀνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα. But this is not so. τούτον depends on ἀλλαττόμενα understood.³ Thus καὶ τούτον μὲν πάντα (ἀλλαττόμενα) repeats the previous clause ἀνθ' οὐ δεῖ πάντα καταλλάττεοθαι and links it to what follows. Far from being excised then, the words τούτον μὲν πάντα should be emphasized as the hinge of the whole sentence.

(3) τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἥ κάθαροις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἥ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἥ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἥ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἥ.

All the editors except Burnet put a comma after πάντων and omit the comma after ἀνδρεία, thus attaching καὶ ἥ σωφροσύνη . . . ἀνδρεία to καθαρμός. But Burnet is certainly right in attaching καὶ ἥ σωφροσύνη . . . ἀνδρεία to κάθαροις and φρόνησις to καθαρμός. In the first half of the sentence σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία are classed together as συλλίβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς and μετὰ φρονήσεως stands apart. Again, the αὐτὴ in αὐτὴ ἥ φρόνησις is clearly emphatic and meant to set φρόνησις in a different class from the other virtues. The older editors punctuated wrongly because they mistranslated κάθαροις and καθαρμός. Geddes sums up their view when he says: 'καθαρμός differs from the foregoing κάθαροις as the result from the process.' Burnet distinguishes the words correctly but does not make clear their exact force in the context. κάθαροις is a general, abstract term. καθαρμός is more specific and concrete. In the Mysteries καθαρμός was the name of the first stage in the initiation of the novice.⁴ In *Rep.* 364 e and *Phaedr.* 244 e, as well as in our present passage, καθαρμός occurs in Orphic contexts. In all three places it is closely followed by the word

¹ *Laws* 915 d 6, *Soph.* 223 d 9, *Rep.* 371 d 1.

² Rutherford, *New Phrynicus*, p. 213, accepts ἀνούμενα here as passive, remarking that this is the only instance in Classical Greek.

³ For ἀλλάττεοθαι governing a genitive without any preposition cf. *Laws* 849 e 6 ἀλλάττεοθαι νόμουμά τε χρημάτων καὶ χρήματα νομίμωτα . . .

⁴ Theo Smyrnaeus, *Math. Plat.*, c. 1, p. 18.

τελετή which also was a technical term for one of the ceremonies in the Mysteries. In less technical contexts *καθαρός* has the sense of 'means of atonement or expiation'.¹ In general we may say that it is a 'rite of purification' with more often than not a specific reference to the Mystery ritual. Hence the older translations of *κάθαρος* and *καθαρός* should be reversed. They signify respectively, not process and result, but result and process, or more accurately, end and means to that end. *κάθαρος* is 'consummated purification', *καθαρός* 'purificatory rite'.

Confirmation for this view is to be found in the scholium of Olympiodorus on our passage in the *Phaedo*.² Olympiodorus is equating the different stages of virtue with the different stages of initiation in the Mysteries, and he says: ἀναλογοῦσιν αἱ ἡθικαὶ τε καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταὶ τοῖς ἐμφάνεσι καθαροῦσιν αἱ δὲ καθαρικαὶ, ὅσαι ἀποκενάζονται πάντα τὰ ἔκτος, τοῖς ἀπορρητότεροις. 'The conventional and civil virtues correspond to the exoteric rites of purification; the purified virtues, in which are renounced the things of the flesh, to the more esoteric rites.' The contrast between the types of virtue corresponds to that in the *Phaedo* between false unreflecting virtue and true philosophic virtue. And, as in the *Phaedo* *κάθαρος* is predicated of completed ἀρετή, *καθαρός* of φρόνησις the means to this end, so here *καθαρικαὶ* qualifies ἀρεταὶ, and *οἱ ἀπορρητότεροι καθαροὶ* are the religious rites which make possible their attainment.

So much for points of reading, punctuation, and literal translation. Let us turn to consider the explanation of the passage and in particular the elaborate metaphor of buying and selling. Archer-Hind says: 'If we press the metaphor too closely it breaks down; for money is only of value for the sake of what it can buy.' But this last statement is not true, for, as Aristotle pointed out, a coin currency must have value in itself. Moreover, I believe that the metaphor does not break down, and I disagree with Williamson's remark that 'Plato's own terms will not bear exact analysis'.

The sentence is closely related to the preceding paragraphs in which Socrates has been discussing the difference between the virtue of those who live a philosophic life³ and the virtue of the mass of mankind.⁴ Common conventional morality is found to be 'naïve's and indeed 'illogical',⁶ for its courage is due to fear and its temperance to desire for pleasure. But virtue is not true virtue unless accompanied by the wisdom which can see a reason for standing firm in the fight or abstaining from the pleasures of the table. In fact virtue is knowledge. This familiar Socratic doctrine underlies the elaborate metaphor of our sentence. The difference between true and counterfeit virtue is illustrated by the difference between two common methods of trading. The first method is that of barter; the second that of buying and selling through the medium of a standard currency. The method of barter is employed by simple uncivilized people. They exchange goods for goods directly. They know no higher method of trading. In the same way conventionally moral people are wont to exchange pleasure for pleasure, fear for fear,⁷ and to imagine that the transaction is virtue. But this bargaining and bartering is not the right way to purchase virtue.⁸ Trading by means of money is a more advanced form of trading, and this is what the philosopher does. He uses the one true currency, namely wisdom.⁹ It is only in terms of wisdom that virtue exists in truth and reality.¹⁰

Let us now apply this analysis to temperance, the part of virtue which has to do

¹ Cf. *κάθαρμα*, a scapegoat.

⁷ ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς . . . καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον

² Published by Casaubon, *Exercitata. Antibar.*, καταλλάττεοθα.

p. 392.

³ 68 c 11.

⁴ 68 d 2.

⁵ 68 e 5.

⁶ 68 d 12.

⁸ μὴ γάρ οὐχ αἴτη γίγη ὁρθή πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή.

⁹ ἔκεινο μάνον τὸ νόμουσα ὄρθον . . . φρόνησις.

¹⁰ τῷ ὅντι γίγη . . . ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς, μετὰ φρονήσεως.

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with the exchange of pleasures. The ordinary unreflecting citizen is 'temperate through intemperance'.¹ He avoids some pleasures because he wants others. He controls himself at one time in order to be able to indulge at another. But self-indulgence is intemperance. Therefore his self-control is for the sake of intemperance. This bartering of pleasure for pleasure, the greater for the lesser, is ethically inferior to the action of the philosopher who abstains from pleasures because he sees that it is right to cultivate the mind, and that bodily indulgence is a hindrance to intellectual development. The philosopher, in the terms of our metaphor, sells pleasure for a sum of money, true money, i.e. wisdom. That is the first step towards virtue, to exchange pleasure for wisdom.² Now comes the significance of the second aspect of trading by means of a standard currency. The philosopher having amassed this valuable 'capital' of wisdom through his 'selling-out' of pleasures³ is able thereafter to traffic to greater advantage in these very commodities. By marketing his unprofitable shares he is enabled to reinvest in gilt-edged securities. By the insight that wisdom affords him he can achieve true temperance. By his initial sacrifice of the pleasures of the body he finds truer and purer pleasures.⁴ But nevertheless wisdom remains the supreme value whether there is a favourable or an adverse balance of pleasures and pains, fears, etc.⁵ Wisdom is the leaven that leavens all the virtues, the pearl of great price for which all else must be sacrificed. Socrates is convinced that 'all these things will be added' unto the man who truly seeks wisdom, but rewards and results are not to be taken into account in an estimation of ultimate values.

This entire process, then, the acquisition and the realization of wisdom in a dividend of pleasure is true virtue. It is a three-term progressive transaction, pleasure → wisdom → pleasure. If wisdom is left out⁶ we have a two-term reciprocal transaction pleasure ← → pleasure which is the semblance and shadow of virtue, a painted show in two dimensions only.⁷ Real virtue is solid, three dimensional, a statue, not a picture. It bears the same relation to counterfeit virtue as a free man does to a slave.⁸ One might mistake the one for the other at a distance, but a closer inspection dispels the illusion.

In explaining the metaphor of buying and selling one slips insensibly into the language of the Gospels. In an analogous way Socrates at the close of this long sentence gives his philosophical parable a religious twist by the introduction of the words *κάθαροις* and *καθαρούς*, both of which are saturated with Orphic associations. He has likened virtue to the result of a trading transaction, wisdom to the currency in which this transaction is effected. Virtue is the end, wisdom the means. Now he calls virtue *ακάθαροις* and wisdom *καθαρούς*. Here then is clear justification for the view we have taken of *κάθαροις* and *καθαρούς* and of the punctuation of the last clause in the sentence. *καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεῖα* must be taken with *τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὅντι* (sc. *ἀρετῇ*). These virtues are *συναλλαγθῆνται ἀληθῆς ἀρετῇ* and are called *κάθαροις τις*, 'consummated purification'. *ἀντὴν ἡ φρόνησις* must be taken with *καθαρούς*. Wisdom is the 'purificatory rite', the first step on the road, the 'seeking of the kingdom of God'. I venture then to translate the whole sentence as follows:

'Yes, my most excellent Simmias, perhaps this is not the right way to purchase virtue, namely to barter pleasures for pleasures and pains for pains and fear for fear, greater for smaller, like pieces of money; perhaps the only true coin for which all

¹ 68 e 2.

² ἀντὶ οὐ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλάττεσθαι.

³ τούτον μὲν πάντα (ἀλλαττόμενα).

⁴ Such true and pure pleasures are always recognized by Plato as part of the good life, e.g. *Phileb.* 63 e 3: ἀλλ' ἂς τε ἡδονάς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς εἴπεις, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιμες, καὶ πρὸς

ταῦτας τὰς μεθ' ὑγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς . . . ταῦτας μείνου.

⁵ καὶ προσγεγομένων καὶ ἀπογεγομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἀλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

⁶ χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως.

⁷ σκιαγραφία.

⁸ ἀνδραποδάθης.

these should be given in exchange is wisdom. When all these are exchanged for wisdom and are bought and sold through the medium of wisdom they constitute real courage and temperance and justice and in a word true virtue, no matter whether there be a favourable or an adverse balance of pleasures and fears and all such feelings; but when without wisdom these are bartered one for another they form only an illusory appearance of virtue, which is in reality sub-human and contains nothing sound nor true. True and real virtue consisting of temperance, justice, and courage is, we might say, the consummated purification of all the afore-mentioned feelings and wisdom herself is the purificatory rite.'

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